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Abstract 
The emergence of Caribbean small island states (SIS) through the 
µGHPRQVWUDWLRQ HIIHFW¶KDVUHVXOWHGLQHYHQVRPHRIWKHVPDOOHVW&DULEEHDQ
islands achieving sovereignty.  Past conventional security threats, such as the 
1983 coup and intervention in Grenada, have resulted in the US Commonwealth 
Caribbean relations being interpreted in the context of US hegemony. Such an 
interpretation has been pejoratively interpreted as being negative, and therefore 
having a negative impact on Commonwealth Caribbean SIS. However, 
increasing recognition of unconventional security threats in the Caribbean (such 
as drug trafficking, illegal immigration, money laundering and gun smuggling) 
have led to the direct and indirect involvement of the United States (US) in the 
UHJLRQ¶VVHFXULW\DJHQGDWKURXJKLQFUHDVHGUHJLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQ'HVSLWH
negative connotations of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the 
US role in Commonwealth Caribbean SIS security can be considered that of a 
mentor state. This thesis will argue pejorative negative interpretations of US 
hegemony, in the context of the 1983 US invasion of Grenada, to assert that 
non-conventional threats are the predominant security threat to Commonwealth 
Caribbean SIS. 
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 Microstates have found an active role in the international system,1 a role 
that was once marginalized and perceived as minimal in the international 
community due to the open question of small state viability and security.2  Many 
IHOWYHU\VPDOOVL]H³SUHFOXGHGWKHFDSDFLWLHVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHH[HUFLVHRI
sovereignty.3  Nonetheless, the decolonization of the post WWII era resulted in 
the proliferation of smaller states, leading to 45 microstates in the international 
system, of which 32 are small island developing states (SIDS), in the 
international community.4  Table 1 below lists the current SIDS in the 
                                                          
1
  7KH&RPPRQZHDOWK6HFUHWDULDW¶VEHQFKPDUN or cut-off of 1.5 million will be used to define a 
microstate.  
For discussion on the definition of a small state see: Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future for 
Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997), 8-9. 
(hereinafter A Future for Small States).     
For discussion on the international system see  Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of 
Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 9-16.  (hereinafter The 
Anarchical Society). 
For discussion on islands see: Godfrey Baldacchino, "Editorial Introduction",  Tijdschrift Voor 
Economishce En Sociale Geografie - Journal of Economic and Social Geography - Island Studies 
95, no. 3 (2004): 269-271. 
2
 George Abbott provides insight into the definition of viability where he notes that viability is 
³GHILQHGLQWHUPVRIWKHPLQLPXPFULWHULDQHFHVVDU\IRUVXSSRUWLQJDPRGHUQLQGXVWULDOVWDWH´
However, Abbott elaborates WKDW³very few of the developing countries, regardless of their size, 
FDQFODLPWREHYLDEOHLQWKLVVHQVH´+HDOVRVXJJHVWVWKDWVXFKFULWHULDDUHLQDFFXUDWHGXHWR
WKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI³VWDQGDUGVDQGFULWHULDVHWE\SROLWLFDOVRFLDODQGHFRnomic developments 
WDNLQJSODFHLQWKHGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV´DQGWKDWVXFKFULWHULD³DUHQRWRQO\XQDWWDLQDEOHEXWDOVR
TXLWHXQQHFHVVDU\IRUVPDOOVWDWHV´ 
 George Abbott, "Small States - The Paradox of Their Existence," Development Policy in Small 
Countries, ed. Percy Selwyn (London: Croom Helm in association with the Institute of 
Development Studies, 1975), 107-108. (hereinafter "Small States - The Paradox of Their 
Existence´ 
3
 Barry Bartmann, "The Microstate Experience: Very Small States in the International System" In 
Hvitabok (the White Book), September (Torshavn: Foroya Landstyrri, 1999), 2. KHUHLQDIWHU³7KH
0LFURVWDWH([SHULHQFH´ 
4
 A small island state for the purposes of this study is a microstate, but also an island.  The 
definition of an island is elusive and is widely discussed in the discipline of Nissology.  Stephen 
Royale, in a World of Islands DGGUHVVHVWKHGHILQLWLRQRIDQLVODQGDVµDSLHFHRIland surrounded 
E\ZDWHU¶LVLQDFFXUDWHDV³VRPHDFFHSWHGLVODQGVDUHQRWVXUURXQGHGE\ZDWHUDQGQRWDOOSLHFHV
RIODQGVXUURXQGHGE\ZDWHUDUHFDOOHGRUDUHUHJDUGHGDVLVODQGV´5R\DOHFRQFHGHVWKDWD
UHVSRQVH³FDQQRWEHJLYHQVDWLVIDFWRULO\XQOHVVRQHDGRSWVWKHSOHDVLQJVLPSOLFLW\RI%LOO+ROP¶V
UXOLQJµDQLVODQGLVZKDWHYHUZHFDOODQLVODQG¶´ 
Godfrey Baldacchino, A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader (Charlottetown, P.E.I.: 
Institute of Island Studies, 2007), 52. 
   13 
international community with their date of sovereignty, date of United Nations 
(UN) membership, their former colonial power and their population in the year 
when they attained sovereignty. SIDS have repeatedly been referred to 
throughout the literature as having an acute sense of island identity due to their 
defined territory, which speaks to their sense of separateness, regardless of 
size.5  The proliferation of small states begs the question, why and how did the 
international system foster the current number of small states, particularly SIDS 
in the international system?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Bill Holm, Eccentric Islands Travels Real and Imaginary (Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions, 2000), 
3.  
5
 David Weale, "Islandness," Island Journal 8 (1991): 82. 
   14 
Table 1:  
State6  Sovereignty7  UN Membership8 Former Colony of9 Population10 
Iceland 1944  1946   Denmark  127,000 
Cyprus*  1960   1960   United Kingdom (UK) 563,000 
Samoa 1962  1976   New Zealand (NZ) 116,000 
Trinidad  1962  1962   UK    900,000 
and Tobago 
Malta   1964  1964   UK   324,000 
Maldives 1965  1965   UK   98,000 
Barbados 1966  1966   UK   247,000 
Nauru  1968  1999   Aus, NZ and UK 6,000 
Mauritius 1968  1968   UK   787,000 
Tonga  1970  1999   UK   90,000 
                                                          
6
 "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook, " https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/ (accessed February 18, 2010,). (hereinafter "Central Intelligence Agency - the 
World Factbook´  
7
 Ibid. 
8
 8QLWHG1DWLRQV³0HPEHU6WDWHV,´http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml. (hereinafter 
³0HPEHU6WDWHV´ 
9
 "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook´ supra note 6. 
10
 Population numbers are at the time of independence. 
8QLWHG1DWLRQV³'HPRJUDSKLF<HDUERRN± Statistics Division,´
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2.htm. KHUHLQDIWHU³Demographic 
Yearbook ± 6WDWLVWLFV'LYLVLRQ´).  
*Note ± the Republic of Cyprus is a former British Crown Colony, declared independent 16 
August 1960. Data exclude persons in the military and special internment camps, numbering 
12,422 at 1946 census. 
United Nations, "Cyprus," Demographic Yearbook - Statistics Division, no. 12 (1960), 138-139. 
However, The Treaty of London, which was abandoned in 1963 with the Great Cypriot Coup, 
witnessed Turkish Cypriots adopt a policy of de facto partition and presentation of a fait accompli 
to the London Conference to demand the separation of constitutional arrangement.  
"Developments in Cyprus - January to February - Fighting at Limassol - British Government's 
Protest Against Importation of Arms - Strengthening of British Forces," Keesing's Record of World 
Events 14 (1963-1964): 20117. 
External intervention from Greece and Turkey witnessed one third of the Island under Turkish 
control. This resulted in two different states with the emergence of the de facto state of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)in 1983.  The TRNC was separate from Ankara as a 
self-governing jurisdiction and was only recognized by Turkey. Partition of the Island led to 
initiatives such as the Annan Plan, named after then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Despite 
LWVIDLOXUH³WKHHQWLUHLVODQGHQWHUHGWKH(8RQ0D\DOWKRXJh the EU acquis - the body of 
common rights and obligations - applies only to the areas under the internationally recognized 
Greek Cypriot Government, and is suspended in the areas administered by Turkish Cypriots. 
However, individual Turkish Cypriots able to document their eligibility for Republic of Cyprus 
FLWL]HQVKLSOHJDOO\HQMR\WKHVDPHULJKWVDFFRUGHGWRRWKHUFLWL]HQVRI(XURSHDQ8QLRQVWDWHV´ 
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Cyprus - Introduction, 
" https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html (accessed January 11, 
2011). 
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Fiji  1970  1970   UK   520,000 
Bahrain    1971  1971   UK   220,000 
Bahamas 1973  1973   UK   190,000 
Grenada 1974   1974   UK   100,000 
Comoros   1975   1975   France  300,000  
Sao Tome 1975  1975   Portugal  80,000 
and Principe 
Cape Verde 1975   1975   Portugal  30,000 
Seychelles 1976  1976   UK   60,000 
Solomon 1978  1978   UK   213,000 
Islands  
Tuvalu 1978  2000   UK   7,000 
Dominica 1978  1978   UK   81,000 
St Lucia 1979  1979   UK   121,000 
Kiribati 1979  1999   UK   58,000 
St Vincent 1979  1980   UK   119,000 
& the Grenadines 
Vanuatu 1980  1981   France and UK 118,000 
Antigua 1981  1981   UK   76,000 
and Barbuda 
St Kitts  1983  1983   UK   46,000 
and Nevis 
Marshall 1986  1991   United States (US) 40,000 
Islands  
Micronesia 1986  1991   US   98,000 
Palau  1994  1994   US   16,000 
Timor-Leste**2002  2002   *Portugal/Indonesia 740,00011 
 
 
                                                          
**Portugal drew plans for East Timorese transition to independence in 1975, with Portuguese 
sovereignty ending in 1978.  Pro-independence versus pro-integration movements led to civil war 
in East Timor resulting in Indonesian occupation of East Timor in 1975. East Timor was 
incorporated DV,QGRQHVLD¶VWKSURYLQFHLQHYHQWKRXJK(DVW7LPRUQHYHUUHFRJQL]HG
,QGRQHVLD¶VFODLP 
"East Timor - Formal Granting of Independence," .HHVLQJ¶V5HFRUGRI:RUOG(YHQWV 48, no. 1 
(2002): 44782. 
11
 Ibid. at 44781.  
   16 
The attitudes towards microstates and the issue of state size have roots in 
the perception of small states that date back to the Concert System in the early 
19th century, where they were viewed, for the most part, as dependencies.  The 
continued marginalization of microstates in the international community is 
H[HPSOLILHGE\/LHFKWHQVWHLQ¶VDSSOLFDWLRQWRWKH/HDJXHRI1DWLRQVLQ12  
The issue of small size was denied as the reason of non-admission.  
1RQHWKHOHVVWKLVVXJJHVWHGWKDW³WKHVPDOOQHVVRIDVWDWHGRHVQRWSUHYHQWLWV
EHLQJDGPLWWHGLQWRWKH/HDJXH´13  (YHQVRWKH/HDJXHRI1DWLRQV¶GHFLVLRQLQ
the case of Liechtenstein resulted in the hesitancy of other European small states 
as they withdrew their applications to the League of Nations, as seen in the case 
of Andorra.  Luxembourg remained the single exception because of its history 
and army.14  
                                                          
12
 Liechtenstein is one of four historic European small states; the other three are Andorra, 
Monaco and San Marino.  Three of the four petitioned the League of Nations for membership: 
San Marino (1919), Monaco (1920) and Liechtenstein (1920). The League of Nations observed 
³E\UHDVRQRI>/LHFKWHQVWHLQ¶V@OLPLWHGDUHDVPDOOSRSXODWLRQDQGKHUJHRJUDSKLFDOSRVLWLRQVKH
KDVFKRVHQWRGHSXWHWRRWKHUVVRPHRIWKHDWWULEXWHVRIVRYHUHLJQW\´DV/LHFKWHQVWHLQKDGQR
DUP\DQGWKHUHIRUH³FRXOGQRWGLVFKDUJHDOOthe international obligations which would be imposed 
RQKHU´UHVXOWLQJLQWKHQRQ-admission of her application due to close connections with another 
state. Some of the examples cited include were control of customs; administration of posts, 
telegraphs, telephone services; diplomatic representation of subjects in foreign countries other 
than Switzerland and Austria; and final decisions in certain judicial cases. 
Michael M. Gunter, "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations: A Precedent for the Nation's 
Ministate Problem?" The American Journal of International Law 68 (July 1974): 498. (hereinafter 
"Liechtenstein and the League of Nations´  
13
 Ibid. at 499; LeaJXHRI1DWLRQV³5HSRUWRQWKH6HFRQG-Sub-FRPPLWWHHWRWKH)LIWK&RPPLWWHH´
Records of the First Assembley ± Plenary Meetings (1920): 563-564. KHUHLQDIWHU³5HSRUWRQWKH
Second-Sub-FRPPLWWHHWRWKH)LIWK&RPPLWWHH´ 
14
 6HH+XGVRQ¶VGLVFXVVLRQRQWKHVSHFial case of Luxemburg in that Luxembourg was seen as 
meeting obligations under Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant. 
M. O. Hudson, "The Members of the League of Nations," British Yearbook of International Law 16 
(1935). (hereinafter "The Members of the League of Nations"). 
Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant states: 
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 
13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members 
of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or 
financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of 
   17 
The case of Liechtenstein in the League of Nations set a precedent for 
small states, as it was not until 1946 (with the admission of Iceland into the 
United Nations) that another microstate joined Luxembourg as an equal among 
the international community, and illustrated that the inclusion of microstates in 
the international system was considered more the exception than the rule.15  
Iceland also demonstrated that islands were to be considered strong candidates 
for sovereignty and self-determination due to the fact that island dependencies 
were already governed as separate jurisdictions which strengthened their claim 
for independence. 
 The first wave of decolonization witnessed the independence of larger 
colonies such as India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel within five years from the end of WWII.16  The 
forces of decolonization influenced a second wave of decolonization that tested 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal 
intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other 
State, whether a Member of the League or not.  
It shall be the duty of the Council in such cases to recommend to the several Governments 
concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally 
contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.  
The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the 
financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss 
and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one 
another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking 
State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the 
forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of 
the League.  
Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to 
be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the 
Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.   
"Avalon Project - the Covenant of the League of Nations" 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp (accessed January 6, 2011,). 
15
 Iceland is unique due to the extent of its geo-political importance and role as a founding 
member of NATO in 1949, considering that Iceland does not have a standing army. 
16
 Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization, Vol. 9 
(Massachusetts: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1964), 35. (hereinafter 
Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization). 
   18 
the perceptions of small size.  For instance, in 1958, Sierra Leone, with a 
SRSXODWLRQRIPLOOLRQZDVFRQVLGHUHGD³ERUGHUOLQHFDVH´17 implying that any 
smaller territories were viewed as being unviable to attain sovereignty.18  Even 
though the British Colonial Office encouraged the federation of smaller 
countries,19 the wave of decolonization of Africa in 1960 (See Table 2),20 
witnessed the self-determination of smaller and smaller territories with the 
independence of Gabon (population 446,000) and Mauritania (population 
970,000) from France in 1960.   
The push for self-determination by ever smaller entities influenced a 
second wave of decolonization which invoked a response from the United 
Nations, embodied in UN Resolution 1514 and UN Resolution 1541.21  These 
resolutions strengthened the call to sovereign statehood, as demonstrated by the 
self- determination of small island colonies in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  
However, UN Resolutions 1514 and 1541 applied to colonial countries and 
                                                          
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Hilary Blood, The Smaller Territories, Problems and Future. (London: Pub. by the Conservative 
Political Centre on behalf of the Conservative Commonwealth Council, 1958), 9-12,18,19.  
19
 The UK colonial office encouraged the federation of smaller colonial territories, even to the 
extent of creating federations between mainland territories from different colonial powers. The 
union of the Gambia (UK) and Senegal (France) were formed but the challenges of integrating of 
two colonial political, economic, legal and social systems were too much to overcome. 
20
 Ghana, with a population of 4,691,000, was the first African territory to demonstrate the ability 
to achieve sovereignty in 1957. 
Central Intelligence Agency - 7KH:RUOG)DFWERRN³*KDQD´
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. 
21
 UN Resolution 1514 (XV) 14 December 1960: Declaration on the granting of independence to 
colonial countries and peoples which effectively led to the self-determination of blue water 
colonies, many of them islands, versus mainland sub national movements. UN Resolution 1541 
(XV) 15 December 1960: Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not 
an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73E of the Charter which  
allowed for the monitoring of political development of colonial territories. 
8QLWHG1DWLRQV³5HVROXWLRQDQG5HVROXWLRQ´ 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/15/ares15.htm. (hereinafter ³5HVROXWLRQand Resolution 
´).  
   19 
peoples and did not extend residual rights of self-determination to Nations within 
states.  For example, the island of Mayotte was the only Island in the Comoros 
group of islands which chose to retain its links to France and forgo independence 
as a part of the Comoros.22 Similarly, Anguilla chose to remain a dependency of 
Britain and forgo associate statehood as part of St. Kitts and Nevis.23 
In addition, colonial powers aimed to create larger political entities out of 
their former colonies.  This is illustrated by attempts at federation in Africa and in 
the West Indies.  For example, in 1958, the British Colonial Office encouraged 
the union of UK colonies with the West Indies Federation, which was slated for 
independence from the UK in 1962.  The federation was considered to be the 
formation of a larger, more viable state and seemed to be a more likely and 
successful course of action.24  This sentiment was due to the recognition of 
similar political, economic and social structures, and the degree of integration 
already present in the region through shared institutions such as the University of 
                                                          
22Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Mayotte - Introduction and Disputes - 
International," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mf.html (accessed 
January 11, 2011). 
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Comoros - Introduction and Disputes - 
International 
," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cn.html (accessed January 11, 
2011).  
23
  The islands of St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla became an associated state of the UK with full 
internal autonomy in 1967.  The island of Anguilla rebelled and was allowed to secede in 1971, 
retaining its links to Britain.  Anguilla was formally recognized in 1980 as a separate British 
dependency. 
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Anguilla - Introduction," 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/av.html (accessed January 11, 
2011). 
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Saint Kitts and Nevis - Introduction 
," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sc.html (accessed January 11, 
2011). 
24
 Anthony Payne, The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79: Regional Integration 
among New States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 14-15. (hereinafter The Politics of the 
Caribbean Community, 1961-79). 
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the West Indies.25  +RZHYHU³WKHGHPDQGIRUVRYHUHLJQW\FRXOGEHDVXUJHQWDQG
strong among the politically conscious in the smaller territories as in the larger; 
WKH\ZHUHLQQRZD\DEDVKHGE\WKHGLIILFXOWLHVWKDWIUHHGRPPD\EULQJ´26  The 
fervor of self-determination among island colonies is exemplified by the 
dissolution of the West Indies Federation in September 1961,27 which led to the 
immediate self-determination of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.28  
The independence of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago raised concerns 
over the remaining small colonies, but also encouraged the eventual self-
determination of Barbados in 1966.29  The self-determination of the largest 
entities of the planned West Indies Federation left the British Colonial Office with 
the predicament of what was to become of the remaining smaller island colonies 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean.   
                                                          
25
 Ibid. at 248. 
26
 Burton Benedict, Problems of Smaller Territories (London: Pub. for the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies by Athlone Press, 1967), 24. (hereinafter Problems of Smaller 
Territories).  
27
 The challenges of integration of the West Indies proved to stall the integration process. The 
advancement of self-government on each of the island territories, economic prosperity by mainly 
-DPDLFDDQG7ULQLGDGDQG7REDJRDQG³WKHDFXWHVHQVHRILVODQGQDWLRQDOLVWLGHQWLWLHVOHGWRWKH
push for self-determination of the larger islaQGVLQWKH:HVW,QGLHV´ 
The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-7, supra note 24 at 22. 
28
 The challenges of the West Indies Federation highlighted the vertical relationship the 
respective islands had with Britain rather than with each other, despite modest levels of 
integration in the region. 
Ibid. at 36.  
29
  Guyana, formerly British Guiana, a mainland British Colony, and part of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean gained independence 26 May 1966. 
 Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Guyana - Government  
" https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gy.html (accessed January 11, 
2011). 
 Barbados gained independence 30 November 1966.  
 Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Barbados - Government - Independence," 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bb.html (accessed January 11, 
2011). 
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Though the British Colonial Office in Whitehall encouraged the concept of 
decolonization, it was felt many of the smaller Commonwealth Caribbean island 
colonies were not ready for the responsibilities of statehood. Therefore, these 
smaller island colonies entered into the arrangement of associate statehood, 
where respective self-governments would be responsible for national affairs and 
were encouraged to engage in regional cooperation, but were spared the 
responsibilities of external affairs such as defense and international relations, 
which remained the responsibility of the British Colonial Office in Whitehall.   
Where the push for self-determination emanated from British island 
colonies, the self-determination of dependencies was addressed with indifference 
and caution among other empires, as demonstrated by colonies of France, the 
Netherlands and Portugal.  The French, who continue to covet the geopolitical 
LPSRUWDQFHRIWKHLUµRXWUHGHPHUH¶WRSURPRWHWKHLULQWHUQDWLRQDOSUHVHQFHDQG
influence, alsREHQHILWHGIURPVWHDGIDVWµGHSDUWPHQWV¶WKDWSURPRWHd strong ties 
with France.     
The Dutch devolved powers to their colonies, making them countries 
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  In doing so, they exemplify the caution 
afforded to self-determination, when Aruba in the Dutch Antilles opted to keep its 
status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1996 rather than pursuing 
sovereignty.30  
                                                          
30
 *HUW2RVWLQGLH³'HSHQGHQFHDQGAutonomy in Sub-National Island Jurisdictions´7KH5RXQG
table, Vol. 95 no. 386 (London: September 2006):  618. 
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Furthermore, in the Portuguese islands, the power of independence 
influenced emerging nationalist independence movements in Cape Verde and 
Sao Tome Principe as early as the 1950s.31  However, the Portuguese insisted 
that they should keep control over their colonies despite the emergence of 
QDWLRQDOLVWVHQWLPHQWVLQ3RUWXJXHVHFRORQLHV7KLVOHGWR3RUWXJDO¶VFRORnial 
wars from 1961 to 1974. The Colonial Wars influenced the Movement of the 
Armed Forces in 1974, where a political coup of junior-ranking officers in the 
army influenced the Carnation Revolution, also commonly referred to as the 25th 
of April Revolution.  That Revolution resulted in a change of government and an 
end to the contentious Colonial Wars. The ending of the Colonial Wars witnessed 
the independence of Portuguese colonies, including Cape Verde, Sao Tome and 
Principe and East Timor in 1975.32   
Appreciating the differences in approach among colonial powers towards 
their dependencies, it seems the proliferation of small states in the international 
system is due in part to the approach the British Colonial Office took.  This is 
especially so if one considers the independence of the Maldives in 1965 with a 
SRSXODWLRQRIEUHDFKLQJ³WKHWDFLWPLQLPDOVL]HRI´33  
                                                          
31
 US Department of State - Bureau of African Affairs, "Background Note: Sao Tome and 
Principe," http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5434.htm (accessed December 15, 2010). 
 Basil Davidson, "On Revolutionary Nationalism: The Legacy of Cabral," Latin American 
Perspectives 11, no. 2, (Spring 1984):  15-17, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2633519. 
32
 Lawrence S. Graham, "Is the Portuguese Revolution Dead?" Luso-Brazilian Review 16, no. 2 
(Winter 1979):  147-159, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3513531. 
Stewart Lloyd--RQHV3RUWXJDO¶V+LVWRU\VLQFH,6&7(± Instituto Superior de Ciências do 
Trabalho e da Empresa (Lisbon), http://www1.ci.uc.pt/cd25a/media/Textos/portugal-since-
1974.pdf (accessed December 15, 2010). 
33
  Barry Bartmann, "Very Small States at the Millennium: The Contest between Vulnerability and 
Opportunity," Invited Paper at the International Colloquium of the Royal Commonwealth Society, 
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This breach caused concern in the UN of the increased potential of having 
a General Assembly of Village States,34 as the US and the UK expressed their 
FRQFHUQVRIKDYLQJVXFKDVPDOOVWDWHOLNHWKH0DOGLYHVKDYLQJWKHVDPH³HTXDO
YRWH´DVWKH86DQG6RYLHW8QLRQLQWKH8135  Such concerns influenced an 
LQTXLU\RQVPDOOVWDWHPHPEHUVKLSWRWKH81DQGUDLVHGWKHTXHVWLRQRI³KRZWR
sTXDUHIRUPDOYRWLQJSRZHUZLWKWKHUHDOLWLHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV"´36  Though 
the US supported Maldives admission to the UN, the US raised concerns of 
similar, small state membership to the UN.  Moreover, (former) UN Secretary-
General U Thant recognizeGWKHGLOHPPDDVKHVWDWHG³LWDSSHDUVGHVLUDEOHWKDW
DGLVWLQFWLRQEHPDGHEHWZHHQWKHULJKWRIDPLQLVWDWH¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGWKH
TXHVWLRQRIIXOOPHPEHUVKLSLQWKH81´37  
Despite UN concerns of small stateV¶ abilities to meet UN requirements 
any classLILFDWLRQRI81PHPEHUVKLSIRUVPDOOVWDWHV³ZRXOGUXQWKHULVNRI
establishing discriminatory criteria which would detract from the sovereign 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Commonwealth at the Millenium Conference Centre (February 20, 1998), 2. (hereinafter 
"Very Small States at the Millennium´ 
34
  Urban Whitaker, "Mini-Membership for Mini-States," War/Peace Report 7 (April 1967), 3-5. 
 P. C. Rao, "Microstates and the United Nations," Indian and Foreign Review 5 (November 15, 
1967): 17,21. 
Joseph R. Harbert, "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972," 
International Organization 30, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 109-127, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706250. 
(hereinafter "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972").  
35
 Stephen M. Schwebel, "Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations," The American 
Journal of International Law 67, no. 1 (January 1973): 109, 
http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2199098. KHUHLQDIWHU³Mini-States and a More Effective 
United Nations´ 
36
 Michael M. Gunter, "What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?" The American 
Journal of International Law 71, no. 1 (January 1977): 110, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2200327. 
("What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?"). 
37
 Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 22 
UN GAOR, SUPP. (No. 1A) 20, UN Doc. A/6701/Add.1 (1967). (hereinafter Introduction to the 
Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization). 
Furthermore, the US and UK submitted proposals of associate statehood for small states to the 
UN. 
³Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations´supra note 35 at 110-111. 
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HTXDOLW\RI0HPEHU6WDWHV´38 DVLWZRXOGUXQFRQWUDU\WR³WKHUHVSHFWIRUWKH
principle of equal rights and self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQRISHRSOHV´DVRXWOLQHGLQWKH81
FKDUWHUSUHDPEOHDQG³WRWKHVRYHUHLJQHTXDOLW\RIDOOLWVPHPEHUV´39 under 
DUWLFOHRIWKH81&KDUWHU7KH81¶VILQGLQJV³VKXWWKHGRRUWRDQ\DWWHPSWVWR
OLPLWPLQLVWDWHPHPEHUVKLS´40 and maintained the sovereign equality of states 
despite size, and left the sovereignty option open to other small 
territories/colonies. 
The independence and UN recognition of ever smaller states such as the 
Maldives demonstrated independence was a viable option for even the smallest 
of colonies and undoubtedly inspired Commonwealth Caribbean nations to 
pursue the sovereignty option. 
Though discussions of federation ceased and resurfaced with proposals of 
political union among the smaller islands of the Eastern Caribbean, the acute 
sense of separateness among island identities was insurmountable.  The 
perceptions of small statehood are exemplified by the initial view of Sir Eric 
*DLU\3UHPLHURI*UHQDGDZKR³DFFHSWHGWKHORJLFWKDWWKHVPDOOHULVODQG
territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean could not make their own way in the 
global system as sovereign states.41However, such views could not withstand the 
changing attitudes in the UN, the non-aligned movement (NAM),42  the Group of 
                                                          
38
 UN Doc. S/AC.16/SR.6, at 7 (1970). 
39
 ³Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations´Vupra note 35 at 112. 
40
 "What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?", supra note 36 at 112. 
41
 Africa (London), June, 1975, 23-24. 
The Times (London), 28 June 1975. 
42
"Non Aligned Movement " http://www.nam.gov.za/ (accessed July 26, 2010). 
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77;43DQGWKH:RUOG%DQN¶VVKLIWLQJIRFXVIURPµUHFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶WRµGHYHORSPHQW.¶44  
These changes ultimately altered the views of Sir Eric Gairy (who became 
*UHQDGD¶VILUVW3ULPH0LQLVWHULQEHFDXVHWKH\ made sovereignty an option 
for small island territories  
 Emerging SIDS interests were also furthered through initiatives in 
regional cooperation creating regional institutions such as the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) and, in particular, the Caribbean development Bank, 
³ZKRVHH[LVWHQFHVHUYHVWRVXVWDLQVPDOOHFRQRPLFDOO\XQYLDEOHVWDWHV´45   Such 
initiatives provide microstates access to regional and international support, which 
HQVXUH³WKHLULQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOSHUVRQDOLW\DQGFRQWLQXHGLQGHSHQGHQFH«´
7KLVH[HPSOLILHVWKHSULQFLSOHRI³H[WDQWLVP,´46 ZKLFKLVGHVFULEHGDV´WKHVDQFWLW\
of sovereignty of existing states, however small.´47  Extantism is the mutual 
UHFRJQLWLRQRIHDFKQDWLRQ¶VVRYHUHLJQW\LQDGGLWLRQWRVKDUHGFKDOOHQJHVLQ
surviving in the international community, and addresses concerns of even the 
VPDOOHVWRIPLFURVWDWHVEHLQJµFDVWDGULIW¶48  The principle of extantism is 
                                                          
43
 "The Group of 77 " http://www.g77.org/ (accessed July 26, 2010). 
44
 A Future for Small States, supra note 1 at 119. 
45
 The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79, supra note 24 at 274-275. 
46
 6FKDIIHUGHILQHVµH[WDQWLVP¶DVWKHVXSSRUWIRUDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJQDWLRQVWDWHV 
 Bernard Schaffer, "The Politics of Dependence", Development Policy in Small Countries, ed. 
Percy Selwyn (London: Croom Helm in association with the Institute of Development Studies, 
1975), 25, 34. 
47
  Barry Bartmann, "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security," Round Table 91, no. 365 (July 
2002): 372. (hereinafter "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security").  
48
 This concern is expressed in the words of Shridath Ramphal, former Secretary-General of the 
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(London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985), 119. (hereinafter Vulnerability: Small States in the 
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H[HPSOLILHGE\(ULF*DLU\¶VVORJDQ³,QGHSHQGHQFHZLOOVXSSRUW*UHQDGDWKH
SHRSOHRI*UHQDGDGRQRWKDYHWRVXSSRUW,QGHSHQGHQFH´49   
The independence of smaller and smaller states in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean instilled confidence in small island leaders that sovereignty was a 
viable option. This was especially so in the eastern Caribbean, where the self-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQRI*UHQDGDWKHILUVWRIWKHµWLQ\¶LVODQGVWRDWWDLQLQGHSHQGHQFH
inspired the smaller territories in the West Indies to pursue the sovereignty 
option.  This inspiration of ever smaller states pursuing the sovereignty option in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean has been described by Vaughn Lewis as the 
³GHPRQVWUDWLRQHIIHFW´50 illustrated in Table 2, and engendered the sentiment 
WKDWWKHSUHFRQFHSWLRQ³UHODWLQJVL]HDQGVRYHUHLJQW\KDVEHHQH[SRVHGDVD
myth.´51  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49
 Trinidad Guardian, 1 November 1972.  
50
 9DXJKQ$/HZLV&RPPHQWDU\RQ%DVLO,QFH³7KH'HFRORQL]DWLRQRIGrenada in the United 
1DWLRQV´LQ,QGHSHQGHQFHIRU*UHQDGD0\WKRU5HDOLW\"3URFHHGLQJVRID&RQIHUHQFHRQWKH
Implications of Independence for Grenada,´St. Augustine: Institute of International Relations, 
The University of the West Indies, 1974), 54. (hereinafter ³7KH'HFRORQL]DWLRQRI*UHQDGDLQWKH
8QLWHG1DWLRQV´). 
"Very Small States at the Millennium´Vupra note 33 at 2. 
51
 $/HZLV³6PDOO6WDWHLVLQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO6RFLHW\ZLWK6SHFLDO5HIHUHQFHWRWKH$VVRFLDWHG
6WDWHV¶Caribbean Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2, (1972):  36-DQGµ&RPPHQWDU\¶LQ,QVWLWXWHRI
International Relations, University of the West Indies, Independence for Grenada ± Myth or 
Reality?, Port of Spain, 1974, 53-5. 
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Table 2: 
State52 Sovereignty53 UN Membership54 Former Colony of55 Population56 
Jamaica 1962   1962   UK   1,661,000 
Trinidad  1962  1962   UK   1,229,953 
and Tobago 
Barbados 1966  1966   UK   247,000 
Grenada 1974   1974   UK   100,000 
Dominica 1978  1978   UK   81,000 
St Lucia 1979  1979   UK   121,000 
St Vincent 1979  1980   UK   119,000 
& the  
Grenadines 
Antigua  1981  1981   UK   76,000 
and Barbuda 
St Kitts and 1983  1983   UK   46,000 
Nevis 
 
The independence of ever smaller states continued to be reflected in the 
composition of international institutions as SIDS membership to the UN became 
commonplace, as every SIDS is a member. Furthermore, the independence of 
SIDS promoted the emergence of regional bodies such as the Organization of 
(DVWHUQ&DULEEHDQ6WDWHV2(&6ZKLFKLVFRPSULVHGRIWKHµWLQ\¶(DVWHUQ
Caribbean islands.57  Other SIDS regional bodies, such as the Pacific Forum, 
                                                          
52
 "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook´supra note 6. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 ³0HPEHU6WDWHV´Vupra note 8. 
55
 "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook´supra note 6. 
56
 Population numbers are at the time of independence. 
³Demographic Yearbook ± 6WDWLVWLFV'LYLVLRQ´, supra note 10. 
57
 Member states include: Anguilla-1995, Antigua and Barbuda-18 June 1981, British Virgin 
Islands-22 November 1984, Dominica-18 June 1981, Grenada-18 June 1981, Montserrat-
Overseas dependency of UK, St. Lucia- 18 June 1981, St. Kitts and Nevis-18 June 1981, St. 
Vincent-18 June 1981.  "Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) " 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/oecs.jsp?menu=community (accessed March 3, 2010). 
(hereinafter "OECS").  
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have emerged in the other significant cluster of SIDS, the South Pacific. South 
Pacific SIDS includes the following states in Table 3. 
Table 3: 
State58 Sovereignty59 UN Membership60 Former Colony of61 Population62 
Samoa 1962  1976   New Zealand (NZ) 116,000 
Nauru  1968  1999   Aus, NZ and UK 6,000 
Tonga  1970  1999   UK   90,000 
Fiji  1970  1970   UK   520,000 
Solomon 1978  1978   UK   213,000 
Islands 
Tuvalu 1978  2000   UK   7,000 
Kiribati 1979  1999   UK   58,000 
Vanuatu 1980  1981   France and UK 118,000 
Marshall  1986  1991   United States (US) 40,000 
Islands 
Micronesia 1986  1991   US   98,000 
Palau  1994  1994   US   16,000 
 
In addition to the larger clusters of the Commonwealth Caribbean and the 
South Pacific, a third area of SIDS with fewer states is found in the Indian Ocean. 
Table 4: 
State63 Sovereignty64 UN Membership65 Former Colony of66 Population67 
Maldives 1965  1965   UK   98,000 
Mauritius 1968  1968   UK   787,000 
Comoros   1975   1975   France  300,000 
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 "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook´supra note 6. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 ³0HPEHU6WDWHV´Vupra note 8. 
61
 "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook´supra note 6. 
62
 Population numbers are at the time of independence. 
³Demographic Yearbook ± 6WDWLVWLFV'LYLVLRQ´, supra note10. 
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 Ibid. 
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Seychelles 1976  1976   UK   60,000 
 
The prevalence of SIDS regional cooperation reflects their recognition for 
collaboration in the area of development, but also of security, which captured the 
attention of the international community with the events of Grenada in the early 
1980s. The events in Grenada put the question of small state security to the 
forefront of international security concerns as it demonstrated that the smallest 
states: ³«DUHZHDNHQHGE\HPLJUDWLRQFRQVWUDLQHGE\UHPRWHQHVVDQG
ultimately dependent on others for their very survival. They have, in 
consequence, a lowered capacity to absorb external shocks, no independent 
H[LVWHQFHZRUWK\RIWKDWQDPHDQGQRIXWXUH´68 
However, such a bleak picture is not an entirely accurate depiction of 
small state security, as it has also been recognized that small states:  
³«KDYHUHVLOLHQWSROLWLFDOVWUXFWXUHVV\PSDWKHWLFSDWURQVDPRQJWKHPDMRU
powers and good prospects for development in the exploitation of their 
([FOXVLYH(FRQRPLF=RQHV((=´69 
The initiatives of SIDS, regional bodies and international institutions 
SURPRWLQJFROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\KDYHFUHDWHG³DZRUOGPDGHVDIHIRUVPDOOVWDWHV´70  
This inclusive atmosphere has also advanced the participation of dependencies 
or, more accurately, sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs), that have realized 
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 Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne, "Lilliput Under Threat: The Security Problems of Small Island 
and Enclave Developing States," Political Studies 41, no. 4 (December 1993): 592, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9501183528&loginpage=Login.
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 Ibid. 
70
 Barry Bartmann, A World made Safe for Small States (Charlottetown: Institute of Island 
Studies, 1991). (hereinafter A World made Safe for Small States). 
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increased autonomy.  This new found autonomy has witnessed SNIJs such as 
Aruba, Bermuda, Cook Islands and Niue enjoying characteristics approaching 
those of sovereignty.71  As well, the international community has experienced a 
new phase of self-determination, witnessing the emergence of de facto states, 
most notably Bougainville.  The emergence of de facto states has proven to 
create new challenges among members of the international community, 
particularly in the area of security and the manner in which it is perceived, and 
subsequent impacts on the international system as a whole. 
The need for the study 
The proliferation of very small states in the international community 
reflects the evolution of the international system and corresponding international 
relations and security concerns.  The US invasion of Grenada in 1983 reaffirmed 
concerns over small state security, and led to an increased focus on conventional 
security threats to SIS and gained international condemnation.  US intervention 
was portrayed as an attack on another sovereign state and constituted a major 
security concern to Commonwealth Caribbean states; ultimately, it was conveyed 
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 Aruba, part of the Lesser Antilles and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, is a SNIJ which enjoys a 
sub-national associate membership in UNSECO.  Moreover, that the Cook Islands and Niue 
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95, no. 386 (September 2006): 545,554-555. 
See also,  Godfrey Baldacchino, Island Enclaves: Offshoring Strategies, Creative Governance, 
and Subnational Island Jurisdictions (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010). 
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in the context of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean.72  However, 
such pejorative negative connotations fail to illustrate the US as a neighboring 
state protecting the interests of international security, as demonstrated in Kuwait 
in the early 1990s.   
In addition, the predominance of non-conventional security concerns, 
which extend beyond the confines of any national border, has proven to define 
the security agenda of small island states. The re-examination of the US role in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean, SIS security in non-conventional terms, and 
regional cooperation will reveal the nature of US hegemony in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean in the context of the US as a mentor state to 
Commonwealth Caribbean SIS.  
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 $QWKRQ\3D\QHKLJKOLJKWVWKDW³WKHFRQFHSWRIKHJHPRQ\KDVEHHQPXFKGHEDWHGLQWKH
international political economy literature but it is best theorized in neo-*UDPVFLDQWHUPV«´
Anthony Payne, "Rethinking United States-Caribbean Relations: Towards a New Mode of Trans-
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of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 7.    Robert Cox 
DOVRVXJJHVWVWKDWµWKHUHFDQEHGRPLQDQFHZLWKRXWKHJHPRQ\KHJHPRQ\LVRQO\RQHSRVVLEOH
IRUPGRPLQDQFHPD\WDNH¶Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (June 1, 
1981), 153.                     However, John 
$JQHZVXJJHVWV³Ultimately, hegemony is the global diffusion of economic, political and cultural 
practices originating from the activities of one nation- state."       John Agnew, (ed.) 
Peter J. Taylor and Gerard Kearns, Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global 
Analysis "The United States and American Hegemony (New York:  Halsted Press, 1993), 209-
211.  Therefore, the hegemonic power is dominant in all three spheres of economic activity, 
providing an economic base for the diffusion of its political and cultural institutions and practices. 
Ibid. at 207-238.  
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Hypothesis     
 The reaction to the US invasion of Grenada was considered a major 
international security concern in the early 1980s, and was viewed by the 
international community as the negative consequences of US hegemony in the 
region. Comparatively, the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait a decade later illustrated how 
a larger neighbor intended to annex and wipe the international legal personality 
of its smaller neighbor.  However, this was not realized in the case of the US and 
Grenada.  The US returned governance and order to Grenada with no indication 
of annexation.  Though Grenada signaled the weakness of small island states to 
the international community, conventional security threats would prove to be 
secondary to SIS security as the prevalence and severity of non-conventional 
security threats proved to be a more of security concern.  Therefore, this thesis 
will argue pejorative negative interpretations of US hegemony in the context of 
the 1983 US invasion of Grenada to assert that non-conventional threats are the 
predominant security threat to Commonwealth Caribbean States. 
Methodology Used to Determine Findings 
The above hypothesis will examine primary and secondary sources from 
the perspective of international relations theory.73  Chapter 2, the literature 
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 Ole Holsti describes how international relations theories act as coloured sunglasses, allowing 
the wearer to see only the salient events relevant to the theory.  Three main approaches of 
International Relations Theory (realism, liberalism and constructivism) provide a basis to discuss 
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to explain the way international politics works, but each of the currently prevailing theories falls 
   33 
review, uses primary sources from the UN and numerous secondary sources to 
illustrate the evolution of SIS in the international community and discuss 
emerging SIS themes such as size, self-determination and security.  Chapter 3, 
The Role of the United States in the Commonwealth Caribbean, uses primary 
sources from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), and the US 
Department of State, in addition to numerous secondary sources to demonstrate 
the nature of US and Commonwealth Caribbean SIS relations.  Chapter 4, Small 
Island State Security and Non-Conventional Security Threats, uses primary 
sources from the OECS, CARICOM, and the US State Department in addition to 
secondary sources to illustrate the prevalence of non-conventional security in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.  Chapter 5, Commonwealth Caribbean Regional and 
International Cooperation and Integration, uses primary resources from the 
OECS, CARICOM, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the US 
General Accounting office, in addition to secondary sources, to illustrate the 
increase of regional and international cooperation in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean and the degree of US integration into Commonwealth Caribbean 
security initiatives.  Chapter 6, Conclusions, draws on secondary sources to 
support concepts and findings. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ZHOOVKRUWRIWKDWJRDO´+HDOVRDVVHUWVWKDW³RQHRIWKHSULQFLpal contributions that international 
relations theory can make is not predicting the future but providing the vocabulary and conceptual 
IUDPHZRUNWRDVNKDUGTXHVWLRQV«´ 
Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," Foreign Policy, no. 145 (November - December 2004): 
53-55, 62, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4152944. 
Also, though international relations theory has attributes of historical perspective, William T.R. 
)R[VXJJHVWVWKDW³,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQVKDVWREHYLHZHGDVDVXEMHFWZKLFKLVVRPHWKLQJPRUH
than contemporary history if it is to evolve as a legitimate academic specialty or to yield results 
relevant to the major choices which governments and opinion leaders make in world politics. 
Preface in W.T.R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), ix.  
   34 
Descriptions of Proposed Chapters in Thesis 
Chapter 1 ± The introduction: will describe the evolution of the 
international system and small states to explain how so many small island 
developing states proliferated in the international community despite concerns 
over size, viability, and security. 
Chapter 2 ± 7KH/LWHUDWXUHUHYLHZZLOOH[DPLQHDXWKRUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVDQG
analysis to the perception of small state size and viability; the increased 
participation and proliferation of small states in the international system, evolving 
perceptions of size and recognition of small island states, small island state 
security and the differentiation between conventional and non-conventional 
security threats, the interconnectedness of the international security in the post-
WWII and Cold War system under the auspices of the UN, and its impacts on 
interstate relations such the US and the SIDS of Grenada. 
Chapter 3 ± The US in the Commonwealth Caribbean: will discuss the role 
of the US in the Commonwealth Caribbean and differentiate it from the US role in 
Latin America, the events leading up to and including the US invasion of 
Grenada in 1983; the international reaction to the US invasion and its impact on 
SIDS security and international security as a whole.  
 Chapter 4 ± Unconventional Security Threats: will discuss the perceptions 
of conventional security towards SIS; and the recognition, prevalence and effects 
of unconventional security threats on SIS in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
region. 
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Chapter 5 ± Regional Cooperation between the US and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean:  will discuss how regional and international 
cooperation has increased in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  The chapter also 
discusses the importance and degree of US integration into Commonwealth 
Caribbean security initiatives. 
Chapter 6 ± Conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
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The transformation of the international system and evolution of the 
sovereign state has posed new challenges to the international community which 
can be observed through the evolution of the international system and interstate 
relations with their long contemporary beginnings in the Concert of Europe to 
current norms with the United Nations.74  Such an examination reveals that 
there were fewer than 20 states during the Concert of Europe system in 1815, 
50 states during the League of Nations, and that the number increased to 192 
fully recognized states during the post-WWII era via the process of 
decolonization.75  Consequently, the proliferation of ever smaller states raised 
concerns of small statehood viability, as their limited size was perceived as a 
weakness and caused concerns of small state ability to meet security needs and 
participate fully in the international community.76  Despite being disregarded as 
anomalies in the international system only decades earlier, the continued 
proliferation and existence of small states resulted in a profound examination of 
small states. 
The examination of small states revealed that many were islands, leading 
to the recognition that small island states experienced different challenges than 
did other mainland states.  The literature review will observe the changing 
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 Hedley Bull differentiates between the concepts of international system and international 
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of Politics 26, no. 2 (May 1964): 308, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2127598. 
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 *HRUJH&$EERWGHILQHVYLDELOLW\DVWKH³PLQLPXPFULWHULDQHFHVVDU\IRUVXSSRUWLQJDPRGHUQ
LQGXVWULDOVWDWH´ 
"Small States - The Paradox of Their Existence´, supra note 2 at 107. 
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perceptions and attitudes toward small states in the international community; 
discuss the recognition of small island states; and reveal the unique nature of 
island state security compared with that of mainland microstates. 
 History of Small States in the International Community 
Amry Vandenbosch identifies four phases in the history of small states in 
contemporary international relations: (1) the Congress of Europe after the 
Napoleonic wars, where small states were not considered important; (2) the 
departure from the great power system in the Congress of Europe with the 
peace conferences of The Hague of 1899 and 1907; (3) the post-WWI inclusion 
and tolerance of the small state in the League of Nations; and (4) the rise of 
small states in the post-WWII era in the UN.77   
The Congress of Europe 
Vandenbosch provides insight into the nature of the Congress or Concert 
of Europe and the departure from the great power system.  The Congress of 
9LHQQD¶VGHILQLQJRIWKHJUHDWSRZHUVZDV intended to maintain the peace in 
Europe following the Napoleonic Wars; in addition, it also defined small states 
as a category in the discipline of international relations.78  Though small states 
were present at the Congress of Vienna, they played a minimal role at the 
SURFHHGLQJVDV³WKHVPDOler Sovereigns, Princes, and States had no 
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 "The Small States in International Politics and Organization", supra note 75 at 293-312.  
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 Rothstein viewed the Napoleonic Wars as the beginning of differentiating states from one 
another as great powers, France, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria were distinguished 
from other small states/powers.  
 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 
11. (hereinafter Alliances and Small Powers).  
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representatives in the deciding conference, and no voice in the decisions by 
ZKLFKWKHLUIXWXUHGHVWLQ\ZDVGHWHUPLQHG´79  The limited role of these small 
states is significant, as the Great Powers demonstrated BeUWUDQG5XVVHOO¶V
GHILQLWLRQRISRZHUWKH³FDSDFLW\WRSURGXFHLQWHQGHGHIIHFWV´80 as they: 
³UHDUUDQJHGWKHPDSRI(XURSHUHVWRUHGG\QDVWLHVFRQILUPHGWKH
partition of Poland, united Belgium with Holland, neutralized Switzerland, 
created the German confederation, and prescribed rules of international 
law with respect to the free navigation of rivers, the rank of diplomatic 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGWKHVXSSUHVVLRQRIWKHVODYHWUDGH´81   
Robert L. Rothstein, in Alliances and Small Powers, observes the great 
powers distinguishing themselves from smaller powers by creating an 
international system where the great powers of Europe made the decisions 
which the small powers were to obey.82  Consequently, the Concert was 
successful in managing the international system by preventing wars among 
small states, as the Concert frequently intervened in small state internal affairs, 
made and dissolved unions, determined boundary lines, ended international 
conflicts and exercised guardianship over weak states.83  Even though the 
Concert was successful in preventing general war among small states,, war 
                                                          
79
 Palmerston to Marquis of Normandy, October 10, 1848, in B.F.S.P., LI, 672. Cited in Edwin De 
Witt Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1920), 295. (hereinafter The Equality of States in International Law). 
Also, the Congress of Vienna illustrated the Europeanization of the international system as all 
European states were represented, with the exception of Turkey and its 
dependencies/principalities. 
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 Bertrand Russell, Power - A New Social Analysis, Norton, 1969), 315.  
81
 The Equality of States in International, supra note 79 at 295. 
"The Small States in International Politics and Organization", supra note 75 at 295. 
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  Alliances and Small Powers, supra note 78 at 13.   
83
  "The Small States in International Politics and Organization", supra note 75 at 296. 
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remained a reality among larger states, as demonstrated by the Crimean and 
Franco-3UXVVLDQZDUV+RZHYHUWKH&RQFHUW¶VUHOLDQFHRQWKHEDODQFHRISRZHU
among its members to maintain peace proved to be misguided after the onset of 
WWI.  
,QDGGLWLRQWRWKH&RQFHUW¶VLQDELOLW\WRFRQWDLQJHQHUDOZDUDPRQJPDMRU
VWDWHVWKHWZR+DJXHFRQIHUHQFHVRIDQGUHSUHVHQWHG³DGHSDUWXUH
IURPWKHSULQFLSOHRI*UHDW3RZHUFRQWURO´ZKLFKXOtimately defined the Concert 
System, and proved to affect the dynamics of the international system. 
 The Hague Conferences - Departure from the Great Power System  
The first Hague Conference was influenced by Russia with its calling for 
an international conference to consider the problem of increased development of 
PLOLWDU\IRUFHV³WRSURSRUWLRQVKLWKHUWRXQNQRZQ´ZKHUH26 states were 
represented.84  The absence of Latin American small states from the inaugural 
Hague Conference demonstrated European large power inclination to dismiss 
them as members of the international community.  Their exclusion to participate 
in the international system is significant, as the first Hague Conference set a 
precedent in reaching out beyond Europe to include China, Persia and Siam.85  
However, the emergence of new powers, such as the US, which effectively 
asserted itself after the Spanish American War in 1898 and further 
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 Dan L. Morrill, "Nicholas II and the Call for the First Hague Conference," The Journal of 
Modern History 46, no. 2 (June 1974): 296, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1877523. 
85
 ³Russia may have wished to limit the invitations to the nations represented at the Court of St. 
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demonstrated its power with the attainment of a blue water Navy rivaling that of 
the Royal Navy, signaled intentions to assert US influence and contest 
European domination of international affairs.86  
US influence is illustrated with the inclusion of Latin American states to 
WKHVHFRQG+DJXH&RQIHUHQFHLQ/DWLQ$PHULFD¶VLQFOXVLRQWRWKHVHFRQG
Hague Conference increased representation at the Conference to 44 states.  
0RUHRYHU/DWLQ$PHULFD¶VDSSDUHQWRPLVVLRQIURPWKHILUVW+DJXH&RQIHUHQFH
and inclusion in the second signaled the international equality among state 
representation, as nearly all independent states in the world were present: 21 
European; 19 American; and 4 Asian states.87  It is important to note that, 
though small states were present at the Hague Conferences, it was not an end 
to great power/small state conflict.  A London Times editorial aids in illustrating 
the attitudes towards small state participation, as their inclusion induced scrutiny 
from critics in larger countries who viewed the Conference as a failure, one that: 
³:DVSUHGHVWLQHGWRIDLOEHFDXVHWKHFRQYRFDWLRQRIVXFKDERG\DWDOl 
ZDVEDVHGXSRQDJURVVYLRODWLRQRIWKHµODZRIIDFWV¶,QSODLQ(QJOLVKWKH
Conference was a sham and has brought forth a progeny of shams, 
because it was founded on a sham. The only principle upon which all 
these powers could be induced to send delegates to it was the legal and 
diplomatic convention that all sovereign states are equal. For certain 
purposes the convention is useful, but, on the face of it, it is a fiction, and 
a very absurd fiction at that. Everybody knows that all sovereign states 
are not equal. The differences between them in population, in territory, in 
wealth, in armed strength, in their habits of thought, in their conceptions 
of law and right ± in all that goes to make up civilization ± are among the 
most obvious and insistent of facts. The suggestion that they should 
submit to such a doctrine is simply fatuous. Such submission would 
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involve the subjugation of the higher civilization by the lower, and would 
inevitably condemn the more advanced peoples to moral and intellectual 
retrogUHVVLRQ´ 
The insistence that small states were lacking in capacity compared to that 
of the large states aptly describes the popular opinion in the 19th century and 
into the 20th. This opinion reflected an international system that was dominated 
by large powers which viewed small states as being unable to settle their own 
DIIDLUVDQGLQWKHUHIHUHQFHWR³DUPHGVWUHQJWK´OHQGVWRWKHYLHZWKDWDVWDWH
legitimizes its sovereignty through its ability to make war.  This notion is 
reflected in the work of Von 7UHLWVFKNHZKRYLHZVVRYHUHLJQW\DV³«GUDZLQJ
the sword when [the state] sees fit that  a defenseless state may still be termed 
D.LQJGRPIRUFRQYHQWLRQDORUFRXUWO\UHDVRQV«EXWLQSRLQWRIIDFWVXFKD
FRXQWU\FDQQRORQJHUUDQNDVDVWDWH´88  The occupation with military might is 
illustrated through the events of WWI and the attitude towards small states 
during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. 
WWI and the Paris Peace Conference 
The orchestration of WWI by large powers consequently impacted small 
states, which continued to assert their interests.  The preoccupation with a 
VWDWH¶VDELOLW\WRDVVHUWLWVHOIWKURXJKPLOLWDU\PLJKWLVIXUWKHULOOXVWUDWHGWKURXJK
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, where the distinction between small and 
large powers continued. Britain viewed the US ranking of Brazil as an 
LQWHUPHGLDWHVWDWHDQGQRWDVDVPDOOVWDWHZLWKFRQGHVFHQVLRQWKDW³WKH
%UD]LOLDQFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHZDURIWZRRUWKUHHWRUSHGRERDWV´ZDVLQVXIILFLHQWRI
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 Von Treitschke, H. (1965) Politics I, in Richard Howard Cox, The State in International 
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such recognition. 89  The Paris Peace Conference illustrated that the great 
powers were not eager to treat small states as equals, in that they were viewed 
DVKDYLQJOLPLWDWLRQVDQGWKHUHIRUHRFFXSLHG³DQLQVHFXUHSRVLWLRQLQWKHIDPLO\
RIQDWLRQV´90  However, the great powers had concerns of offending small states 
E\³REYLRXVGRPLQDWLRQE\WKHJUHDWSRZHUV,´91 due to the increasing number of 
small states emerging out of the wreckage of former empires. Where European 
peoples/nations were viewed as capable of self-government, former German 
possessions in tKH3DFLILFDQG$IULFDZHUHGLVPLVVHGDVEDUEDULDQQDWLRQV³WR
whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of political self-determination 
LQWKH(XURSHDQVHQVH´DQGWKDWWKH\³ZRXOGSUREDEO\QHYHUEHDEOHWRORRNDIWHU
themselves.´92  Where religion and nationalist tendencies were contained in 
Europe,93 the Paris Peace Conference created three types of mandate in the 
GLYLVLRQRI*HUPDQ\¶VFRORQLHV³$´0DQGDWHV³IRUQDWLRQVVXFKDVWKRVHLQWKH
Middle East which were nearly ready to run their own affairV´³%´0DQGDWHV
ZKLFKZRXOGEHUXQE\WKHPDQGDWRU\SRZHUDQG³&´0DQGDWHVIRU³WHUULWRULHV
that were contiguous or close to the mandatory power, which would administer 
WKHWHUULWRU\DVSDUWRILWVRZQ³&´0DQGDWHVFRYHUHG6RXWKZHVW$IULFDDQGWKH
Pacific Islands near Australia and New Zealand.94 
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The influence European small states gained in the Hague Conferences 
and during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference - despite some obvious limitations 
- continued to spill into the League of Nations, where they received 
representation on the council and considerable representation in the 
Assembly.95   
The League of Nations 
The increased profile of small states is described through the works of 
Annette Baker Fox in The Small States in the International System, 1919-
1969.96  Fox notes that the League of Nations offered an unprecedented 
opportunity for lesser states to play a part in the system: ³7KXVVHYHUDOVPDOO
states could become prominent actors through diplomatic negotiation, the right-
KDQGPDLGHQRIZHDNHUVWDWHV´97  However, 0LFKDHO*XQWHULQ³/LHFKWHQVWHLQ
and the League of Nations: A Precedent for the United Nations Ministate 
3UREOHP´LOOXVWUDWHVWKHOLPLWVWRVPDOOVWDWHLQFOXVLRQLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
community with the applications to the League of Nations from the historic very 
small European states of San Marino, Monaco and Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein 
proved to be the only state to carry out an application which was denied, 
SURORQJLQJWKHVHµ/LOOLSXWLDQ¶VWDWHV¶UHFRJQLWLRQLQQRPRUHWKDQDFRXUWO\RU
ceremonial sense.98   
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 7KH)LIWK$GPLVVLRQV&RPPLWWHHDGPLWWHG³WKHUHFDQEHQRGRXEW
MXULGLFDOO\WKH3ULQFLSDOLW\RI/LHFKWHQVWHLQLVDVRYHUHLJQVWDWH´+RZHYHUWKDW
³E\UHDVRQRIKHU [Liechtenstein] limited area, small population, and her 
geographical position she has chosen to depute to others some of the attributes 
RIVRYHUHLJQW\´99  0RUHRYHUWKH&RPPLWWHHQRWHGWKDW/LHFKWHQVWHLQKDG³QR
DUP\´ which meant it ³FRXOGQRWFDUU\RXWDOOKHUREOLJDWLRQVXQGHU$UWLFOHRI
WKH&RYHQDQW´ 100   /LHFKWHQVWHLQ¶V exclusion from the League of Nations 
influenced the LHDJXHWR³FRQVLGHUZKHWKHUDQGLQZKDWPDQQHULWZRXOGEH
possible to attach to the League of Sovereign States, which, by reason of their 
VPDOOVL]HFDQQRWEHDGPLWWHGDVRUGLQDU\PHPEHUV´101 Such a consideration 
raises the question of whether /LHFKWHQVWHLQ¶VµVPDOOVL]H¶ZDVWKH ³DFWXDO
SUREOHP´102   
0RUHRYHU5RVDO\Q+LJJLQV¶DQDO\VLVRIWKH/HDJXHRI1DWLRQ¶VGHFLVLRQ
illustrates inconsistency in the recognition of sovereign statehood in the 
international system, when she states: ³$VIRUWKHGLPLQXWLYHVWDWHVWRLQVLVWWKDW
they are sovereign, but so small that they have had to depute some of the 
attributes of sovereignty, is legal reasoning of the most unfruitful kind.  It is more 
in conformity with the facts to come to the conclusion that sovereignty is a 
relative concept; and while these states may possess attributes for limited 
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International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1963).  (hereinafter The Development of International Law through the Political 
Organs of the United Nations). 
99
 "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations", supra note 12 at 498-499.  
League of Nations, The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, Annex C, 652, 667. 
100
 "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations", supra note 12 at 498.  
³5HSRUWRQWKH6HFRQG-Sub-FRPPLWWHHWRWKH)LIWK&RPPLWWHH´supra note 13 at 667. 
101
 Ibid. at 652. 
102
 "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations", supra note 12 at 499. 
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participation in world events, they do not possess it for comprehensive 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ´103  
Luxembourg became the only very small state to become a member of 
the League of Nations, despite experiencing similar scrutiny to that of 
Liechtenstein LQLWVDSSOLFDWLRQ/X[HPERXUJ¶VDFFHSWDQFHLVFRQVLGHUHGLQODUJH
part due to the change in its policy of neutrality, which led to the maintenance of 
DVWDQGLQJDUP\WKDW³MXVWLILHGLWVFDSDFLW\WRIXOILOOWKHREOLJDWLRQVRI$UWLFOHRI
the Covenant,104 which was highlighted as a deficiency in the case of 
/LHFKWHQVWHLQ¶VDSSOLFDWLRQDVLWKDGQRDUP\105  This further illustrates the 
legitimizing of state sovereignty through the ability to make war, as Jurist Quincy 
Wright notes: 
³,QSUDFWLFHDVWDWHLVQRWUHJDUGHGDVIXOO\VRYHUHLJQXQOHVVLWKDV
substantially all of the powers of normal states at the time.  Among the 
powers commonly possessed by states is that to convert a state of peace 
LQWRDVWDWHRIZDUWRGHIHQGLWVHOI«WRRFFXS\«res nullius, to perform 
ZURQJIXODFWVUHQGHULQJLWVHOIUHVSRQVLEOH´106  
This recognition of similar power among states creates a measure in 
which to determine if a state is sovereign or not.  However, the limits of its scope 
LVKLJKOLJKWHGZLWKWKHREVHUYDWLRQVRI5RVDO\Q+LJJLQVZKRQRWHV³GLVFXVVLRQV
IRUH[DPSOHRIZKHWKHUDµGHSHQGHQWVWDWH¶FDQH[LVWXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDUH
largely meaningless unless there is first an examination of whether the 
community of nations would find it appropriate, in light of its long-range 
                                                          
103
 The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations, 
supra note 98 at 35. 
104
 "The Members of the League of Nations", supra note 14 at 141.  
105
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REMHFWLYHVWRDIIRUGWKHULJKWVZKLFKIROORZIURPµVWDWHKRRG¶WRHQWLWLHVIHWWHUHG
by restrictions which impair their independence.´107 
1RQHWKHOHVVWKH/HDJXHRI1DWLRQV¶GHFLVLRQWRUHMHFW/LHFKWHQVWHLQ¶V
DSSOLFDWLRQNHSW³WKHKLVWRULF(XURSHDQYHU\VPDOOVWDWHV/LHFKWHQVWHLQ0RQDFR
6DQ0DULQRDQG$QGRUUD«FRQILQHGWRWKHPDUJLQVRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
diplomacy.´108  However, increased international participation of small states, 
particularly those in Latin America supported by the US, influenced an initiative 
WRFRGLI\³WKHLGHDV´RIVWDWHKRRGWKDW³ZHUHLQWKHDLU´XQGHUWUDGLWLRQDO
international law.109  Consequently, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights 
and Duties of States was signed in 1933.110 
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The Montevideo Convention and the Concept of Statehood 
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in 1933 
FRGLILHG³WKHVWDWHDVDSHUVRQRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZVKRXOGSRVVHVVWKe following 
qualifications: a) a permanent population b) a defined territory c) government; 
DQGGFDSDFLW\WRHQWHULQWRUHODWLRQVZLWKRWKHUVWDWHV´111  Alan James notes, 
³There is no international constitution which can be consulted regarding the 
relevanWPHDQLQJRIWKHWHUPVRYHUHLJQW\´112  )RU%XOO³VRYHUHLJQW\´LV
VRPHWKLQJWREHµDVVHUWHG¶E\VWDWHVZKLFKSDUWLFLSDWHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
relations.113   +RZHYHU$ODQ-DPHV¶REVHUYHV³ZKHWKHUDVWDWHDVVHUWV
independence and supremacy in a sufficient degree to be adjudged as actually 
DVVHUWLQJWKHPLQSUDFWLFH´114  Therefore, as many small states met criteria 
recognized under the Montevideo Convention, the observations of Bull and 
-DPHVDSWO\UHIOHFWODUJHVWDWHV¶FRQFHUQVLIWKHVHVPDOOVWDWHVGLGLQIDFWDVsert 
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Though Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States has been scrutinized and it 
LVYLHZHG³IXUWKHUFULWHULDDUHQHFHVVDU\WRPDNHDVDWLVIDFWRU\GHILQLWLRQRIWKHVWDWH´KRZHYHU it 
represents the only accepted codified definition of statehood.  
 "Defining Statehood", supra note 109 at 447. 
112
 6RYHUHLJQW\LVDQHOXVLYHFRQFHSWDQGUHPDLQVDQ³emotive term that it very naturally finds an 
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 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 
1986), 1, 17. (hereinafter Sovereign Statehood). 
113
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 Sovereign Statehood, supra note 112 at 20.  
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WKHLUµVRYHUHLJQW\¶LQVXIILFLHQWGHJUHHDVDQHTXDOLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
community.115  
Small States in the Inter-War Years 
Though small states experienced more favorable conditions with the 
League of Nations, they were short-lived with the onset of the worldwide 
depression of the 1930s, and the increased influence of revisionist powers (Nazi 
Germany, Italy and Japan), which particularly affected small states of Eastern 
Europe.  Annette Baker Fox notes: 
³Whatever promise collective security under the League might have held 
out was destroyed by actions of small states as well as great. Neither 
"bridge-building" nor balancing off one predatory great power against 
another, the favored techniques of European small states, succeeded in 
protecting those in the path of the determined aggressors. Nor did the 
"one-way" alliance with an in-effectual though friendly great power, 
)UDQFHZKLFKSDLGOLWWOHDWWHQWLRQWRSURWHFWLQJLWVVPDOODOOLHV´116  
  The failure of the League to provide collective security exposed the 
precariousness of small state security, as highlighted by Fox when she 
observes, ³for ruthless great powers, vulnerable small states seemed easier to 
GHIHDWWKDQWRZRR´117   David Vital notes that Czechoslovakia capitulated in 
ERWK::,DQG:,,³ZLWKRXWDVKRWEHLQJILUHG´DQGXVHVLWDVDQH[DPSOHRIWKH
W\SLFDOµVPDOO¶SRZHU118  8OWLPDWHO\WKH/HDJXHRI1DWLRQV¶LQDELOLW\WRDYRLG
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117
 Ibid. 
118
 David Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 7. (hereinafter The Survival of Small States). 
   50 
major conflict resulted in its demise with the outbreak of WWII.  Despite the 
perceived vulnerability of small states during WWII, the independence of Iceland 
in 1944 and acceptance into the UN in 1946 marked the equal participation of 
only the second very small state in the international community.119   
From the League of Nations to the UN - The Question of Small State Viability 
Despite shortcomings of the League of Nations, the organization signified 
an evolution of international principles that continued in the United Nations 
Charter, including governance, independence, and admission into statehood 
under three sets of stipulations about self-determination, the treatment of self-
governing territories and trusteeship.120  Rupert Emerson notes that  the 
Declaration of Non-Self-*RYHUQLQJ7HUULWRULHV³«IRUWKHILUVWWLPHJDYHWKH
organized international community some access to the way in which the colonial 
powers were behaving and some title to debate their achievements and short 
FRPLQJV´121  Though the intent and interpretation of the Declaration of Non-Self-
Governing Territories differed between colonial powers and anti-colonial 
supporters, the effect witnessed the independence of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, 
Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel within five 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Also, it is important to note that Vital uses the terms small state and small power 
interchangeably. 
David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations 
(Clarendon Press, 1967), 7. (hereinafter The Inequality of States). 
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 Elmer Plischke, Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options (Washington: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), 3-4. (hereinafter Microstates in 
World Affairs). 
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 RuSHUW(PHUVRQYLHZHG³WKHSULQFLSOHRIVHOI- GHWHUPLQDWLRQPDGHDQH[SOLFLWDSSHDUDQFH´LQ
the UN charter.  
Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization, supra note 16 at 35. 
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years from the end of WWII.122  Unlike the post-WWI period that witnessed the 
emergence of states from former empires, the post-WWII period witnessed the 
emergence of states from among dependencies of the victors.123  Moreover, the 
emergence of new states, many of them considered small states, raised 
concerns over small state viability in the international system.  David Vital and 
Amry Vadenbosch124 argue that there is no single or accurate formula to rank a 
VWDWHWKDW³RQO\WKHWRSRIWKHS\UDPLGLVQRUPDOO\GHILQHGFOHDUO\´UHIHUULQJWR
RWKHUVDV³OHVVHUVWDWHV´125  This ranking of states highlights the recognition of 
the asymmetry of relational and structural power between the great powers and 
small states in the international system.126  Despite the tendency to rank states 
in the international system, Hedley Bull, in The Anarchical Society, avoids the 
explicit differentiation or ranking of states according to their size.  Instead, he 
provides insight into the practical dimension of state participation in the 
international system.127 
Moreover, David Vital speaks to these lesser states in The Inequality of 
States, DVVHUWLQJWKDW³DVPDOOVWDWHLVPRUHYXOQHUDEOHWRSUHVVXUHPRUHOLNHO\
to give way under stress, more limited in the political options open to it and 
VXEMHFWWRDWLJKWHUFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQGRPHVWLFDQGH[WHUQDODIIDLUV´128 raising 
concerns of small staWHYLDELOLW\DVWKH\W\SLFDOO\OHDGD³GHIHQVLYHOLIH´DQG
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avoid situations where their weakness might be exploited.129  For Vital, state 
YLDELOLW\LVWHVWHG³E\LWVFDSDFLW\WRZLWKVWDQGRSSRVLWLRQDQGVWLFNWRSXUSRVHV
thought commensurate with the national interest.´130  Ultimately, Vital questions 
small state viability,131 as he describes the survival of small states in 
international relations as precarious,132 asserting that their autonomy will remain 
until it is challenged.133  
Similar to Vital, Rothstein, (Alliance and Small Powers) views small states 
as assuming a defensive and vulnerable position in international relations.134  In 
contrast to Vital, Rothstein addresses the social consideration of size as he 
asserts that small size is a question of psychological handicaps as much as it is 
a problem of limited capabilities. Rothstein views weakness as a fundamental 
aspect of small size and that their correlation manifests a different self-view.  He 
argues that this leads small states to recognize limited choices, assume a 
defensive posture and assume vulnerability in international relations.135  The 
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perception of the small state handicap or vulnerability contributes to what 
5RWKVWHLQUHIHUUHGWRDVDµVHFXULW\GLOHPPD¶DPRQJVPDOOVWDWHV136   
Despite the view of small states as lesser states, Annette Baker Fox 
asserts in The Power of Small States137 that small states had a role to play in 
the international system,138 and this signaled the inclusion of small states in 
international relations.139 Fox describes the ability of VPDOOVWDWHVWRUHVSRQG³«
to the pressures of great powers during the second World War, and managed 
with varying degrees of success to prove that small and militarily weak States 
are by no means automatically reduced to being helpless pawns in international 
SROLWLFV«´140  Moreover, she observes that small stateV¶ ability to avoid 
FDSLWXODWLRQLQVRPHFULVHVFRQWUDGLFWVFKDUJHVRIZHDNQHVVDV³VPDOOVWDWHVLQ
the 1950s seems to have found greater freedom of maneuverability  at the very 
time their military iQHTXDOLW\YDVWO\LQFUHDVHG´141  
 )XUWKHUPRUH)R[¶VLOOXVWUDWLRQRIDVPDOOVWDWH¶VDELOLW\WRFRXQWHUDFWODUJH
state influence demonstrates the capacity for self-help.  In addition, Fenwick 
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views self-KHOSDVWKHIXQGDPHQWDOµPDUNRIVRYHUHLJQW\¶142 as it was frequently 
used as a criterion to distinguish between sovereign and non-sovereign 
states.143  Like Fox, Simon Kuznets questions the perceptions of size and 
viability. 
In addition to international relations literature, Simon Kuznets, in Six 
Lectures on Economic Growth,144 provides insight into the assumptions of 
economic size and viability.  Kuznets examines the concerns of economic 
capacity of smaller states considering the limits to economic growth in smaller 
economies such as access and sufficient quantity of natural resources or 
attributes,145 ZKLFKXOWLPDWHO\TXHVWLRQVWKHLUYLDELOLW\DV³VRPHPHDVXUHRIWKHVH
collective attributes may offer a gross index of power.146  However, Kuznets 
examines the advantages of smallness recognizing that the social cohesiveness 
of smaller states makes their smaller economies more resilient to external 
economic shocks and exhibit more equal distribution of income between social 
classes and geographical regions.147  .X]QHWV¶ILQGLQJVOHQGWRWKH
misconceptions of size, revealing the ³OLPLWDWLRQRIVL]HLVQRWUHDOO\DQLPSRUWDQW
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 (Underground resources, coastline, etc); a minimum scale to support heavy industrial 
manufacturing (airplanes, automobiles, heavy electrical generators); reliance on mono-
economies (or few sectors compared to larger economies).  
Ibid. at 90. 
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KDQGLFDSWRGHYHORSPHQW´148  Similar to studies of the period, Kuznets views 
µsmall¶ in the traditional sense, and uses the threshold of 10 million to define a 
small state economy.  
Economist William Demas, in The Economics of Development in Small 
Countries,149 builds on the work of Kuznets and considers a small state to have 
a population less than 5 million.150  However, Demas makes a significant 
contribution in recognizing challenges attributed to small size, UHFRJQL]LQJµWKDWD
FRXQWU\ZLWKOHVVWKDQPLOOLRQSHRSOH¶PD\H[SHULHQFHGLIILFXOW\LQSURYLGLQJIXOO-
scale governmental administrative services.151  Consequently, Demas questions 
the viability of very small states in the international community.  Moreover, 
.X]QHWV¶UHIHUHQFHWRWKHYHU\VPDOOVWDWHVRI0RQDFR$QGRUUDDQG
Luxembourg as splinters in the international community152 further illustrates 
%DUWPDQQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDWWKHVH(XURSHDQYHU\VPDOOVWDWHVDWWKHWLPHZHUH
FRQVLGHUHG³H[FHSWLRQVWRWKHUXle, that very small size precluded the capacities 
QHFHVVDU\IRUWKHH[HUFLVHRIVRYHUHLJQW\´153    
Small State Size 
Barry Buzan provides perspective into the implications of state size in the 
international community, stating:  
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³6L]HFRXQWVEHFDXVHVWDWHVDUe supposed to be relatively permanent 
constructions fulfilling the wide range of functions necessary for self-
government, without sufficient size, the unit is too fragile in company of its 
larger fellows and lacks the capability to perform all tasks of selIUXOH´154 
The view that very small size precluded the capacities necessary for the 
exercise of sovereignty was demonstrated by the British Colonial Office in 
Whitehall, which viewed states with populations of less than 2.5 million or states 
smaller than Sierra Leone as being unable to seriously pursue the option of 
sovereignty up until 1958.155   However, the independence of the French 
territories Mauritania and Gabon, with populations below one million and half a 
million, respectively, and the 1960 independence of the British island of Cyprus, 
with a population of less than one million, challenged the preconception that 
small size precluded the capacities necessary for the exercise of sovereignty. 
The independence of ever smaller dependencies and inclusion into the 
international community influenced the UN General Assembly Resolutions 1514 
and 1541. 
UN Resolutions 1514 and 1541 and the Emergence of Very Small States 
James Mittleman, in Collective Decolonisation and the U.N. Committee of 
24156 describes the 1960 UN General Assembly Resolution I514 (XV) ± the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
± as a basis for self-determination, in that it became a definitive expression of 
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anti-colonialism.157  Resolution 1514 was accompanied by UN Resolution 1541 
(XV) (15 December 1960), which outlined principles which should guide 
members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under Article 73E of the Charter,158 which called for the 
monitoring of political development of colonial territories. These resolutions 
influenced the creation of a Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to 
the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, which served as the major international 
instrument of decolonization, advocating for the self-determination of non-
governing peoples, and ensuring the absence of obstacles impeding 
implementation of Resolution 1514.159  These UN instruments challenged 
obstacles impeding the right to self-determination and ultimately influenced the 
independence of ever smaller dependencies.  
The independence and granting of UN membership to the Maldives in 
1965 is described by Barry Bartmann as breaking the tacit lower limits of 
                                                          
157
 Ibid. at 41.  
It is notable that the inalienable right to self-determination as expressed in Resolution 1514 
omitted continental nations. Rupert Emerson notes tKHSUREOHPLQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHµVHOI¶LQµVHOI-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶, which was eased by the distinction between colonial peoples and those other 
unfortunate souls who sought independence within the boundaries of existing states. 
Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization, supra note 16 at 27-30. 
)XUWKHUPRUHWKHLQIOXHQFHRIJUHDWSRZHUVLVLOOXVWUDWHGE\$OH[%HOODQ\ZKRLQ³7KH(QJOLVK
6FKRRO´HPSKDVL]HVKRZWKHDSSDUHQWRULJLQRILQWHUQDWLRQDOVRFLHW\¶VIRXQGDWLRQDOUXOHVDQG
their dissemination by European and Western powers during the period of decolonization was 
ERWKFRQVHQVXDODQGFRHUFLYHFLWHGLQ$OH[-%HOODQ\³7KH(QJOLVK6FKRRO´0DUWLQ
Griffiths(ed.), International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 84. 
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 ³5HVROXWLRQDQG5HVROXWLRQ´, supra note 21.   
159
 The Special Committee is a sub-organ of the General Assembly, established under 
Resolution I654 (XVI) it is also referred to as the Special Committee on Decolonization. 
"Collective Decolonization and the U.N. Committee of 24", supra note 156 at 65. 
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statehood with a population of fewer than one hundred thousand people,160 
demonstrating the independence of ever smaller states.  The inclusion of such 
lesser states (the perception at the time) raised concerns over sovereign 
equality and establishing an imbalance of power among nations.161  Holsti notes 
LQ³1DWLRQDO5ROH&RQFHSWLRQVLQWKH6WXG\RI)RUHLJQ3ROLF\´WKDWYHU\VPDOO
states were considered to engage in the international system only on a very 
limited basis.162  This perception is exemplified by UN observers, who raised 
FRQFHUQVDQG³DUJXHGthat the admission of small nascent nations resulted in a 
JURZLQJLPEDODQFHEHWZHHQYRWLQJSRZHULQWKH81DQGµUHDO¶SRZHULQWKHµUHDO¶
ZRUOG´163  
 Therefore, colonial powers encouraged the creation of larger political 
entities, through federations, as a means to alleviate disadvantages of size.  
7KLVLVH[HPSOLILHGE\WKHFUHDWLRQRIWKH:HVW,QGLHV)HGHUDWLRQDVLWZDV³D
means of increasing the effective size of the West Indian territories to the point 
where they became eligible for self-JRYHUQPHQWDVRQHXQLW´164  However, 
Anthony Payne, in The Politics of the Caribbean Community 1961-79, discusses 
the failure of the federation and described the lure of self-determination among 
Commonwealth Caribbean states with the independence of Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Barbados.  The independence of these larger Commonwealth 
&DULEEHDQ,VODQGVUHIOHFWHG$QGUHZ6FRWW¶VYLHZWKDW³WKHNH\FRQVLGHUDWLRQ«
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 "The Microstate Experience´Supra note 3 at 3.  
161
 "Very Small States at the Millennium´Vupra note 33 at 1. 
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 K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies 
Quarterly 14, no. 3 (September 1970): 233-309, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013584. 
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 "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972", supra note 34 at 110. 
164
 The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79, supra note 24 at 13. 
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IRULQGHSHQGHQFH«LVZKHWKHUDJURXSRISHUVRQVGHVLULQJWRSURFODim 
WKHPVHOYHVDµQDWLRQ¶KDYHWKHFDSDFLW\WRDVVHUWWKHLULQGHSHQGHQFHDQGDFWRQ
WKDWEDVLV´165  Also, the independence of these larger Commonwealth 
Caribbean Islands in comparison with smaller islands in the region exemplifies 
Burton Benedicts observatioQWKDWµVPDOO¶LVDUHODWLYHWHUPWKHUHIRUH
TXHVWLRQLQJWKHSUDFWLFHRIHVWDEOLVKLQJDUELWUDU\µFXW-RIIV¶IRUWKHDFFHSWDEOHVL]H
of a state.166   
The challenges in ranking states according to size influenced other 
considerations to categorize states, as seen through the work of David Singer 
and Melvin Small. Singer and Small included diplomatic recognition to establish 
the status of states in the international system.  However, they primarily 
H[FOXGHG³JOREDOO\LQVLJQLILFDQWHQWLWLHV´ZLWKSRSXODWLRQVRIXnder half a million, 
but eventually remedied their limitation by accounting for states which were 
members of the League of Nations or the UN.167 
Even though small state viability was repeatedly questioned, as illustrated 
through the works of George Reid, who ³HPSKDVL]HGWKHQHDULUUHOHYDQFHRI
FRQYHQWLRQDOFDSDELOLWLHVRISRZHU´RIYHU\VPDOOVWDWHVKHGRHVUHFRJQL]HYHU\
VPDOOVWDWHSRWHQWLDOLQ³SROLWLFDOZLOODQGGLSORPDWLFLQJHQXLW\LQPHHWLQJWKH
                                                          
165
 A. M. Scott, The Functioning of the International System (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 235.  
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Problems of Smaller Territories, supra note 26 at 45.  
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IXQGDPHQWDOREMHFWLYHVRIVHFXULW\DQGVXUYLYDO´168  The recognition of very 
VPDOOVWDWHVOHQGVWR+DUROG/DVZHOO¶VDQG$EUDKDP.DSODQ¶VLGHDWKDW³SRZHULV
SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHPDNLQJRIGHFLVLRQV´169  However, Barry Bartmann in The 
Microstate Experience: Very Small States in the International System,170 
differentiates the beginnings of very small state diplomacy from that of larger 
VWDWHVDVYHU\VPDOOVWDWHVZHUHFRQVLGHUHG³ORFDOSRZHUV´DVWKH\KDGIHZ
ongoing bilateral relationships, limited permanent missions, and engaged mostly 
with the former colonial power, or a neighboring state.171  This differentiation 
between very small states and large states became the focus of the UN in 1968. 
UN Report on Small States: 
The UN Secretary-*HQHUDO¶VDQQXDOUHSRUWUHIOHFWHGWKHLVVXHZLWK
small state viability, as the report acknowledged growing apprehension over 
sovereign entities that were described as exceptionally small in area, population, 
                                                          
168
 George Reid, "A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policies of very Small States with Special 
Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean", PhD Thesis, University of Southampton, 66-82 
cited in "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", supra note 47 at 363. 
169
 Harold Dwight Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political 
Inquiry (Yale University Press, 1950), 75. 
170
 "The Microstate Experience´Supra note 3. 
171
 Despite the modest beginnings of microstate diplomacy, Barry Bartmann observes that it 
does not suggest these states are indifferent to international concerns, and asserts microstate 
GLSORPDF\LVDVµV\PEROLF¶DVLWLVµSUDFWLFDO¶WKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ³UHDIILUPVWKHGLJQLW\
DQGWKHOHJDOHTXDOLW\RIDOOVWDWHV«³ 
Ibid. at 14. 
In addition to Barry Bartmann, Elmer Plischke, in  Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems 
and OptionsGHVFULEHVYHU\VPDOOVWDWHGLSORPDF\LQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DV³UHODWLRQV
EHWZHHQQDWLRQVDVWDNLQJDQRGGWZLVW´ with Luxembourg, a miniature European Grand Duchy  
accrediting its own diplomatic emissaries to only 10 other countries and relying on a neighbour 
to represent it to some 50 other governments; or one country commissioning a single 
ambassador on multiple assignments to 10 African states, and another government appointing 9 
ambassadors to represent it simultaneously  to more than 40 countries.  Plischke describes the 
HDUO\EHJLQQLQJVDQGQDWXUHRIYHU\VPDOOVWDWHGLSORPDF\DVD³SKHQRPHQRQ«\HWOLWWOH
XQGHUVWRRG´  
Microstates in World Affairs, supra note 120 at 1. 
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and human and economic resources.172  Correspondingly, these new states 
were categorized as small states, very small states, ministates and the more 
preferred term, microstates.173  UN concerns over microstates required UN 
Secretary-*HQHUDO87KDQWWRFDOOIRUDVWXG\WR³OD\GRZQWKHQHFHVVDU\
limitations of full membership while also defining other forms of association 
which would EHQHILWERWKWKH³PLFURVWDWHV´DQGWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV«´174 such as 
dissociating the principle of sovereign equality from that of equal voting.175 
The UN microstate study was addressed by the United Nations Institute 
IRU7UDLQLQJDQG5HVHDUFK81,7$5LQ³6WDWus and Problems of Very Small 
6WDWHVDQG7HUULWRULHV´LQ176 which was updated in 1971 in Small States 
and Territories: Status and Problems by Jacques Rapoport et al.177  7KHUHSRUW¶V
exploration of any special or associate membership for microstates concluded 
any diminutive categorization of microstates was a contentious issue with 
PLFURVWDWHVDVWKH\FRQVLGHUHG81IXOOPHPEHUVKLSDVWKH³ILQDOVWDPSRI
DSSURYDORQWKHLULQGHSHQGHQFH´178  Consequently, the UN studies in addition to 
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 Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 
supra note 37.  
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 Microstates in World Affairs, supra note 120 at preface. 
174
 Edward Dommen and Philippe Hein, States, Microstates, and Islands (London: Croom Helm, 
1985), 4. (hereinafter States, Microstates, and Islands). 
Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 
supra note 37. 
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 Jacques Rapoport and others, Small States & Territories: Status and Problems, (New York: 
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 United Nations Institute for Training and Research. and Jacques Rapoport, Status and 
Problems of very Small States and Territories. (New York: 1969). 
177
 Small States & Territories, supra note 175. 
7KHVWXG\LVFRQVLGHUHG³RQHRIWKHPRVWFRPSUHKHQVLYHH[DPLQDWLRQV´RIVPDOOVWDWHV 
Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, supra note 48 at 8-9. 
However, Edward Dommen notes that the UN ³VWXG\KDVQRWOHGWRDQ\FRQFUHWHDFWLRQRUHYHQ
WRDUHVROXWLRQPHQWLRQLQJWKHVSHFLILFSUREOHPVRIPLFURVWDWHV´  
States, Microstates, and Islands, supra note 174 at 20.    
178
 "What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?", supra note 36 at 116.  
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the work of the UN microstate Committee prevented large state inclinations to 
limit microstate membership179 and ceased any considerations of a separate, 
diminutive status for microstates.  
 The UNITAR study further consolidated the use of population as the key 
indicator to categorize states, and fixed the microstate upper limit at a population 
of one million.180  In addition to the UNITAR Study, Charles Taylor in 1969 
FRQWULEXWHGWRWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQLGHQWLILDEOHJURXSRI³PLFURVWDWHV.´,Q
contrast to the UNITAR study, Taylor uses a population of less than 2,928,000 
to define a microstate,181 as he notes difficulties and arbitrariness involved in 
fixing an acceptable cut-off point and admits possibilities ranging from one 
hundred thousand to one million.182  7D\ORU¶VILQGLQJVDUHVignificant in that, 
DFFRUGLQJWR7D\ORU¶VFULWHULDKLVVWXG\FRQFOXGHVIURPDVDPSOHRI
countries, that 74 states and territories are identified as very small and 50 of 
those are islands or groups of islands.183   
                                                                                                                                                                           
Elmer Plischke provides perspective into the significance of UN membership and its relation to 
the recognition of staWHVLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DVKHH[SODLQV³6RYHUHLJQVWDWHV
without attempting to define a theoretical essence of statehood  include not only those states 
deemed to be independent in the traditional sense but also a few otherwise questionable entities 
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or colonial country; formal recognition by some other states; establishment and maintenance of 
regularized bilateral diplomatic relation with one or more governments; and Membership (other 
WKDQREVHUYHUVKLSLQWKH81RULWVVSHFLDOL]HGDJHQFLHV´ 
Microstates in World Affairs, supra note 120 at 11-12. 
179
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 Small States & Territories, supra note 175 at 31. 
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 In addition  to a population of less than 2,928,000; Taylor used a land area less than 
142,822km and a GNP of less than US$1,583 million to identify a state as a microstate. 
Charles Taylor, "Statistical Typology of Micro- States and Territories: Towards a Definition of a 
Microstate," United Nations Institute for Training and Research: Small States and Territories: 
Status and Problems (1971), 194. KHUHLQDIWHU³Statistical Typology of Micro- States and 
Territories´ 
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 See William L. Harris in Microstates in the United NationsDEURDGHUSXUSRVH´&ROXPELD
Journal of Transnational law, Vol 9 (Spring 1970): Annex, p.23. 
183
 "Statistical Typology of Micro- States and Territories´supra note 181 at 192-194. 
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7D\ORU¶VUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWLVODQGVDUHWypically small states complements 
the work of Stanley de Smith, who views a state with a population of less than 
150,000 to be very small. 184  ,QDGGLWLRQWR'H6PLWK¶VSDUWLFXODUO\ORZSRSXODWLRQ
cut-RIIKHREVHUYHV³LVODQGVRFLHWLHVDVLQVXODU´185  DeSmith asserts that 
maritime borders may be particularly indomitable, and uses the example of the 
English Channel to illustrate that it has served, in some respects, to be a 
maritime frontier larger than the Atlantic Ocean itself.186  The correlation 
between island microstates and island insularity provides insight into the sense 
of island separateness, island identity, and the lure of self-determination of ever 
smaller island microstates.  
The Demonstration Effect: 
The emergence of these smaller and smaller states is discussed by 
Payne in The politics of the Caribbean Community 1961-79.187  The path to 
independence for Grenada in 1974 is described and the influence of the 
µGHPRQVWUDWLRQHIIHFW¶LVKLJKOLJKWHGDVLWLQIOXHQFHGWKHLQGHSHQGHQFHRIHYHU
smaller territories.188  9DXJKQ/HZLV¶VµGHPRQVWUDWLRQHIIHFW¶UHIHUVWRWKHDWWLWXGH
of the Commonwealth Caribbean when the 1966 independence of mainland 
Guyana created optimism for independence across the region: if Guyana can 
gain independence, why not Barbados, and why not independence for Grenada 
                                                          
184
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186
 Ibid. at 57.  
187
 The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79, supra note at 24. 
188
 ³7KH'HFRORQL]DWLRQRI*UHQDGDLQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV´, supra note 50.  As cited in 
"Very Small States at the Millennium´Vupra note 33 at 2. 
   64 
and for St. Kitts?189  The issue of size seemed to become less of a barrier.  As 
3KLOLSSH+HLQREVHUYHG³LWGRHVQRWDSSHDUOLNHO\WKDWDQ\FRXQWU\ZLOOLQWKH
future be excluded from United Nations membership because of its size.190  
Moreover, Patrick Emanuel notes that the verification of small state viability is 
witnessed in the surviving and functioning of these states in the changing 
environment of the international community.191  3D\QHLQ³7KH&RQWRXUVRI
Modern Caribbean PolLWLFV´192 SRLQWVRXWWKDWWKHVHYHU\VPDOOVWDWHV³ZHUHDEOH
to survive and operate in the international system in which several institutions 
KDGFRPHLQWRH[LVWHQFHWRVXVWDLQVPDOOYXOQHUDEOHVWDWHV´193  
Further Recognition of Islands: 
As the Commonwealth Caribbean witnessed the independence of many 
small islands, Caldwell et alLQ³7KHDemography of States,´194 supported 
7D\ORU¶VFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQPLFURVWDWHVDQGLVODQGVIXUWKHULQJWKHUHFRJQLWLRQ
of the small island state by affirming that the smaller the state, the greater 
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likelihood that it is an island.  Barry Bartmann provides insight into the 
REVHUYDWLRQWKDWPRVWPLFURVWDWHVDUHLQGHHGLVODQGVH[SODLQLQJWKDW³LWLV
generally a more difficult challenge for avaricious continental neighbors to 
realize their ambitions than might be the case with neighboring enclave states, 
as irredentist claims are typically more difficult to justify with island 
PLFURVWDWHV´195  
The Vulnerability of Small Island States  
The recognition of development challenges of these new states quickly 
IROORZHGWKHLUDFKLHYHPHQWRIVWDWHKRRG+HLQLQ³7KHStudy of Microstates,´
KLJKOLJKWVWKH81¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIµKDQGLFDSV¶VKDUHGE\VPDOOLVODQGVWDWHV
found in various UN resolutions since 1972,196 and outlines numerous 
contributions of the Commonwealth, which assumed a leading role in the study 
of microstate development.197  0RUHRYHU%DUU\%DUWPDQQLQ³,VODQG:DUDQG
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Commonwealth; and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in 1979, and 1981. 
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Security,´UHYHDOVWKDWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\ZDVSURPSWLQLGHQWLI\LQJWKDW
VPDOOLVODQGVWDWHV³«ZHUHH[Feedingly vulnerable to non-conventional 
LQYDVLRQVIURPPHUFHQDU\IRUFHVDQGWKRVHIRUFHVFRXOGEHIHZLQQXPEHU´198  
The mercenary attacks in the Seychelles, the Comoros, and the Maldives 
H[HPSOLI\WKHH[WHQWRIVPDOOLVODQGVWDWHYXOQHUDELOLW\DV³WKHVHVWates can be 
RYHUUXQRUWKHLUJRYHUQPHQWVRYHUWKURZQE\DIHZGR]HQDUPHGPHQ´199  
George Quester elaborates: 
³+RZIHZ&XEDQRU6RXWK$IULFDQPHUFHQDULHVZRXOGEHUHTXLUHGWRWDNH
over and establish effective control over such a republic? Is it one 
airplane-load of such operatives, or two? How easy is it for a foreign 
warship to establish the same domination? Where there is no hinterland 
for the inhabitants of the island to retreat to, there is no second line of 
defense, no backup position from which to repulse such foreign 
DJJUHVVLRQ´ 
In Grenada:  Revolution and Invasion, Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and 
Tony Thorndike200 provide a comprehensive account of the 1979 Revolution, the 
1983 political coup and the internal difficulties in Grenada where as few as 50 
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armed supporters HQFRXUDJHG³VHULRXVHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOFKDQJH´ 201 that 
would influence the region and the international community.  Barry Buzan, in 
People, States, and Fear;202 provides insight into the transcending of internal 
difficulties to external concerns demonstrated by Grenada with his idea that 
³GRPHVWLFWKUHDWVWRDZHDNVWDWHFDQDOPRVWQHYHUEHLVRODWHGIURPWKH
influence of outside powers, thus entangling domestic security problems with its 
H[WHUQDOUHODWLRQV´203  
Conventional Security Concerns  
Barry Bartmann and others highlight the occurrence of 
conventional/irredentist threats to the non-sovereign micro territories of East 
Timor, Western Sahara and the Falkland Islands.   
The Falklands: 
   The irredentist threat of Argentina in the Falklands shifted focus on small 
island state security to the Commonwealth Caribbean.  The Argentinean 
invasion of the Falklands also increased irredentist tensions between Venezuela 
and Guyana and Belize and Guatemala.  Tensions in Guyana increased to the 
extent that its government appealed to the UN Security Council that the massing 
of Venezuelan troops on the Guyanese border represented a real and present 
                                                          
201
 Ibid. at Introduction. 
"Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", supra note 47 at 367.   
202
 People, States, and Fear, supra note 154. 
203
 Jyoti M. Pathania, "Bangladesh: Non-Traditional Security," 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org//papers8/paper751.html (accessed July 8, 2010). (hereinafter 
³Non-7UDGLWLRQDO6HFXULW\´). 
   68 
LUUHGHQWLVWWKUHDWWR*X\DQD¶VWHUULWRULDOVRYHUHLJQW\204  Such examples illustrate 
the presence of irredentist threats and the relationship between Commonwealth 
Caribbean states and Latin American states. 
*HRUJH4XHVWHULQ³7URXEOHLQWKH,VODQGV: Defending the 
0LFURVWDWHV´205 QRWHVWKDWWKH)DONODQGVGHPRQVWUDWHGKRZ³DPLQLVFXOH
population can become central to DPDMRULQWHUQDWLRQDOLQFLGHQW´206 as the 
Falklands not only pitted Argentina and Britain against one another, but also 
tested international relations with the US. 
Grenada: 
Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike, in Grenada: Revolution 
and Invasion, provide a comprehensive account of the 1983 US invasion of 
Grenada.207  0RUHRYHU3D\QHLQ³7KH&RQWRXUVRI0RGHUQ&DULEEHDQ3ROLWLFV,´
provides insight into how the events in Grenada signaled the first time 
³&DULEEHDQ6WDWHVWKHPVHOYHVZHUHIRUFHGWRWKLQNDERXWWKHLURZQVHFXULW\´208 
and that the events were rooted in the economic difficulty of these very small 
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VWDWHVDVWKH\ZHUHVHDUFKLQJIRU³DEHWWHUDOWHUQDWLYHWRWUDGLWLRQDOSROLFLHVDQG
SUDFWLFHV´209  
3DXO6XWWRQLQ³86,QWHUYHQWLRQ5HJLRQDO6HFXULty, and Militarization in 
WKH&DULEEHDQ´210 provides insight into how US attention shifted to the 
Commonwealth Caribbean with the 1983 coup.  Sutton observes that the US 
military presence in the Commonwealth Caribbean prior to the invasion of 
Grenada was small211 and describes how the US invasion of Grenada was 
SHUFHLYHGDV³WKHZDWHUVKHG\HDULQZKLFKWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
willy-QLOO\FDPHREVHUYDEO\WRUHSODFHWKDWRI%ULWDLQ´212 which would translate 
into an increased US presence in the region.  For Payne213 and Sutton,214 the 
US invasion of Grenada signaled an attempt by the US to reassert US 
hegemony in the region despite views proposed by Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye, who argue that, despite US political and military superiority, the US no 
longer possessed adequate resources to assert formal hegemony.215  
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 In contrast, Buzan provides insight into the interconnectedness of 
security concerns in the international community and goes past the limitation of 
UHDOLVW³HPSKDVLVRQWKHVWDWH´216 when he notes that the ³VWDWHDQGV\VWHP
FDQQRWEHGLVFRQQHFWHGIURPHDFKRWKHULQUHODWLRQWRVHFXULW\´217  Furthermore, 
%X]DQ¶VFRQFHSWRIDµVHFXULW\FRPSOH[¶SURYLGHVDEDVLVIRUGLVFXVVLRQLQWR
PRWLYHVIRUWKH86LQYDVLRQRI*UHQDGDDVKHUHFRJQL]HV³DJURXSRIVWDtes 
whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their 
QDWLRQDOVHFXULWLHVFDQQRWUHDOLVWLFDOO\EHFRQVLGHUHGDSDUWIURPRQHDQRWKHU«´
that geographical, political, strategic, historical, economic or cultural links bind 
the interests and actions of states.218    
Barry Bartmann also provides perspective to the significance of the US 
LQYDVLRQRI*UHQDGDLQWHUPVRIPLFURVWDWHVHFXULW\LQWKDWLW³«GHPRQVWUDWHG
vividly the asymmetries of power between very small states and major poweUV´
LQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DQGPDUNHG³«WKHILUVWRFFDVLRQZKHQD
VRYHUHLJQPLFURVWDWHIRXQGLWVHOILQRSHQFRQIOLFWZLWKDPDMRUSRZHU´219  Though 
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microstate viability to participate as an equal member in the international 
community was no longer contested, Bartmann notes that the events of 
*UHQDGDLQGXFHG³«LQFUHDVLQJFRQFHUQDERXWWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHLQGHSHQGHQFH´
RIPLFURVWDWHVDVLWEHFDPHDSSDUHQWWKDW³YHU\VPDOOVWDWHVSXUVXH
independent policies and partnerships in the global system at their SHULO´220  
&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHHYHQWVRI*UHQDGDEHFDPHD³ZDWHUVKHGLQ&DULEEHDQ
DIIDLUV´221 which resulted in many works highlighting the concerns surrounding 
microstate security.   
Microstate Vulnerability Literature ± Mid-1980s 
The events of Grenada influenced four major studies focused on the 
vulnerability of microstates: Small is Dangerous,222 Vulnerability: Small States in 
a Global Society;223 Small States and the Commonwealth;224 and States, 
Microstates and Islands.225  Though the Commonwealth Secretariat addresses 
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the impacts of natural disasters and economic vulnerability,226 these particular 
studies focus on political vulnerability.227 
Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World ± Report of a Study 
Group of The David Davies Memorial Institute for International Studies, edited 
by Sheila Harden, signaled a return to the focus on very small state viability, 
now couched in the term vulnerability, as the study title suggests.  The study 
questions the effectiveness of the UN collective security system and compares 
the events of the Falklands and Grenada. Where the Argentinean invasion was 
YLHZHGDVDYLRODWLRQRI³VXFKNH\81SULQFLSOHVDVQRQ-intervention, the non-
use of force, and the right of self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQRISHRSOHV´WKH%ULWLVKDFWLRQZDV
welcomed.  However, the US action after an internal coup was perceived as 
³YLRODWLQJWKHSULQFLSOHRIQRQ-intervention in the domestic affairs of an 
LQGHSHQGHQWVWDWH´DQGGHVSLWH86MXVWLILFDWLRQLQWHUYHQWLRQKDVFRQWLQXHGWREH
SHUFHLYHGDV³KLJKO\HPRWLYH´228  
The study reaffirmed the misjudgment and lack of attention paid to 
microstate security, raising the problem of adequate security forces229 and 
LQWHUQDOVHFXULW\FRQFHUQVDV³DFRXSLQDQLVODQGRQO\WKLUW\PLOHVZLGHZLOOKDYH
a far greater chance of success than one in a larger area where it might be 
FRQWDLQHG´230  Moreover, the repercussions for the international community 
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were reaffirmed, as the Grenada invasion had proved that microstate security 
extended beyond national borders.231  In addition, the study addressed the 
political, economic and social stability determinants in microstate security;232 
these determinants are also addressed in the works of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat.   
The 1984 Commonwealth Secretariat Consultative Group on the Special 
Needs of Small States published a report entitled Vulnerability: Small States in a 
Global Society.233  7KH&RQVXOWDWLYH*URXSFRQWLQXHGWRXVH81,7$5¶VPLOOLRQ
upper limit to define a microstate, as it was particularly relevant in the 
Commonwealth context234 and represented a group of states that provided 
³FOHDUHYLGHQFHWKDWVHYHUHO\UHVWULFWHGKXPDQUHVRXUFHVFDQEHDFUXFLDO
FRQVWUDLQWRQDFRXQWU\¶VRYHUDOOFDSDFLW\WRIXQFWLRQHIIHFWLYHO\DVDQ
independent member of the international community.´235  In general, these very 
VPDOOVWDWHVZHUH³EXIIHWHGSROLWLFDOO\HFRQRPLFDOO\DQGVRFLDOO\IURPERWK
LQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDOIRUFHV«´236    
  However, the report focuses on very small state vulnerability to external 
DWWDFNDQGGLVFXVVHV&RPPRQZHDOWKOHDGHUV¶HPSKDVLVRQWKHLQWHUQDWional 
FRPPXQLW\¶V³«PRUDOREOLJDWLRQWRSURYLGHHIIHFWLYHO\IRUWKHWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\
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RIVPDOOVWDWHV´LQWKH*RD'HFODUDWLRQ237 and calls for the strengthening of UN 
collective security.  Moreover, the report discounts any argument based on the 
ineffecWLYHQHVVRIWKH81¶VFROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\V\VWHP when it states that ³VWHSV
VKRXOGKDYHEHHQWDNHQ«WRGLVFRXUDJHWKHGHFRORQL]DWLRQRIYHU\VPDOO
WHUULWRULHVZKLFKZRXOGREYLRXVO\EHXQDEOHWRGHIHQGWKHPVHOYHVPLOLWDULO\´238  
In addition, the report provides insight into the misconceptions of size by 
GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJEHWZHHQµZHDNVWDWHV¶DQGµZHDNSRZHUV¶DVVHUWLQJ³WKHLQWHUQDO
cohesion of small states translate into their strength, which also explains very 
small state emergence and survival in the international community.239  Robert C. 
Kiste and R.A. Kerr exemplify this distinction in The Potential for Soviet 
Penetration of the South PacificUHFRJQL]LQJWKH³SUHVXPHGFRKHVLRQRIVPDOO
societies, which tends to promote a strong sense of national identity, an asset 
ZKLFKPDNHVµVXEYHUVLRQE\VWHDOWK¶OHVVOLNHO\´240  
Also from the Commonwealth, a collection of papers from the Round 
Table, a journal focused on Commonwealth international affairs, was published 
in 1985.  Small States and the Commonwealth, edited by Peter Lyon, was 
presented at the 1985 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in the 
Bahamas.241  Similar to other such literature of the time, vulnerability of small 
states is the focus.  However, despite the negative connotations of the title, 
³3UREOHPV RI9XOQHUDELOLW\´)DEHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHFROOHFWLRQSURYLGHV
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insights into the assets of statehood,  recognizing that jurisdiction and a legal 
international personality which can speak for itself in the international community 
are valuable resources. 242  
In addition to the Commonwealth, the UNCTAD Secretariat contributed to 
the literature in States, Microstates and Islands.243  This collection of papers 
provides a thorough discussion of the definition of a microstate by Dommen and 
a review of microstate literature by Hein.  Similarly, the issues of vulnerability 
and development of small states are addressed.  However, States, Microstates 
and Islands provides a shift in focus to countries outside the Commonwealth 
system.  
It is interesting to note that there was shared authorship of the four works 
in 1985. Peter Lyon was a member of the Small is Dangerous study group in 
addition to his own work. Neville Linton was a member of the consultative group 
for Vulnerability: Small States in a Global Society, and provided background 
materials for Small is Dangerous.  This provides an explanation for the overlap 
of content, particularly between Small is Dangerous and Vulnerability: Small 
States in a Global Society, as they both focus on international affairs and 
provide similar recommendations.244  
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Microstate Conventional Security threats in the 1990s 
The concerns of microstate conventional security would resurface with 
WKHHYHQWVRI.XZDLWLQ7KH³LQHIILFDF\RIFRQYHQWLRQDOPLOLWDU\RSWLRQVIRU
very small stateV´245 was confirmed with the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait on 2 
August 1990.246  This event signaled only the second instance of an invasion 
and occupation of a microstate in the post WWII era.247  Barry Bartmann, in 
Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security, illustrates the gravity of the 
DQQH[DWLRQRI.XZDLW%DUWPDQQGHVFULEHVWKHHYHQWVRI.XZDLWDVD³PRUH
RPLQRXV´VHFXULW\WKUHDWWRPLFURVWDWHVDQGWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\WKDQ
*UHQDGDDV,UDTDWWHPSWHGWRHUDGLFDWHWKH³LQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOSHUVRQDOLW\RI a 
VRYHUHLJQVWDWHDQGDPHPEHURIWKH81«KDGLWVWRRGZRXOGKDYHEHHQFDXVH
IRUJUDYHFRQFHUQIRURWKHUYXOQHUDEOHVPDOOVWDWHV´LQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
community.248  John G. Stoessinger, in Why Nations Go to War,249  contrasts the 
invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and the annexation of Czechoslovakia 
by Hitler.250  Following annexation in 1939, &]HFKRVORYDNLD³FHDVHGWRH[LVW´
receiving no response from the great powers of the day until five months later 
when Hitler attacked Poland and WWII was officially declared.251  In contrast, 
the annexation of Kuwait was condemned by the US and, with the support of 
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%ULWDLQ³WKHFRUQHUVWRQHRIDWKLUW\-QDWLRQFRDOLWLRQ«XQGHUWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV
IODJ´FDOOHGIRU,UDT¶VLPPHGLDWHDQGXQFRQGLWLRQDOZLWKGUDZDOIURP.XZDLW252  
The events of Kuwait illustrated that D³FRQVHQVXVKDGEHHQUHDFKHGWKDW
international intervention was justified in cases of aggression by one country 
DJDLQVWDQRWKHU´253  In contrast, Stoessinger remarks that consensus on 
international intervention regardiQJLQWHUQDOPDWWHUVRIWKHVWDWH³LVQRWDOO-
encompassing.´254  Nonetheless, the reaction of the international community, as 
expressed through the UN and the subsequent liberation of Kuwait, exemplified 
the capability of UN collective security, and reaffirmed an international system 
safe for small states.255  7KH81¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKH.XZDLWLQYDVLRQUHDVVHUWHG
the UN to be a relevant organization capable of resolving interstate conflicts. 
Non-Conventional Security Threats in the 1990s 
Though the international system proved to be responsive to microstate 
security, Sutton, in Size and Survival: The Politics of Security in the Caribbean 
and the Pacific,256 asserts that small state security needs are continuous, not 
contingent, and that the international community cannot guarantee their survival.  
As a result, Sutton argues that small states need to adopt more comprehensive 
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security policies.257  This is reflected in the wake of economic pressure on social 
stability in the Commonwealth Caribbean, where the former Prime Minister of 
Trinidad and Tobago, A.N.R. Robinson, warned during the 1989 CARICOM 
6XPPLWWKDWXQOHVVWKHVLWXDWLRQZDVDGGUHVVHG³WKH&DULEEHDQFRXOGEHLQ
danger of becoming a backwater, separated from the main current of human 
advance into the twenty-firVWFHQWXU\´258  Ironically, Robinson was captured 
during a coup only a year later. 
%LVKQX5DJRRQDWK¶V(³7KH)DLOXUHRIWKH$EX%DNU&RXS7KH3OXUDO
Society, Cultural Traditions and Political Development in Trinidad,´259) describes 
the events of 1990 in Trinidad, which confirmed that microstates can be overrun 
by a few dozen armed troops, as the coup was instigated by just over 100 
organized youths in the Muslimeen.  Unlike Grenada, the events of Trinidad did 
not consume the international community.  The 1990s would witness a focus 
from conventional security threats to non-conventional security threats facing 
microstates. 
The security agenda of the 1980s was perceived mainly in conventional 
terms focused on the state and was eventually broadened to include more 
comprehensive issues such as economic and environmental threats to the state.  
+RZHYHUWKHVZRXOGLQWURGXFHDVKLIWLQWKH³VHFXULW\SDUDGLJP,´260 as 
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there was a deepening of the notion beyond the breadth of military security to 
include a consideration of the human and social impacts of security.  James 
Rosenau provides insight into non-conventional security threats by 
GLVWLQJXLVKLQJWKHP³IURPFRQYHQWLRQDOLVVXHVE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKH\VSDQQDWLRQDO
boundaries and thus cannot be addressed, much less resolved, through the 
DFWLRQVXQGHUWDNHQRQO\DWWKHQDWLRQDORUORFDOOHYHO´261  The increased 
recognition of non-conventional security threats are illustrated through the 
literature of Sutton and Payne, who continue a line of discussion similar to that 
of the 1960s and mid-VDUJXLQJWKDWPLFURVWDWHVJHQHUDOO\KDYH³ORZ
YLDELOLW\DQGKLJKYXOQHUDELOLW\´LQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\262  
The mid-1980s literature in the Commonwealth Caribbean considered 
non-conventional security threats (drugs and smuggling, and related activities 
such as surveillance of waters, and protection of fisherman) as low-level security 
threats.263  %\WKHV6XWWRQLQ³7KH3ROLWLFVRI6HFXULW\LQWKH&DULEEHDQ
and the Pacific,´264 observes that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS) - an island microstate regional organization - ³SODFHGDJUHDWHUSUHPLXP
on potential threats from internal subversion, secession and mercenary 
DFWLRQ«´, that is, threats of a non-conventional nature.265  Conversely, mainland 
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Commonwealth Caribbean states such as Guyana and Belize were more 
concerned over conventional threats such as irredentist territorial claims by 
Venezuela and Guatemala.266  Though Sutton recognizes similar geopolitical 
and security concerns among  islands  and enclave states,267 despite 
observations raised by Selwyn that island characteristics have more to do with 
VL]HWKDQµLVODQGQHVV¶EHFDXVHVXFKFKDUDFWHULVWLFV«FRXOGEHSDUDOOHOHGLQ
small, remote mainland countries, or indeed in peripheral regions of many larger 
countries."268  6XWWRQ¶VGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQEHWZHHQLVODQGDQGPDLQODQGPLFURVWDWHV¶ 
geopolitical and security concerns speaks to the distinctiveness of Islands and 
ultimately surpasses arguments related to size.  The further recognition of 
µLVODQGQHVV¶LVGHPRQVWUDted with UN initiatives in the 1990s. 
The Issue of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Vulnerability 
The particular vulnerability and distinct needs of small island developing 
states were further recognized by the UN under Agenda 21, with the call for a 
conference specific to this group of states, resulting in The Barbados Plan of 
Action (1994).  The conference focused on the economic, environmental and 
social development vulnerabilities or disadvantages of islands and viewed them 
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DVKDYLQJ³VLPLODUSK\VLFDODQGVWUXFWXUDOFKDOOHQJHVWRWKHLUGHYHORSPHQW´269  
SIDS asserted gross domestic product was an inadequate measure of their 
development, as it did not reflect the special problems associated with small 
size,270 and requested the creation of a vulnerability index detailing SIDS 
YXOQHUDELOLWLHVRUFKDOOHQJHVWRGHYHORSPHQW$FFRUGLQJO\/LQR%ULJXJOLR¶V
vulnerability index in Small Island Developing States and their Economic 
Vulnerabilities,271 under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), sets out similar disadvantages to SIDS 
development, such as the characteristics of small size, insularity and 
remoteness, proneness to natural disasters, environmental factors, dependence 
of foreign sources of finance and demographic factors due to migration.272  Such 
conclusions speak to the vulnerability of small island states and contribute to the 
notion of very small state unviability.  However, Anthony Payne notes: 
³«RQHFDQVWLOOOHJLWLPDWHO\IHHODVHQVHRIGLVDSSRLQWPHQWRQUHDGLng 
much of what has been written about the economic implications of 
smallness. The main problem has been that the analysis has never been 
grounded in a common economic definition of small size. As a result, it 
slips and slices over the general area of smallness in a loose and 
XQVDWLVIDFWRU\PDQQHU«              
In addition to these confusions, there is the further analytical difficulty that 
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small states include those with developed and developing economies, the 
SUREOHPVRIZKLFKDUHQRWSDWHQWO\WKHVDPH´273 
  
*RGIUH\%DOGDFFKLQRQRWHV7KRPDV.XKQ¶VFODVVLFVWXG\RIWKHUROHRI
SDUDGLJPVLQVFLHQFHDQGKRZLWLVWKHDFFXPXODWLRQRIµGLVFRUGDQFLHV¶RU
µDQRPDOLHV¶RIHYLGHQFHWKDWFDQQRWDGHTXDWHO\EHH[SODLQHGE\WUDGLWLRQDO
theory that forces a major paradigm VKLIWLQVFLHQWLILFWKLQNLQJ´274 
%DOGDFFKLQRSRLQWVRXWWKDW³VWXGHQWVRIVPDOOVWDWHVKDYHQRZDQRPDOLHV
aplenty that cannot be accounted for by the traditional economic theory of small 
VWDWHV´7KLVLVLOOXVWUDWHGLQWKHZRUNRI$UPVWURQJDQG5HDGZKRassembled 
and compared the economic performance of small states, and came to 
conclusions that challenge traditional thinking towards the economic vulnerability 
or unviability of size: ³6L]HKDVQRVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWXSRQDFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRPLF
growth performance, such that hypotheses concerning the adverse implications 
RIVPDOOVL]HDUHXQIRXQGHGLQHPSLULFDOIDFW«´ 
The strong growth achieved by some microstates is better than expected 
given the adverse effects of their small size. In addition, the performance of 
many large states is worse than expected given their beneficial size. 
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³>$Q@DOWHUQDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ«HPSKDVL]HVWKHFULWLFDOLPSRUWDQFHRI
inter-state differences in the quality of endogenous policy formulation and 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ´275 
Geoffrey Bertram and Ray Watters offer an example of new thinking 
towards small island state economics through their Migration, Aid and 
%XUHDXFUDF\0,5$%PRGHOZKLFKZDVRULJLQDOO\³DQDWWHPSWWRPRGHOWKH
stylized facts of modern economic development in a number of small Pacific 
LVODQGV´276 DQGDOVRVHWRXWWR³FDVWGRXEWRQWKHZLGHVSUHDGSHUFHSWLRQWKDW
VPDOOLVODQGVVXIIHUHGIURPYXOQHUDELOLW\´277  The MIRAB model recognizes the 
sustainability and development prospects of small island economies which focus 
on the flow of aid, movement of migrants, operation of bureaucrats and active 
remittance networks.278 
,QDGGLWLRQWR%HUWUDPDQG:DWWHUV¶0,5$%PRGHO*RGIUH\%DOGDFFKLQR
sets out the idea of PROFIT: People considerations affecting citizenship, 
residence and employment rights (P); Resource management (R); Overseas 
engagement and ultra national recognition (O); Finance (F) and Transportation 
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(T) to reflect small island states that KDYHPRUH³proactive policy orientation and 
a disposition towards carving out procedural aQGMXULVGLFWLRQDOSRZHUV´279 
-DPHV0F(OUR\¶VFRQFHSWRI6PDOO,VODQG7RXULVW(FRQRPLHV6,7(VDOVR
complements the small island state economic models of MIRAB and PROFIT by 
identifying the economic benefits small island states acquire from proximity and 
spin-offs from US tourism. 
  MIRAB and PROFIT respond to claims of small island state vulnerability,  
such as  %ULJXJOLR¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\LQGH[,  DQGUHYHDO%DOGDFFKLQR¶VREVHUYDWLRQRI
WKH³WHQGHQF\WRYLHZYHU\VPDOOVWDWHVDJDLQVWPRGHOVRIGHYHORSPHQWZKLch 
DUHURRWHGLQWKHH[SHULHQFHRIODUJHLQGXVWULDOL]HGFRXQWULHV´ which has 
created D³WHQGHQF\IRUSROLF\PDNHUVLQYHU\VPDOOVWDWHVWRDFFHSWWKHVH
models themselves precluding opportunities for truly imaginative niche 
VWUDWHJLHV´,280 therefore, undermining the positive aspects and strengths of 
microstates.  
 Such examples of small island state economic models speak to small 
island state viability.  SIS viability is also discussed by Paul Streeten in The 
Special Problems of Small Countries where Streeten suggests the resilience of 
very small size through political stability, a skilled and adaptable workforce and 
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an absence of administrative red tape.  He argues that these things give very 
small economies a competitive edge in the search for investment.281 
Despite recognition of political, economic and social viability of states of a 
very small size, the security and vulnerability of such states continues to be a 
IRFDOSRLQWRIVPDOOVWDWHOLWHUDWXUHDVZLWKWKH&RPPRQZHDOWK6HFUHWDULDW¶V
UHSRUW³A Future for Small States ± Overcoming Vulnerability.´282 The 1997 
report is significant in its revision to the upper limit in defining a small state as 
having a population up to 1.5 million.  Despite recognizing that any cut-off is 
somewhat arbitrary, the increase of world population and importance of regional 
consideration to countries just over the 1 million mark provided rationale to 
increase the cut-off to 1.5 million.283  Moreover, the revision of the cut-off point 
reflects %XUWRQ%HQHGLFW¶VFRQFHSWWKDWVPDOOness is relative and supports the 
UHTXLUHPHQWIRUDUHYLVLRQWKDWUHIOHFWV³WKHFKDUDFWHURIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
V\VWHP«´284 
Barry Bartmann acknowledges that the literature addressing the concerns 
RIWKHVHYHU\VPDOOVWDWHVLV³MXVWLILHGDQGQHFHVVDU\,´285 as he recognizes that 
the main obstacles of SIDS security are nonconventional security threats such 
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as civil insurgency and non-state players,286 ZKLFK³FDQEHWKRURXJKO\FRUURVLYH
LQWHUPVRIWKHVWDWH¶VZHOO-being...and may even threaten the identity and 
contLQXLQJH[LVWHQFHRIWKHVWDWHLWVHOI´287    
%DUWPDQQQRWHVWKDW³WKHVXUYLYDORIGLVWLQFWFXOWXUHVDQGFRPPXQLW\
values in very small places may seem as nothing less than remarkable given the 
PDQ\SUHGLFWLRQVIRUWKHLUH[WLQFWLRQ´288  Such survival is aided E\³WKHIULHQGVKLS
of a close mentor state, the support of regional bodies within their 
neighborhoods, and the extantism of the international system itself continue to 
be the major pillars of small island security.´289  Though Bartmann in Very Small 
States at the Millennium: the Contest between Vulnerability and Opportunity,290 
DVVHUWVWKDW³WKHZRUOGLVQRWHQWLUHO\VDIHIRUYHU\VPDOOVWDWHV«´KH
acknowledges the changing patterns of the international system have 
encouraged a milieu more favorable to very small states, making the 20th 
century an ideal time for a small state system.291  SIS in particular have become 
DIRFXVRIPXFKLQWHUHVWDVGHPRQVWUDWHGLQ³$:RUOGRI,VODQGV,´ZKLFKDLPVDW
moving from a continental paradigm of analyzing SIS scholarship and 
challenges to one where islands are placed in the centre of things.292  This 
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FKDQJHLQSHUVSHFWLYHLVDOVRFDSWXUHGE\(SHOL+DX¶RIDLQ³2XU6HDRI
Islands.´293 
In addition to small state viability, Bartmann recognizes a continued 
recognition of small island states demonstrated  by a second wave of self-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDW³«LVHYLGHQWHYHQDPRQJLVODQGPLFURVWDWHV´DV³HYHQ
Lilliputs, if scattered it seems, can face even more diminutive Lilliputians of their 
RZQ´294  7KHFDVHRI1HYLVGHPRQVWUDWHV³WKHSRZHURI separate island 
identity,´ZKLFKLOOXVWUDWHV³«WKHVSHFWUHRIVHFHVVLRQLVHYHUSUHVHQW´DQG
UHYHDOVWKDWWKHµVHOI¶LQµself-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶RIYHU\VPDOOWHUULWRULHVLQDSRVW-Cold 
War world has pushed beyond traditional colonial precepts of an earlier era.295   
Literature Review Summary/Conclusion 
The transformation of the international system and evolution of the 
sovereign state has been demonstrated from the Concert of Europe to current 
norms within the United Nations. The examination of small state and 
consequently very small state proliferation revealed a number of themes, 
including issues surrounding:  small state viability and the issue of size; the 
correlation of very small size and islandness; conventional security threats are 
more the exception than the rule for SIDS; and that SIDS security is defined 
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more in the terms on non-conventional security and that the continued security 
of SIDS is best defined in terms of international cooperation and support.  The 
nature of Commonwealth Caribbean SIDS security will be further examined in 
their relationship with the US, particularly in the context of the 1983 events in 
Grenada.  
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The US in the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America 
The US has been perceived as a hegemonic power throughout Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  However, despite such charges, particularly in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean with the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, the US 
relationship with the Commonwealth Caribbean can be viewed in terms of power 
asymmetry.  The historic role of the US in the Commonwealth Caribbean tends 
to be perceived through the same lens as is Latin America.  However, the very 
different histories, languages, legal structures and cultures of the two regions 
result in very different relationships with the US.   
To reveal a more sensitive interpretation of the US relationship and 
consequent role in the Commonwealth Caribbean, its distinction from Latin 
America will be examined.  First, it is necessary to compare the composition of 
the Commonwealth Caribbean296 with that of Latin America, 297 as demonstrated 
in table 5, below.  
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 Table 5: The Commonwealth Caribbean versus Latin America 
Commonwealth Caribbean Independence Latin America Independence 
Jamaica 1962 Haiti 1804 
Trinidad and Tobago 1962 Columbia 1810 
Guyana 1966 Chile 1810 
Barbados 1966 Mexico 1810 Declared 
1821 Recognized by 
Spain 
Grenada 1974 Paraguay 1811 
Dominica 1978 Venezuela 1811 
St Lucia 1979 Argentina 1816 
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
1979 El Salvador 1821 
Belize 1981 Guatemala 1821 
Antigua and Barbuda 1981 Costa Rica 1821 
St Kitts and Nevis 1983 Nicaragua 1821 
  Peru 1821 
  Honduras 1821 
  Ecuador 1822 
  Brazil 1822 
  Bolivia 1825 
  Uruguay 1828 from Brazil 
  Cuba 1898 from Spain       
1902 from US  
   92 
  Panama 1821 from Spain       
1903 from Columbia 
  
Dominican 
Republic         
1844 from Haiti 
 
  Puerto Rico US territory with 
commonwealth status  
 
   Map 1298 illustrates the proximity of the Commonwealth Caribbean (see 
Map 2, which also identifies sub-national jurisdictions of the Commonwealth)299  
to that of Latin America (see Map 3).300  
Map 1 
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Map 2 
 
Map 3 
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Table 5 illustrates that sovereignty for Commonwealth Caribbean States 
is relatively new, compared with that of Latin America.  The duration of 
international relationships between the US, Latin America and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean is also illustrated through the Organization of 
American States (OAS).  The 35 members and permanent missions of the OAS 
consist of the US (1889); Suriname (1977), a former Dutch colony in Northern 
South America; and the following states listed in Table 6, below.301  
Table 6: OAS Member States  
OAS Commonwealth 
Nations 
OAS Membership OAS Latin American 
Nations 
OAS Membership 
Barbados 1967 Argentina 1889 
Trinidad and Tobago 1967 Bolivia 1889 
Jamaica 1969 Brazil  1889 
Grenada 1975 Chile 1889 
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Dominica 1979 Columbia 1889 
St Lucia 1979 Costa Rica 1889 
Antigua and Barbuda 1981 Ecuador 1889 
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines  
1981 Dominican Republic 1889 
The Bahamas 1982 El Salvador 1889 
St Kitts and Nevis 1984 Guatemala 1889 
Canada  1990 Haiti 1889 
Belize 1991 Honduras 1889 
Guyana 1991 Mexico 1889 
 
  Nicaragua 1889 
 
  Peru 1889 
  Paraguay 1889 
  Uruguay 1889 
  Venezuela 1889 
  **Cuba 1902 
  Panama 1905 
 
US Foreign Policy in the Americas and the Caribbean  
US foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean has often been 
JHQHUDOL]HGWREHVRPHZKDWLGHQWLFDOWKURXJKWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKH³0RQURH
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Doctrine (1823), passing through the Olney Declaration (1895), Roosevelt 
Corollary (1904 and 1905), Dollar Diplomacy (1912), the Good Neighbor policy 
(1933), the act of Havana (1940), the Kennan Corollary (1950), the Johnson 
'RFWULQHDQGWKH&%,«´302 and, the Dulles Resolution (1954). 
  Shifts in US Foreign policy, through the Monroe Doctrine and its 
interpretations,303  the Good Neighbor Policy;304 and the Dulles Resolution;305 
has demonstrated that the US relationship with Latin America vis-á-vis that of 
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 Humberto Garcia-Muniz, (eds.)  Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, "The United States 
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 ³7KHWKUHHPDLQFRQFHSWVRIWKHGRFWULQHDUHWRVHSDUDWHVSKHUHVRILQIOXHQFHIRUWKH
Americas and Europe; non-colonization; and non-intervention were designed to signify a clear 
break between the New World and colonial powers of Europe and served as a warning towards 
European powers against interfering in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American 
VWDWHVRUSRWHQWLDO8QLWHG6WDWHVWHUULWRULHV´ 
"Monroe Doctrine, 1823," http://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/Monroe (accessed 
August 19, 2010). 
$OVR³7KHRGRUH5RRVHYHOW
VFRUROODU\WR3UHVLGHQW-DPHV0RQURH
VIDPRXVGRFWULQHRI
proclaimed that not only did America have the right,  to block European attempts to re-colonize 
any of the Western Hemisphere, it also had the right to take over and shape up any nation in the 
hemisphere guilty of "chronic wrongdoing" or uncivilized behaviour that left it "impotent," 
powerless to defend itself against aggressors from the other Hemisphere, meaning mainly 
(QJODQG)UDQFH6SDLQ*HUPDQ\DQG,WDO\´ 
Tom Wolfe, "The Doctrine that Never Died," The New York Times Online, 30 January 2005 
(accessed August 18, 2010). (hereinafter "The Doctrine that Never Died").  
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respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt and Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1938), 1.  
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 The Dulles Resolution was the US response to political changes in Guatemala in the early 
¶V³7KH'XOOHV5HVROXWLRQXSGDWHGWKH0RQURH'RFWULQHWRILWLQZLWKWKHth Century 
experience on how foreign intervention, which Monroe sought to prevent, might be achieved 
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foreign variety. It branded Communist domination of any American state as a threat to the 
VRYHUHLJQW\RIDOOZKLFKVKRXOGEHPHWFROOHFWLYHO\³LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKDOOWUHDWLHV´ 
 "Pilot Dulles Outsails the Reds," 
http://books.google.ca/books?id=ZkgEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA29&lpg=PA29&dq=the+dulles+resolut
ion+++guatemala&source=bl&ots=H5x-
mmJaSd&sig=GgZECoYxITz8plnYEr6mBFcplSc&hl=en&ei=SQuqTbHDFMLq0gHh5OiOCw&sa
=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CBgQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=the dulles 
resolution + guatemala&f=false (accessed 12, 36).  
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the Commonwealth Caribbean is different from one another. Separation of US 
relations with Latin America, versus that of US relations with Britain, and 
Commonwealth Caribbean states and British dependencies in the Caribbean are 
exemplified in border disputes between Guyana and Venezuela, Belize and 
Guatemala, and the Falkland Islands and Argentina. 
Venezuela and Guyana ± The US Relationship and Olney Declaration (1895)  
The British Guiana (Anglo)-Venezuelan Boundary witnessed Venezuela 
requesting US intervention in the dispute, which eventually occurred in 1895 and 
1896 and signaled a more outward-looking US foreign policy. 306  Moreover, US 
intervention between Latin America and the Commonwealth Caribbean 
demonstrated US willingness to extend its interests in the region expressed 
through the Olney Declaration/Corollary,307 and represents the first instance of 
US intervention in a Commonwealth Caribbean state.308   The award of the 
Arbitration Tribunal proved to be unsatisfactory to Venezuela, despite US 
intervention. However, US intervention and resentment towards Britain due to 
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 Odeen Ishmael, "Guyana's Western Border - Introduction to the Documents," 
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 Richard Olney, US Secretary of State from 1895-1897, and his interpretation and application 
of the Monroe doctrine  as a basis of intervention demanding England for Arbitration in the 
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that of the threat of War.   
 George B. Young, "Intervention Under the Monroe Doctrine: The Olney Corollary," Political 
Science Quarterly 57, no. 2 (June 1942): 249-250, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2143553.    
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 This officially began in 1841 the Venezuela protesting a British Guiana encroachment on 
Venezuelan territory. The contested Schomburgk Line established in the 1840 survey of British 
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in Venezuela, breaking diplomatic relations with Great Britain in 1876.  Otto Schoenrich, "The 
Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute," The American Journal of International Law 43, no. 
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   98 
%ULWLVKµSUHVVXUH¶RQ9HQH]XHODWRDFFHSWVXFKDQDZDUGVSHDNVWR86EHVW
interest of Latin American countries vis-á-vis interests of British Guiana at the 
time.309 Even though Venezuela accepted the Arbitration Tribunals award, the 
sub-sequent publishing of the late Mr. Mallet-3UHYRVW¶V0HPRUDQGXPUHRSHQHG
the Venezuelan claim to the Western Essequibo River.310  Though Venezuelan 
WHUULWRULDOFODLPVGLGQRWDIIHFW*X\DQD¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHWKHWHUULWRULDOFODLP
continues to present an irredentist threat to the independent Commonwealth 
nation of Guyana. The Guyana-Venezuela border dispute has created suspicion 
between the two countries and that suspicion has subsequently been 
perpetuated among other states in the region.  This has created two regional 
communities, Latin American states and the Commonwealth Caribbean states, 
which serves to illustrate the differentiation between the two, particularly in the 
context of US relations. In addition to Latin American irredentist threats to 
Guyana, the Commonwealth Caribbean country of Belize also experiences 
irredentist threats from the Latin American State of Guatemala.   
Guatemala and Belize ± US Relationship 
At first, Belize and the US cultivated strong economic and diplomatic links 
due to an expression of US anti-FRORQLDOLVPDQG%HOL]H¶VVHQWLPHQWWKDW%ULWDLQ
would be the main obstacle to its sovereignty.311  +RZHYHU*XDWHPDOD¶V
                                                          
309
 Ibid. 
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 Mr. Mallet-3UHYRVW¶V0HPRUDQGXPFODLPHGWKH$UELWUDO7ribunal decision of 1899 was a 
³SROLWLFDOGHDO´EHWZHHQ*UHDW%ULWDLQDQG5XVVLD 
Ibid. at 528.  
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 Originally the British colony of British Honduras, the colony's name was changed to Belize 
June 1, 1973 in anticipation of independence. British reluctance to self governance in Belize 
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territorial claim to the entirety of Belize represents another case of an irredentist 
threat to a Commonwealth nation from a Latin American country, and has 
SURYHQWRUHSUHVHQWWKHPDLQREVWDFOHWR%HOL]H¶VLQGHSHQGHQFH312  Similar to 
the Britain-Venezuela border dispute, the US was requested to mediate once 
talks between Guatemala and Britain broke off in 1965.  The US found itself 
caught between Latin American and Commonwealth Caribbean interests when 
its proposals for closer ties between Guatemala and Belize created potential for 
Belize becoming more dependent on Guatemala. In the end, the US proposals 
were denounced by Belize. 313  The failure of US mediation resulted in Belize 
requesting independence and defense guarantees from Britain.314    
Though a procession of right wing governments in Guatemala since 1954 
served US interests in the region, they also stirred Guatemalan national 
interests that witnessed pro-military Guatemalan governments mass their troops 
on the Guatemala/Belize border on a number of occasions.  When talks from 
1969 to 1972 broke off, Britain announced it was sending an aircraft carrier and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
"Belize ± Decolonisation and the Border Dispute with Guatemala," 
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Ibid. 
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19, 2011). 
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 "Belize - Decolonisation and The Border Dispute with Guatemala", supra note 311. 
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8,000 troops to Belize for an amphibious exercise.315  This led to the massing of 
Guatemalan troops on the border.316 Eventually talks resumed, but ceased 
again in 1975; cessation of talks influenced Belizean Premier of the day, George 
Price, to increase efforts towards independence.  The increased efforts towards 
independence involved a push for further international recognition, particularly at 
the UN.  Key players for further recognition included Commonwealth Caribbean 
states, particularly Barbados.  The strategy for further international recognition 
by Belize influenced the US to move from its position of abstention to 
recognition, which influenced OAS member states, particularly Mexico.  The 
eventual recognition of Belize by the Latin countries of Cuba, Mexico, Panama 
and Nicaragua, which constituted a break in Latin American solidarity, left 
Guatemala isolated on the issue, resulting in Belize achieving independence in 
1981.317   
The period following the independence of Belize saw an increase in US 
political, economic and military activity in the region.  The US recognized the 
strategic significance of Belize, due to US military engagements in Central 
America, and this led to closer ties between the two countries.  US diplomatic 
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staff grew from seven at the time of independence to more than 50 by 1990. The 
US also increased its assistance to the Belize Defence Force and sent military 
observers to joint British and Belizean forces, ensured more frequent visits by 
US warships, and deployed the US Army Corps of Engineers on a US AID-
funded road and bridge building program in 1987.  In addition, the US offered 
balance-of-payments assistance to Belize and US AID on domestic matters 
such as pricing, trade and the level of public savings.  Closer ties between the 
two countries also witnessed the establishment of a broadcast relay station, 
access to US programming on Belizean television, and access to unofficial 
private investors such as Coca-&RODZKLFKSXUFKDVHGDQHLJKWKRIWKHFRXQWU\¶V
land area to grow citrus.318  Despite the independence of Belize in 1981, 
Guatemala did not recognize Belize until 1992.  Moreover, the border dispute 
continues and is to go before the International Court of Justice at The Hague.319  
Monarchism versus Republicanism and the Organization of American States  
In addition to the historical/political tensions between Guyana and 
Venezuela, and between Belize and Guatemala, Roy Preiswerk discusses the 
challenges towards cooperation between the Latin American republics and the 
constitutional monarchies of the Commonwealth, as history has created two 
different worlds.320  Preiswerk highlights that solidarity among Latin American 
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states and similarly Commonwealth Caribbean states has engendered suspicion 
between the two regions, as the Commonwealth Caribbean was cautious of 
irredentist threats from Latin America.  Latin America, in turn, had concerns of 
the Commonwealth Caribbean.  The Commonwealth Caribbean comprised of 
ministates and raised the debate of inclusion of ministates in regional bodies 
such as the Organization of American States (OAS), which would also increase 
the number of English-speaking states, raising concern of voting solidarity 
between the two regions.321  0RUHRYHU³WKHHFRQRPLFFRQFHUQVRIWUDGLWLRQDO
links of the West Indies and Guyana with the Commonwealth, the incompatibility 
of the economies from a static point of view, and the lack of cohesion of 
&$5,)7$ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHIRUHLJQHFRQRPLFSROLFLHVRIPHPEHUV´322 posed 
obstacles to Latin American and Commonwealth Caribbean relations. 
Despite Latin American concerns the OAS welcomed Commonwealth 
Caribbean state membership, as was demonstrated with the admission of 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago in 1967.  This would prove to open the way 
for increased relations between Latin America and the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.  However, border disputes between Guyana and Venezuela and 
between Belize and Guatemala serve as examples where the Commonwealth 
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&DULEEHDQYLHZHGWKH86DVIDYRULQJ/DWLQ$PHULFDVWDWHV¶LQWHUHVWVRYHUWKRVH
of the Commonwealth Caribbean.323 
The differences between Latin America and the Commonwealth 
Caribbean would draw the US into more than mediation of border disputes with 
the events of the Falklands War in 1982. 
The Falkland Islands War 
The Falkland Islands324 have been at the centre of external ownership for 
most of its history: it has been claimed by France, Spain, Argentina and Britain, 
and ownership issues continue today over shipping lane rights and potential off 
shore oil reserves.325  Of these countries, Argentina has never abandoned its 
claim to the Islands, despite British possession of them.  The development of 
offshore oil off the Falklands by a UK oil exploration company has increased 
tensions in the dispute over the Falklands.326  The British investigated 
decolonizing the islands in the 1970s, but it was not an initiative of the 
inhabitants. In response to the lack of political change on the islands, Argentina 
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invaded the Falklands in 1982, prompting almost immediate British action to 
reclaim the territory.  
Once again the US found itself between Latin America and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.  Former US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, considered a policy of neutrality in the Falklands War to be in the 
best interests of the US. Kirkpatrick was concerned that the US should not 
jeopardize its relations with Latin America by backing Britain.  However, 
.LUNSDWULFN¶VSRVLWLRQRIQHXWUDOLW\ZDVTXHVWLRQHGDV, "only hours after the 1982 
invasion of the Falklands, she notoriously attended as guest of honour a 
receSWLRQDWWKH$UJHQWLQH(PEDVV\LQ:DVKLQJWRQ´327 She then went on 
television to assert that if the islands rightly belonged to Argentina its action 
FRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGDV³DUPHGDJJUHVVLRQ´328  Conversely, the 
Europeanists in the US State Department and the Pentagon could not imagine 
that the United States would not support a NATO member.  Former US 
Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, was aware of these conflicting pressures 
and held that the United States was uniquely placed to negotiate a political 
settlement.  More importantly, he asserted that playing mediator between 
Argentina and the United Kingdom would at the very least provide Washington 
with an excuse for not taking sides immediately.  When the Argentinians 
                                                          
327
 "Jeane Kirkpatrick: US Ambassador to the UN Who Strove to Get President Reagan to Take 
Argentina's Part in the Falklands Conflict.´Times Online Obituary, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article1088794.ece (accessed February 10, 
2010). 
(KHUHLQDIWHU³Jeane Kirkpatrick´ 
328
 Ibid. 
   105 
rejected proposals for a settlement, WaVKLQJWRQRIILFLDOO\FRPPLWWHGWR%ULWDLQ¶V
side in the dispute.329  
US support for Britain is highly significant in a military sense, as Britain 
benefited from US fuel, Sidewinder missiles, other arms, vital US satellite 
intelligence that enabled it to win the war,330 and reinforced strong ties between 
the US, Britain and the Commonwealth Caribbean.  US division over the matter 
illustrates the requirement for the US to cooperate with other states, which 
illustrates the limits to US foreign policy as Jeane Kirkpatrick noted that³ZHZLOO
need to learn to be a power, not a superpower. We should prepare 
psychologically and economically for reversion to the status of a normal 
QDWLRQ«´331    
 The depth and complexity of US involvement in Latin America and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean is exemplified through the cases/events already 
mentioned. However, the US relationship with the greater Caribbean has often 
been interpreted through the US invasion of Grenada in 1983. 
Grenada 
In order to examine the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, some 
perspective into the events leading up to the US invasion is required.  In March 
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DFRXSG¶pWDWLQ*UHQDGDFDXJKWWKHDWWHQWLRQRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
community.  Forty-five party members of the New Jewel movement, a Marxist 
socialist party, mounted an attack to overthrow the government of Sir Eric 
Gairy,332 exemplifying how easily one of the smaller sovereign states in the 
western hemisphere could be overtaken.  Furthermore, the uprising of the New 
Jewel Movement has been described as: 
  ³..striking terror in to the hearts of the smaller island 
governments... nearly all (of whom) have come out against the coup, 
seeing it, especially because of their own small size, as a threatening 
example to their own leftists with whom Bishop, as a regional human 
ULJKWVODZ\HUKDGFORVHSHUVRQDOUHODWLRQV´333 
This fear resonated particularly in Antigua, St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica 
and St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Barbados, all of which openly 
disapproved the action of the New Jewel Movement and refused to recognize 
the new government due to concerns that recognition would ultimately serve 
future political uprisings in the region. However, the rise of the New Jewel 
Movement gradually gained support from other Caribbean states. Expectedly, 
UHJLPHVRIVLPLODULGHRORJ\VXFKDV-DPDLFD¶V0LFKDHO0DQOH\DQG*X\DQD¶V
)RUEHV%XUQKDP&XED¶V)LGHO&DVWURDQGWKH6RYLHW8QLRQVXSSRUWHGWKH
3HRSOH¶V5HYROXWLRQDU\*RYHUQPHQW35* 
 %ULWDLQ¶VWUDGLWLRQRIUHFRJQL]LQJJRYHUQPHQWVHYHQLIWKH\GLVDSSrove of 
them resulted in recognition of the PRG in Grenada despite anti-PRG 
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sentiments of the Thatcher government, which led to OECS recognition.334 
However, a more resigned attitude toward the PRG was adopted in CARICOM 
where the new government was accepted but failed to be embraced.335  This 
position largely reflects the international attitude toward the PRG and Grenada 
at the time; particularly the US attitude, which also recognized the new PRG 
government despite its communist nature.336  
    7KHFRXSG¶ptat effectively raised international relation tensions 
among states in the eastern Caribbean and the western hemisphere as a whole, 
and inspired the creation of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System 
(RSS).337  However, it was a second, more violent coup in October 1983 which 
prompted US intervention in Grenada. 
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Cooperation: Traditional and Non-traditional Areas, Caribbean Security´ 
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The 1983 FRXSG¶pWDWLQ*UHQDGDZLWQHVVHGD left wing revolt of 
approximately 50 armed supporters led by Bernard Coard, resulting in the 
capture and execution of PRG Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and high-level 
government officials.338  The leftist leaders and military supporters took over the 
government under the Revolutionary Military Council.  The FRXSG¶pWDW received 
µKRVWLOHUHDFWLRQV¶IURPHYHQLWVVWURQJHVWFRPPXQLVWVXSSRUWHUVVXFKDV&XED¶V
Fidel Castro,339 as prior acceptance of the PRG turned to regional and 
international condemnation. 
 The violence of the 1983 FRXSG¶pWDWLQFUHDVHGLQWHUQDWLRQDODQGUHJLRQDO
security concerns.  In particular, OECS countries of Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua 
and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and 
Montserrat, requested assistance from Jamaica, Barbados and the US.340  The 
86³UHVSRQGHGWRWKHSOHDRIWKH2UJDQL]DWLRQRIWKH(DVW&DULEEHDQ6WDWHV
2(&6WRLQWHUYHQH´341 This resulted in the deployment of a multi-national 
force, with contingents from Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Barbados, 
and Jamaica. The US coalition forces invaded Grenada on 25 October 1983. 
 
                                                          
338
 "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", supra note 47 at 367. 
339
 Grenada: Politics, Economics, and Society, supra note 333 at 164. 
340
 (YHQWKRXJK2(&6³OHDGHUVDVNHGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWROHDGDQGRUJDQL]HDMRLQW
&RPPRQZHDOWK&DULEEHDQLQYDVLRQRI*UHQDGD´WKHUHLVGHEDWHRQWKHDPRXQWRI86LQIOXHQFH
upon the OECS decision to request US assistance. 
Grenada Revolution and Invasion, supra note 200 at 149. 
341
 Frederic L. Pryor, Revolutionary Grenada: A Study in Political Economy (New York:  Praeger, 
1986), 357.  
In addition to the OECS request for assistance to the US, the US invasion of Grenada has been 
legitimized on the request for assistance from Grenadian Governor-General Paul Scoon on the 
basis of the same OECS Treaty. For a more detailed discussion see: Frederic L. Pryor, 
Revolutionary Grenada: A Study in Political Economy, 1986), 358.  See also: Grenada 
Revolution and Invasion, supra note 200 at 157. 
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The Shift in US Foreign Policy and the New Right 
  The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 led to a shift in US foreign policy 
in Latin America and the Caribbean.  The Reagan Administration was highly 
FULWLFDORI3UHVLGHQW&DUWHU¶VLGHRORJLFDOSOXUDOLVPDQGOLEHUDOLVPZKLFK
recognized the PRG in Grenada and countered with concerns of Soviet-Cuban 
militarism in the region and throughout the Third World.342  In addition, the US 
SHUFHLYHG%ULWDLQ¶VZLWKGUDZDOLQWKH&RPPRQZHDOWK&DULEEHDQDVOHDYLQJD
vacuum in which tiny economically vulnerable states such as Grenada were 
susceptible to exploitation by Cuba,343 OHDGLQJWKH86WRIHDUWKH³SURVSHFWRID
FRPPXQL]HG&DULEEHDQ%DVLQ´344  This provides insight into US President 
5RQDOG5HDJDQ¶VLQYDVLRQRI*UHQDGDZKLFKH[FHHGHGthe Carter 
AGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSROLF\RIµPLOLWDU\FRQWDLQPHQW¶WRWKDWRIµXUJHQWDQGQHFHVVDU\
PLOLWDU\DFWLRQ¶DVDUHVSRQVHWRSROLWLFDOXQUHVWLQWKHHDVWHUQ&DULEEHDQ
However, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 received a mixed response from 
the international community. 
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 The US ambassador to the United Nations at the time, Jeane Kirkpatrick, viewed the Carter 
administration as the problem, as she stated³$PHULFDQSROLFLHVKDYHQRWRQO\SURYHGLQFDSDEOH
of dealing with problems of Soviet/Cuban expansion in the area, they have possibly contributed 
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The International Crisis in the Caribbean, supra note 213 at 48. 
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 Ibid. 
344
 Grenada Revolution and Invasion, supra note 200 at 55. 
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International Response to the Invasion 
International reaction is best illustrated through the UN Security Council 
resolution denouncing the US invasion of Grenada,345 which passed 11 votes to 
1, with 3 abstentions. Guyana, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe, France, the 
Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Poland, Malta, Pakistan, China and Jordan voted 
in favour of the resolution. The US was the sole vote against, thereby vetoing 
the resolution.  Togo, Zaire and Britain were the three abstentions.  This led 
Nicaragua and Zimbabwe to take the resolution to the UN General Assembly, 
where no veto existed. Belgium amended the resolution with a clause to hold 
free elections in Grenada as soon as possible.  The resolution passed 108 votes 
to 9, with a number of countries abstaining. The only countries to support the US 
were Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, El Salvador 
and Israel.346  Despite limited support for the US invasion, the invasion was 
ODUJHO\FRQVLGHUHGDVDQH[DPSOH³RIDELJSRZHUWUDPSOLQJRQWKHVRYHUHLJQW\
of a small cRXQWU\´347 and created tensions in the international community, as 
demonstrated between the US and Britain,348 the Caribbean349 and Latin 
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 The draft resolution tabled by Guyana, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe to the UN Security Council 
declared that the council 1) Deeply deplores the armed intervention in Grenada which openly 
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 Grenada Revolution and Invasion, supra note 200 at 176.  
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 Ibid. at 169. 
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America.350  The disparity of power between the US and the SIDS of Grenada 
resulted in the US invasion of Grenada being labelled as the resurgence of US 
KHJHPRQ\LQWKH&DULEEHDQDV³DQ\VWUXJJOHEHWZHHQDFRORVVXVOLNHWKH86
and a tiny island, the US is going to lose in terms of public opinion.  The US 
ORRNVIRROLVKRUKHJHPRQLFLW¶VDQR-ZLQQHU´351  
 US Hegemony versus US Power Asymmetry 
The US invasion of Grenada has been seen as an attempt to reassert US 
hegemony and stem the influence of communist regimes like Cuba and the 
Soviet Union in the region.352 However, global US hegemony in the post WWII 
                                                                                                                                                                           
VLJQDOOHG³3UHVLGHQW5HDJDQKDGIDLOHGWRFDUU\ZLWKKLPKLVFORVHVWDOO\LQWKHZHVWHUQZRUOG´
)RUPRUHGLVFXVVLRQRQ%ULWDLQ¶VUHDFWLRQWRWKH86LQYDVLRQRI*UHQDGDVHHIbid. at 170-171. 
349
 The Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago opposed the military intervention in 
Grenada, unlike the interventionist states of Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, 
and St. Vincent. The division on the matter is exemSOLILHGE\WKHVWUDLQRI*X\DQD¶VDQG7ULQLGDG
DQG7REDJR¶VUHODWLRQVZLWK-DPDLFDZKHUHLWZDVIHOWWKDW-DPDLFDKDGVKRZQJUHDWHUOR\DOW\WR
the US than to the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
Ibid. at 152, 172. 
In addition, the US invasion of Grenada created tensions between  Trinidad and Tobago and 
%DUEDGRVH[HPSOLILHGZKHQ³$GDPVSXEOLFO\FDOOHGWKH7ULQLGDGLDQDPEDVVDGRUWR%DUEDGRVD
liar for denying that he had been informed of the invasion plans and asked that he be 
ZLWKGUDZQ´,QWKHHYHQW7ULQLGDGVXSported its ambassador. Though temporary, Trinidad and 
Tobago requested Barbados not to send an envoy to the Port of Spain.   
Ibid. at 172. 
International Herald Tribune, 1 November 1983.  
350
 Brazil, Mexico, Columbia, Venezuela and Uruguay condemned the US invasion of Grenada 
and charged the Commonwealth Caribbean countries involved in the invasion were seen to 
GHPRQVWUDWHDQ³LQFRQVLVWHQF\RIFODLPVPDGHWKHQLQGHIHQFHRIWKHSULQFLSOHRIQRQ- 
intervention and the self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQRISHRSOHV´DVWKH\VXSSRrted the British claim to the 
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8QLWHG6WDWHV´DV³WKH2$6ZDVOHJDOO\WKHFRPSHWHQWLQWHUQDWLRQDODXWKRULW\WRKDYHGHDOWZLWK
the situation in Grenada. 
Granma, 6 November 1983.  
Grenada Revolution and Invasion, supra note 200 at 174. 
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 *DU\:LOOLDPV¶VFRUUHVSRQGHQFHZLWK5REHUW3DVWRUIRUPHU1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\&RXQFLO
member, February 18, 2003.  Cited in Gary Williams, US-Grenada Relations: Revolution and 
Intervention in the Backyard (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 165. 
352
 The International Crisis in the Caribbean, supra note 213 at 35-66. 
   112 
era was considered to be in global decline with the outcome of the war in 
Vietnam. 353 Moreover, US resources to assert the political, economic, and 
social requirements of formal hegemony were arguably in decline.354   
Despite a focus on state interdependence within the international 
community,355 the Commonwealth Caribbean was cautious of close links with 
the US.356  Furthermore, the US invasion of Grenada can be interpreted as a 
UHVSRQVHWRWKHYLROHQFHRIWKHFRXSG¶pWDW in an attempt by the US and 
2(&6VWDWHVWRDWWDLQVHFXULW\³If it is assumed that most statesmen most of the 
time seek security rather than hegemony and that power is regarded as means 
to attain security, there is at least a possibility that there could be an all-round 
increase in security.´357  Considering US intervHQWLRQLQ*UHQDGDGLGUHVXOWLQµDQ
all-round increase in security,¶ which will be further discussed in following 
chapters, the re-assertion of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean is 
questionable.  While the argument of the re-assertion of US hegemony in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean with the US invasion of Grenada is open for debate, 
the demonstration of power asymmetry between the US and Grenada is not. 
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 "Rethinking United States-&DULEEHDQ5HODWLRQV´, supra note 72 at 74. 
354
 Keohane and Nye argue the US no longer possessed adequate resources to meet the 
extensive requirements to assert formal hegemony. For further discussion see Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. in Nye, Power and Interdependence, supra note 215 at 38-60.  
Also, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, supra note 215 at 31-46. 
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 The International Crisis in the Caribbean, supra note 213 at 42. 
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in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The feeling of substituting one form of foreign domination for 
another and the unpleasant experiences suffered by many black West Indians in the United 
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DEOHWRJHQHUDWHIRUWKLVGHYHORSPHQW´ 
"The Relevance of Latin America to the Foreign Policy of Commonwealth Caribbean States", 
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 William Fox, The Super-powers: the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union ² Their 
Responsibility for Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), 11.  
William T. R. Fox, "E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision," Review of 
International Studies 11, no. 1 (January 1985): 13, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097028. 
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US Caribbean Power Asymmetry 
³7KHSRZHUDV\PPHWU\LQ1RUWK-6RXWKQHJRWLDWLRQVLVPDQ\OD\HUHG´358  
In the case of the US invasion of Grenada, military power asymmetry was 
illustrated as the 6,000-strong US force demonstrated their superiority by 
RFFXS\LQJWKHLUµPDMRUPLOLWDU\REMHFWLYHVZLWKLQGD\V359  Moreover, William 
=DUWPDQQGHVFULEHVWKH³1RUWK-SouWK´UHODWLRQVKLSDV³the confrontation 
between developed societies and less developed societies locked into a 
relationship of interdependence which only accentuates the power 
LPEDODQFH´360  3ROLWLFDOXQUHVWLQ*UHQDGDZLWKWKHYLROHQWFRXSG¶pWDWLQ
proved to illustrate the interdependence of Commonwealth Caribbean and US 
VHFXULW\DV863UHVLGHQW5RQDOG5HDJDQREVHUYHG³«LWLVQ¶WQXWPHJWKDWLVDW
stake in the Caribbean and Central America; it is the United States National 
6HFXULW\´361  Moreover, the US invasion of Grenada signaled the turning point in 
US-Commonwealth Caribbean relations, as the US moved from its relatively 
small role, to replacing Britain as the major player in the region.362  
7KLVWXUQLQJSRLQWIXUWKHUGHPRQVWUDWHGWKHµVXSHUSRZHU¶VWDWXs of the US 
in relation not only to small states or powers, but also to the major or great 
powers.  Therefore, to claim that small island states are insecure or lack 
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necessary security capabilities due to an inability to thwart a superpower 
invasion is unreasonable. 
Furthermore, the violence and conventional security of Grenada proved 
to be the cause of underlying political and economic concerns, 363and illustrated 
that even the security of a small island state could translate into security 
concerns for the wider international community.364  The recognition of political 
and economic aspects to commonwealth security prompted an increase of 
diplomatic, economic and military cooperation between the US and 
Commonwealth Caribbean governments. 
 The Commonwealth Caribbean and Closer Ties to the United States 
The Cold War created an atmosphere in which the US was eager to 
reward friendly Latin American and Caribbean states.  However, Latin American 
and Caribbean states were also eager to accept economic support in exchange 
for anti-communist support.  Nonetheless, increased political, economic and 
social ties with the US would prove to increase the international security of 
Commonwealth Caribbean states. 
Increased diplomatic ties between the Commonwealth Caribbean and the 
86ZHUHDSSDUHQWEHIRUHWKH86LQYDVLRQRI*UHQDGDDV-DPDLFD¶V(GZDUG
Seaga was one of the first foreign heads of government to visit Washington.  His 
visit would signal an increase of Caribbean government official visits to the 
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 Report on the Inter-American Dialogue, The Americas at a Crossroads (Woodrow Wilson 
International Centre for Scholars, Washington 1983), 40. Cited in The International Crisis in the 
Caribbean, supra note 213 at 157. 
364
 "Non-Traditional Security," supra note 203.  
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US.365  Efforts to build closer ties between the Commonwealth Caribbean and 
the US are also illustrated by the efforts of Seaga and Tom Adams of Barbados 
in the creation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).366  In addition to increased 
Commonwealth Caribbean/US ties, the CBI was also a response to ³WKHJURZLQJ
UHMHFWLRQRI86KHJHPRQ\´LQ&HQWUDO$PHULFDDQGWKH&DULEEHDQ as 
exemplified by the Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutions.367  
Though the effectiveness of the CBI has been the centre of much debate, 
the Reagan Administration commenced a cooperative relationship in the 
Caribbean, and made substantial investments in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  
Despite arguments of the effectiveness of the CBI, it was integral to US-
Commonwealth Caribbean relations.  The CBI signaled recognition of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean creating a more favorable environment for English-
speaking countries in the region, and signaled that the Commonwealth 
&DULEEHDQZDVRXWRI/DWLQ$PHULFD¶VEDFN\DUG 
 The CBI consisted of bilateral aid, tax incentives, concessionary trade 
agreements and commitment of US aid dollars to the Commonwealth Caribbean 
region, and signalled an increase in US investment in, and cooperation with, 
Caribbean governments.368  Table 7 illustrates the increase of US Economic and 
Development assistance to CARICOM states from 1980 to 1986.369   
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 The International Crisis in the Caribbean, supra note 213 at 55. 
367
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Table 7: Economic/ Development Assistance to selected CARICOM States 
and to The Eastern Caribbean (millions of dollars) 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Jamaica 12.7 69.1 136.9 115.0 108.0 98.0 124.4 
The Eastern 
Caribbean 
46.1 27.1 70.0 66.0 55.0 52.0 66.1 
In addition to US foreign assistance to the Commonwealth Caribbean, the 
US increased security assistance by 22,542.0% from 1979 to 1986 in the form of 
military sales grants: military education and military training to the CARICOM 
region are illustrated in Table 8.370  Ultimately, direct military assistance from the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Cited in H. Michael Erisman, "The Caricom States and US Foreign Policy: The Danger of Central 
Americanization," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 31, no. 3 (Autumn 1989): 
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 The Eastern Caribbean consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. 
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Source: US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Special 5HSRUW1R³%DFNJURXQG
2QWKH&DULEEHDQ%DVLQ,QLWLDWLYH´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´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SS-8; and US Department of State, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Current Policy No. 666, (March 5, 1985), p.3.  
Erisman, ibid. at 163. 
370
 The Eastern Caribbean consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. 
Lucia, St Vincent and St. Kitts.   
6RXUFH86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH%XUHDXRI3XEOLF$IIDLUV&XUUHQW3ROLF\³)RUHLJQ
$VVLVWDQFH3URSRVDOV/DWLQ$PHULFD$QGWKH&DULEEHDQ´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+0LFKDHO(ULVPDQ
³&RORVVXV&KDOOHQJHG86&DULEEHDQ3ROLF\LQ7KHV´LQ+0LFKDHO(ULVPDQDQG-RKQ'
Martz (Eds.), Colossus Challenged: The Struggle For Caribbean Influence (Boulder: Waterview 
Press, 1982), 86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH6SHFLDO5HSRUW1R³,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\DQG
Development CooSHUDWLRQ3URJUDP´$SULO86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH%XUHDXRI3XEOLF
$IIDLUV&XUUHQW3ROLF\1R³%LODWHUDO$VVLVWDQFH)RU/DWLQ$PHULFDDQGWKH&DULEEHDQ)<
´0DUFK86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH%XUHDXRI3XEOLF$IIDLUV&XUUHQW3ROLF\ No. 666,, 
³$LGDQG86,QWHUHVWVLQ/DWLQ$PHULFDDQG7KH&DULEEHDQ´0DUFKDQGGDWDSURYLGHG
by the US Department of State. 
Note: The percentage of increase, 1980-1986 are as follows:  
Military Sales Credits  = 0.0% 
      Military Education/Training  = 951.1% 
      Military Grants   = 1,900.0% 
      Overall Total   = 22,542.0% 
Erisman, ibid. at 171. 
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86WRWKH(DVWHUQ&DULEEHDQ³LQFUHDVHGIURPOHVVWKDQD\HDULQ
and 1982 to more than US$5.6 million a year in 1985-´371 
Table 8: US Security Assistance in the CARICOM Region (US$ millions) 
 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Military Sales 
Credits 
       
Bahamas ------- ------- ------- 1.0 ------- .06 ------- ------- 
Jamaica ------- ------- 1.59 1.0 3.25 ------- ------- ------- 
*E. Caribbean ------- ------- 5.0 7.5 3.25 ------- ------- ------- 
Military 
Education/Training 
        
Antigua ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- .05 ------- ------- 
Bahamas ------- ------- .06 .06 .06 ------- .05 .05 
Barbados .006 .058 .084 .10 ------- .075 ------- ------- 
Dominica ------- .01 .008 .06 ------- .05 ------- ------- 
Grenada ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- .10 ------- ------- 
Jamaica ------- ------- .025 .075 .175 .20 .25 .275 
St. Kitts ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- .025 ------- ------- 
St. Lucia ------- .01 .008 .06 ------- .05 ------- ------- 
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St. Vincent ------- .01 .008 .06 ------- .05 ------- ------- 
E. Caribbean ------- ------- ------- ------- .21 .40 .30 .40 
Trinidad ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- .05 .05 
Grants         
Belize ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- .50 .50 1.0 
Jamaica ------- ------- ------- 1.00 3.25 4.00 5.00 8.00 
E. Caribbean ------- ------- ------- 1.00 2.25 3.00 5.00 10.00 
In addition to political and economic initiatives, the US committed to a 
supportive military program which fostered an increase of US military presence 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean with the creation of the US Forces Caribbean 
Command in 1981.372  An increased US military presence resulted in joint 
exercises Solid Shield 80, Readex 80, Ocean Venture and Operation Amber in 
1981, and Universal Trek in 1983.  This was just the beginning of other joint 
military operations between the US and the Commonwealth Caribbean such as 
Modus Operandi to combat drug trafficking; Operation Buccaneer in Jamaica 
against marijuana growing and trafficking; and large exercises such as Exercise 
Palm in 1985; Tradewinds in 1995 and 96 which involved, at varying times, all 
Anglo Caribbean countries, the US, Britain, France and the Netherlands.373  
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The progress of economic and military cooperation between the US and 
the Caribbean is reflected in the continuation of US foreign assistance dollars to 
the Commonwealth Caribbean into the 21st century; foreign assistance dollars to 
the Commonwealth Caribbean are illustrated in Table 9. 374  
Table 9: US Foreign Assistance to the Caribbean, 2002-2007 (US$ millions)  
 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Est. 2007 Req 
Bahamas 1.444 1.336 1.264 1.294 2.512 0.805 
Jamaica 19.102 22.337 24.186 22.459 19.472 16.617 
Trinidad 
&Tobago 
0.432  0.540 0 0.049 1.028 2.894 
Eastern 
Caribbean 
Third 
Border 
² 
² 
15.491 
3.000 
6.900 
4.976 
4.958 
8.928 
4.813 
2.970 
4.774 
3.000 
 
Moreover, cooperation between the US and Commonwealth Caribbean 
small islanGVWDWHVFRQWLQXHVDVH[HPSOLILHGE\WKH³&RQIHUHQFHRQWKH
&DULEEHDQ$9LVLRQ´LQ, which brought heads of state from the 15-
nation Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to Washington for the first time in 10 
                                                          
374
 Source: US Department of State. FY2004-2007 Congressional Budget Justifications for 
Foreign Operations.  
Note: The Eastern Caribbean category funds military assistance and Peace Corp programs for 
seven countries. Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Development assistance for these nations is funded 
XQGHU86$,'¶V&DULEEHDQ5HJLRQDOSURJUDP 
Cited in Mark P. Sullivan, "Caribbean Region: Issues in US Relations: CRS Report for Congress 
2005", 28, 
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:xFGk3krs8qoJ:www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_rl32160_
25may05.pdf+US+and+Caribbean+relations&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=ca&client=firefox-a 
(accessed February 3, 2009) and  Mark P. Sullivan, "Caribbean Region: Issues in US Relations 
2006", 35, http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:e-
AxvSV8_iYJ:www.nationalaglawcentre.org/assets/crs/RL32160.pdf+US+and+Caribbean+relatio
ns&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=10&gl=ca&client=firefox-a (accessed February 3, 2009). 
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years,375 and the 2009 Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago.  
Moreover, continued US support to the Caribbean Basin Security is 
GHPRQVWUDWHGE\3UHVLGHQW%DUDFN2EDPD¶VPLOOLRQFRPPLWPHQWWRWKH
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and request of $79 million for 2011.376  
Secondary Roles in the Caribbean 
  The increasing role of the US in the Caribbean Basin and the events of 
Grenada in 1983 signified the lesser role of Britain and the lead role of the US in 
the region. However, like Britain, other European powers such as France and 
the Netherlands have also maintained a presence in the region.  Moreover, Latin 
American powers such as Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia and Brazil have risen in 
international profile with their inclusion into the G20 and arguably have become 
more influential in WKHµZLGHQLQJRIWKH&DULEEHDQ¶ as the move from the G8 to 
the G20 UHSUHVHQW³WKHRSHQLQJWRDQHZHUDRIJOREDOJRYHUQDQFH377   Even 
though there is no small state representation in the G20, the G20 includes states 
that were once considered lesser states, which now contribute to changing the 
dynamic of power in the international system.378  While the G8 represents the 
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 Andrew Carmona, "CARICOM and Washington Commission a New Chapter in U.S.-
Caribbean Relations - Council on Hemispheric Affairs," http://www.coha.org/2007/07/caricom-
and-washington-commission-a-new-chapter-in-us-caribbean-relations/ (accessed February 3, 
2009). 
376
 Office of the Spokesman, "U.S.-Caribbean Technical Meeting on Security Cooperation," 
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US Department of State - Bureau of Public Affairs, "Caribbean Basin Security Initiative " 
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 Larry Elliott, "From G8 to G20: The End of Exclusion,´2SHQ Democracy, 
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9, 2010).  
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 Fareed Zakaria, "Writing the Rules for a New World´Newsweek, 30 December 2008, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/30/writing-the-rules-for-a-new-world.html (accessed January 
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rich nations of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the US, the G20 includes the major developing nations of 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, the Republic of 
Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.379   
The move from the G8 to G20 was introduced by former Canadian Prime 
Minister Paul Martin despite possible negative consequences in terms of 
&DQDGD¶VLQIOXHQFHRQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDJH$VPRUHGHYHORSLQJQDWLRQV
realize an increase in their influence or power as they participate in international 
affairs through bodies such as the G20, conversely, the G8 powers find 
themselves in a more compromised position. The creation of the G20 raises the 
question:  ³ZKDWUHOHYDQFH&DQDGDPLJKWKDYHLQWKHODUJHUJURXSEHFDXVH
axiomatically the country will have much less,´ZKLFKFRQVHTXHQWO\GLPLQLVKHV
&DQDGD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQIOXHnce.380 Nonetheless, realizing the increase of equity 
among states to participate in the direction of the international system speaks to 
the equity of sovereign states, whether they be small or large; or developing or 
advanced. This is exemplified by the increased participation of SIS in the 
international community on issues such as climate change. 
Ultimately, moving from the G8 to the G20 will ultimately work to the 
DGYDQWDJHRIVPDOO&DULEEHDQWHUULWRULHVJLYHQWKDWDPRUH³HIIHFWLYHDQGVWDEOH
                                                          
379
 The European Union, which is represented by the rotating Council presidency and the 
European Central Bank, is the 20th member of the G20. 
380
 Jeffrey Simpson, "Canada's Importance Fades, Going from G8 to G20,´7KH Globe and Mail, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com.rlproxy.upei.ca/news/opinions/canadas-importance-fades-
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international economic order is likely to emerge if the advanced developing 
FRXQWULHVRI/DWLQ$PHULFDDQGHOVHZKHUH«SDUWLFLSDWHIXOO\LQLWVGHVLJQ´381 
The Impact of the US invasion of Grenada on Small Island State Concerns 
  The events in Grenada between 1979 and 1983 raised concerns about 
the quality of small island state independence382 and prompted a focus on the 
conventional security concerns of SIDS and their impact on the international 
community.  The recognition of economic, social and political instability383 as 
contributors to security concerns in microstates led to the further recognition of 
small island state security in terms of non-conventional security threats, which 
will be discussed further in Chapter 4. Moreover, the US invasion of Grenada 
signalled the beginning of increased cooperation between the US and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, which will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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The UN instilled measures of collective security following WWII as a 
means of avoiding the outbreak of general war and in an attempt to increase 
security in the international system.384  Measures have been taken to stem 
conventional threats, such as invasion, irredentist threats from a neighboring 
state or sub-version from a neighboring state.  Though these threats have been 
less common in the post-1945 world, they continue to challenge state security in 
our international system.  This has been demonstrated in events such as East 
Timor, where the colonial power, Portugal, abdicated responsibility for East 
Timor.  This opened the way for the irredentist threat of Indonesia to invade and 
DQQH[(DVW7LPRUGHVSLWH81UHFRJQLWLRQRI(DVW7LPRU¶VULJKWWRVHOI-
determination.385  Moreover, irredentist threats between Guyana and 
Venezuela386 and Belize and Guatemala387 in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
overshadowed the self-determination of both Guyana, and Belize.  However, the 
most dramatic example of such threats was ,UDT¶VLQYDVLRQDQGDQQH[DWLRQRI
Kuwait, through which Iraq soughWWRHOLPLQDWH.XZDLW¶VOHJDOLQWHUQDWLRQDO
personality.388 
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 For a discussion on UN collective security relevant to small states see:  
³,QWHUQDWLRQDOLaw: The Protection of Small States", supra note 204 at 1, 15. 
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In response to such threats, it has become common for the international 
community or regional powers to intervene to establish order when a state is 
subject to aggression by a more powerful state, as was the case in Kuwait.  
Also, regional powers such as Australia and New Zealand have been integral to 
South Pacific Island security, as demonstrated in their intervention in the 
Solomon Islands in 2003 and in Papua New Guinea in 2004.  Though Australian 
DQG1HZ=HDODQGLQWHUYHQWLRQZDVDFFHSWHGE\KRVWJRYHUQPHQWV³each 
required considerable persuasion to overcome the traditional posture of respect 
IRUVRYHUHLJQW\DQGµWKH3DFLILF:D\¶´389 
'HVSLWHDUJXPHQWVRI86HQFURDFKPHQWRQ*UHQDGD¶VVRYHUHLJQW\Whe 
re-establishment of order in Grenada makes the case that US intervention was 
intended to re-establish its status as a regional power.390  Nevertheless, the US 
invasion of Grenada led the international community and academics to 
recognize the potential vulnerability of small island states, as illustrated by the 
1985 Caribbean Colloquium on the Special Needs of Small States.  
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The 1985 Caribbean Colloquium raised a wide range of debates and 
identified conventional security threats such as irredentist threats, sub-version 
from a neighboring state and invasion from another state.  However, it was 
recognized that security threats toward Caribbean small island states are not 
only of a military nature, but also arise out of economic, social and political 
instability.391  In addition, a number of non-conventional security threats were 
identified, such as drugs, gun-running, money laundering, illegal migration and 
proneness to natural disasters.392  Furthermore, the US determined issues such 
as illegal migration and drugs to be a national security threat as early as 
1986.393 
  Though the colloquium considered US hegemony a security threat, a 
quote in a speech delivered on 17 October 1996 by the Attorney-General of 
Trinidad and Tobago, Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj, illustrates how arguments of 
US hegemony can be considered secondary in comparison to the severity of 
non-conventional security threats. Maharaj stated:                                                                        
³/HWPHVWDWHHPSKDWLFDOO\WKDWWKHJUHDWHVWWKUHDWWRRXUVRYHUHLJQW\
comes from the drug lords. These are international criminals who have no 
respect for sovereignty or boundary lines. They do not stop at our borders 
RUDQ\RQHHOVH¶VERUGHUVZLWKWKHLUSRLVRQ7KHWUXWKLVWKH\FDQQRWFDUU\
on their deadly trade without violating our borders and sovereignty. If the 
United States of America, the most powerful nation in the world, cannot 
fight the drug barons alone, how can we? Drug traffickers are 
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392
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international criminals and can be defeated only with international 
FRRSHUDWLRQ´394 
'HVSLWHWKHJUDYLW\RI9HQH]XHOD¶VLUUHGHQWLVWWKUHDWWR7ULQLGDGDQG
7REDJR¶VWHUULWRULDOZDWHUVDQGRIIVKRUHRLOUHVRXUFHV0DKDUDMYLHZHGQRn-
conventional security threats (such as drug lords) to be a greater threat to 
7ULQLGDGDQG7REDJR¶VVRYHUHLJQW\ 
The nature of non-conventional security threats can be comprehensively 
referred to as organized crime and will be explored in a closer examination of 
drugs, gun-running, money laundering and illegal migration in the Caribbean 
region. 395 
Non- Conventional Security Threats 
Drugs: 
,YHODZ*ULIILWKGHVFULEHVDµYRUWH[¶ZKHUHGUXJWUDIILFNHUVWDNHDGYDQWDJH
of the Caribbean Sea to transport drugs from drug producers in South America 
WRDGUXJGLVWULEXWRULQ1RUWK$PHULFD7KH³LVODQGFKDUDFWHU´RIWKHUHJLRQ
«SHUPLWVHQWU\LQWRDQGXVHRI&DULEEHDQWHUULWRULHVIURPWKHVXUURXQGLQJVHD
DWOLWHUDOO\KXQGUHGVRIGLIIHUHQWSODFHV´396  Some examples of plural island 
territories are the several islands of St. Vincent and the Grenadines; about 100 
islands and cays of the US Virgin Islands; and the 700 islands and 200 cays of 
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the Bahamas.397  Caribbean countries that do not trade their own drugs can be 
affected by the drug trade by being used as drug transshipment points which 
increase the scope of the problem.  The movement of drugs such as cocaine is 
illustrated below, in Map 4: 1996 Cocaine Flow in the Western Hemisphere.398 
Map 4: 
 
Drug seizures in Commonwealth Caribbean SIS provide an indication of 
the amount of drugs in the region, as shown in Table 10 below.399 
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Table 10: Drug Seizures in Commonwealth Caribbean SIS 2007 - 2010 
Country Drug 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Cocaine 
Marijuana 
1.36 kg 
168.5 kg 
2.3 kg 
496 kg 
14kg 
96 kg 
5.7 kg 
464 kg 
The 
Bahamas 
Cocaine 
Marijuana 
269 kg 
42 t 
1.823 t 
11 t 
1,878 kg 
12 t 
630 kg 
50.5 t 
Barbados Cocaine 
Marijuana 
63.67 kg 
« 
78.3 kg 
3,989 kg 
46 kg 
4,662 kg 
228.6 kg 
4,194 kg 
Dominica Cocaine 
Marijuana 
1.5 kg 
« 
30.5 g 
1,415 kg 
11 kg 
842 kg 
353 kg 
181 kg 
Grenada Cocaine 
Marijuana 
25.03 kg 6 kg 
460 kg 
46 kg 
355 kg 
935.8 kg 
260 kg 
Jamaica Cocaine 
Marijuana 
177.88 kg 
39.291t 
264kg 
9 t 
266 kg 
32 t 
80 kg 
« 
St Kitts and 
Nevis 
Cocaine 
Marijuana 
602.1 g  
« 
.5 kg 
44 kg 
78 kg 
155 kg 
29 g 
7.5 kg 
Saint Lucia Cocaine 48.87 kg 93 kg 21 kg 792.5 kg 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 "US International Narcotics Strategy Report 2008," 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100890.pdf (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011), 190, 205-
209, 221, 229. 
 US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,  
"US International Narcotics Strategy Report 2009," 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/120054.pdf (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011), 137, 241-
247, 359, 360, 583. 
 US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,  
"US International Narcotics Strategy Report 2010," 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138548.pdf (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011), 136, 253-
259, 381, 616. 
 US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,  
"US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2011," 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156575.pdf (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011), 134, 224-
231, 326, 327.   
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Marijuana « 540 kg 534 kg 793 kg 
St. Vincent  
& Grenadine 
Cocaine 
Marijuana 
28 kg 
« 
8 kg 
8,911 kg 
5 kg 
17,911 kg 
524.4 kg 
1,559.7 kg 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Cocaine 
Marijuana 
« 
26.3 kg 
158 kg 
« 
84 kg 
375 kg 
167 kg 
194 kg 
 
7KHGUXJWUDGHKDVEHFRPHWKHPRVWSURILWDEOHVHFWRURIWKH&DULEEHDQ¶V
informal economy and has resulted in widespread corruption; in greater 
consumption of marijuana, heroin, and cocaine, which has in turn exacerbated 
the incidence of domestic violence; and has undermined the social development 
and well being of Caribbean societies.400    
Gun-running/Arms Trafficking: 
Gun-running has become inextricably linked with (1) the drug trade, 
where weapons and ammunition are used for protection of drugs and drug 
operatives, and (2) money laundering, which provides the financial means to 
obtain large shipments of arms and ammunitions.401  The impact of arms 
trafficking has been detrimental to the governance of Caribbean small island 
states. As a result, ZHDSRQVKLJKOLJKWWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIVPDOOLVODQGVWDWHV¶
conventional forces such as police and military and make them more susceptible 
to corruption and coups. 
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7KHPRYHPHQWRIJXQVLVLOOXVWUDWHGE\'RPLQLFD¶V Sidney Burnett-Allyne, 
an arms merchant with direct ties to corruption in Dominica, who was caught in a 
ERDWORDGHGZLWKZHDSRQVKHDGHGIRU%DUEDGRVLQDQDWWHPSW³WRRYHUWKURZWKH
newly elected government of Tom Adams in Barbados.´402 This was after Tom 
Adams charged that Burnett-$OO\QHZDV³VXEYHUWLQJ´%DUEDGLDQJRYHUQPHQW
officials with guns and gifts in exchange for a government license for the Alleyne 
Mercantile Bank.  This ZDVWREHDFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHEHJLQQLQJRI'RPLQLFD¶V
involvement in offshore banking.403 
7KHFRXSG¶HWDW attempt by the Black Muslim group, the Jamaat-al-
Muslimeen, in Trinidad and Tobago in 1990 is another example of how the 
impact arms have in the region has been underestimated.  In that event, 115 
rifles were bought legally in the US and shipped legally from Miami to be used in 
the coup attempt.  It was only over a year later that Jamaat operatives were 
finally arrested for contracting to buy 60 AK-47s and 10 Mach-10 machine 
guns.404  
Suspicion of government corruption led to an Official Commission of 
Inquiry into government corruption involving drug cartels in Antigua in the early 
VZKLFKH[SRVHG³WKHGHSWKDQGVSUHDGRIFRUUXSWLRQLQGHHGLWV
LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ´405  The corruption involved approximately 10 tons of arms 
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that were bought in Israel and legitimatized under the guise of the Antiguan 
Defense Force, but ended up in the possession of the Medellin drug cartel. 
Some of the arms were later used in the assassination of a Colombian 
presidential candidate. 
This issue of arms trafficking and violence reveals a larger issue of 
Caribbean small island governance as it was highlighted when the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHSRUWUDLVHGWKHFRQFHUQRYHU³WKHZLGHUPRUHHQGXULQJFRUUXSW
relationships between the principals in the scheme and high-ranking officials 
within tKH$QWLJXDJRYHUQPHQW´406  
These examples illustrate the contagious effect guns play in contributing 
to the violence and corruption that is synonymous with non-conventional security 
threats.  Such violence and internal corruption has made the task of meeting 
security needs even more difficult for Commonwealth Caribbean governments.  
The impact of non-conventional security threats is further illustrated with the 
concerns over money laundering and offshore banking in the Caribbean. 
Money laundering: 
Bruce Zagaris sums up the money laundering threat by stating: 
³0RQH\ODXQGHULQJDQGRWKHUILQDQFLDORSHUDWLRQVFDUULHGRXWE\QDUFR-
terrorists in developing countries are a source of grave financial problems 
to those countries. [Money laundering] brings a new entrepreneur class, 
the financial power of which is often used in a manner contrary to national 
DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV´407 
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The impact of money laundering is much greater when placed in the 
larger context of the drug trade; creating capital; illicit offshore banking and 
moving assets; and creating capital for gun purchases from other countries.408 
Money laundering is defined as the conversion of profits from illegal 
activities (not limited to drug trafficking) into seemingly legitimate financial 
assets, and is achieved in three stages: placement, layering and integration.409  
Placement involves the disposal of cash through integration into revenues from 
a legitimate business or converting the cash into bank deposits, then layering 
the money by transferring it through many accounts to disguise the trail and 
integrate the seemingly legitimate funds into legitimate businesses.410  To give 
context to the magnitude of the illegal activity, the amount of drug money 
laundered worldwide in the late 1990s was estimated to be between US $300 
billion and US $500 billion annually.411  These funds provide criminal 
organizations with economic power that can be used for political contributions 
and favors and bribes, which in turn translates into political power. 
Caribbean small island states typically have mono-cultural economies 
and offshore banking has become a strategy for economic diversification which 
provides important service sectors in their economies.  However, offshore 
EDQNLQJLVGHVFULEHGDVIDFLQJ³XQSUHFHGHQWHG5DSLG&RPSOHx Constant 
&KDQJH´ZKLFKKDV³«KDGVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWVRQWKHLUKRVWJRYHUQPHQWV.´ Such 
XQFHUWDLQW\DQGTXHVWLRQDEOHGHFLVLRQVKDYHUDLVHG³UHVRXUFHLVVXHV´ZLWKKRVW
                                                          
408
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409
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governments.412  Concern over off-shore banking is illustrated by the 1998 and 
2000 OECD report that found offshore banking or tax havens were involved in 
harmful tax practices.413  This brought the largely un-scrutinized and unregulated 
sector of offshore banking under the review of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) in 2000.414  
The FATF is an inter-governmental body charged with developing and 
promoting national and international policies to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing.415  7KH)$7)¶VEODFNOLVWRI1RQ-Cooperative Countries and 
7HUULWRULHV1&&7LGHQWLILHG³VHULRXVV\VWHPLF SUREOHPV´LQWKHWUDQVSDUHQF\RI
offshore banking practices, and included the following jurisdictions:  Bahamas, 
Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  All blacklist countries complied with FATF 
recommendations with the last countries (Myanmar, Nauru and Nigeria) being 
delisted in 2006.416 In addition to FATF regulations, the US introduced further 
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regulation to stem money laundering and terrorism in the US through the US 
Patriot Act.417  The actions against money laundering has aided in making off-
shore banking institutions more transparent, and therefore, has reduced some of 
the secrecy that enables money laundering.  
Illegal Migration/Undocumented migration: 
Illegal migration was not viewed as a regional security threat until the 
1980s. The noticeable rise of migration, specifically undocumented migration 
from the Eastern Caribbean to the US, resulted in illegal migration becoming a 
widely debated policy issue rivaled only by the illegal drug trade.418  In the past, 
illegal migration in the Caribbean tended to be focused on illegal immigrants 
from Haiti and the Dominican Republic to the US.  However, illegal migration is 
also seen from poorer countries to wealthier countries within the Caribbean as 
demonstrated by the Eastern Caribbean cases of unauthorized workers moving 
from Dominica and St. Lucia to the French departments of Martinique and 
Guadeloupe, and from Grenada and the Windward Islands to Trinidad and 
7REDJR7KHLPSDFWRILOOHJDOPLJUDWLRQRQVHFXULW\LVWKDWLW³XQGHUPLQHVWKH
HVWDEOLVKHGODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQVRIPDQ\FRXQWULHV´419  This in turn erodes 
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³SHRSOH¶VWUXVWLQWKHOHJDODQGIRUPDOHFRQRP\´RIWKDWcountry.420  The issue of 
US deportees is also a significant aspect of the problem.  This was noted by 
3UHVLGHQW%KDUDWW-DJGHRRI*X\DQDZKR³FKDVWLVHGWKH86IRUµDJJUHVVLYHO\¶
UHFUXLWLQJWKHLUQXUVHVDQGWHDFKHUVZKLOHDWWKHVDPHWLPHµDJJUHVVLYHO\¶
depoUWLQJFULPLQDOVDQGWXUQLQJDEOLQGH\HWRH[SRUWRIVPDOODUPV´421 The US 
deportation policy of criminals back to the Caribbean created such resentment 
WKDWDIRUPHUDPEDVVDGRURIWKH'RPLQLFDQ5HSXEOLF³UHIHUUHGWRLWDVDPDMRU
SDUWRIWKH³6HFRQG&ROG:DU´DQG7KH5HJLRQDO6HFXULW\6\VWHPPHWWRFUHDWH
³DFRPPRQSRVLWLRQvis-á-vis the US in terms of the threats to sovereignty and 
security posed by the deportees.´ In the end, however, nothing ever came of 
the meeting. 422   
 The Eastern Caribbean has seen an increase in crime, specifically drug-
related crime. For example, Trinidad and Tobago has seen an increase in the 
number of kidnapped businessman, including eight in 2001 and twenty nine in 
2002.423  The increase in crime has led to the overcrowding of jails, according to 
WKHUHSRUW³IURPWKH%DKDPDVGRZQWKHFKDLQRILVODQGVWR*X\DQDMDLOVDUH
EXUVWLQJDWWKHVHDPV´424   The deporting of criminals from the US to the 
Caribbean is blamed for the increase of violent crimes, such as the Machete 
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attack in Grenada by Ronald Michael Phillip who was deported from in the US in 
2000 after spending more than 6 years in a US prison. 425  
Recently, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement deportation 
data obtained by News America Now show the number of criminal deportees 
from the beginning of the 2011 fiscal year (October of last year) to the end of 
March this year for the following countries:  Antigua 5, The Bahamas 65, 
Barbados 11, Dominica 10, Jamaica 528, St. Kitts and Nevis 3, St. Lucia 7, 
Trinidad and Tobago 125.426 
The Impact of Non-Conventional Security Threats  
The non-conventional security threats of drug trafficking, gun-running, 
money laundering and illegal migration all contribute to the corruption within the 
state. The elements and impacts of the non-conventional security threats 
described above illustrate the link between corruption and security, where: 
³&RUUXSWLRQXQGHUPLQHVWKHOHJLWLPDF\RISXEOLFLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGVWULNHVDW
the society, moral order, and justice, as well as at the comprehensive 
developmeQWRISHRSOHV«´427 The correlation of drug trafficking and 
PRQH\ODXQGHULQJKDYHFRPH³VXEVXPHGXQGHUWKHODEHORIQDUFR-
WHUURULVP´428 
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Current Atmosphere of Non-Conventional Security threats in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean 
The current atmosphere of Commonwealth Caribbean transnational 
security issues related to illicit drugs illustrate the Commonwealth Caribbean 
small island states not as primary producers or consumers, but as 
transshipment points, minor drug cultivators or home states of offshore financial 
centers. While states share concerns regarding money laundering, current 
transnational security concerns for the commonwealth Caribbean are listed in 
Table 11.429 
Table 11: Commonwealth Caribbean Transnational Security Concerns  
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Considered a minor transshipment point for narcotics bound 
for the US and Europe; more significant as an offshore 
financial centre. 
Bahamas Transshipment point for cocaine and marijuana bound for 
US and Europe; offshore financial centre. 
Barbados One of many Caribbean transshipment points for narcotics 
bound for Europe and the US; offshore financial centre. 
Grenada Small-scale cannabis cultivation; lesser transshipment point 
for marijuana and cocaine to US. 
Dominica  Transshipment point for narcotics bound for the US and 
Europe; minor cannabis producer (2008). 
Jamaica  Transshipment point for cocaine from South America to 
North America and Europe; illicit cultivation and 
consumption of cannabis; government has an active manual 
cannabis eradication program; corruption is a major 
concern; substantial money-laundering activity; Colombian 
narcotics traffickers favor Jamaica for illicit financial 
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transactions. 
St Kitts and Nevis Transshipment point for South American drugs destined for 
the US and Europe; some money-laundering activity. 
St Lucia Transit point for South American drugs destined for the US 
and Europe. 
St Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
Transshipment point for South American drugs destined for 
the US and Europe; small-scale cannabis cultivation. 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Transshipment point for South American drugs destined for 
the US and Europe; producer of cannabis. 
  
The security concerns of Eastern Caribbean small island states may 
appear modest in comparison to that of Jamaica, where corruption is a major 
concern, but Eastern Caribbean states still face challenges as the 
encompassing nature of non-conventional security threats effect the political, 
economic and social aspects of small island sovereign states.  An examination 
of the Bahamas provides insight into the impact of non-conventional security 
threats on Caribbean small island states. 
The Bahamas 
 The Bahamas illustrates the impact organized crime and non-
FRQYHQWLRQDOVHFXULW\WKUHDWVFDQKDYHRQDVPDOOLVODQGVWDWH7KH%DKDPDV¶
proximity to the US and its geography of 700 islands and 200 cays provides an 
expanse of passageways that act as a transshipment conduit for marijuana and 
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cocaine, as well as the smuggling of Haitian refugees.430  Moreover, banking 
secrecy laws have created an ideal environment for money laundering.  
Furthermore, the corruption of Bahamian police and senior levels of government 
was revealed through their inadequate and ineffective response to drug 
WUDQVVKLSPHQWDFWLYLWLHVDW1RUPDQ¶V&D\LQWKHHDUO\V  In addition to the 
corruptLRQRIJRYHUQPHQWWKH³HDV\PRQH\´RIGUXJWUDIILFNLQJFDXVHG other 
detrimental social effects.  The 1980s saw a drop in school attendance among 
children who were offered as much as $500 for an afternoon acting as lookout.  
'UXJXVH³VN\URFNHWHG´ZLWKXS to 80% of poor adult males freebasing on 
cocaine, which resulted in an increased strain on mental health facilities and a 
rise in crime.  The impact of these events are best described by Bruce 
%XOOLQJWRQZKRVWDWHG³%DKDPLDQVRFLHW\ZDVWKRURXJKO\GLVHDVed as the result 
of the penetration of the narcotics trade, a security catastrophe that is a far more 
real danger for many small island states, particularly those sitting in the drug 
ODQHVWKDQDQ\FRQYHQWLRQDOPLOLWDU\WKUHDWIURPDQRWKHUVWDWH´431  
Recognizing the social aspect of security, Barry Bartmann stresses that 
³WKHSHQHWUDWLRQRIVPDOOLVODQGVWDWHVE\WKHQDUFRWLFVWUDGHFDQEHVRFRUURVLYH
DQGVRWUDJLF´432  Though more subtle than the situation described in the 
Bahamas, the case of St Lucia illustrates the correlation of economic security 
and non-conventional security threats in small island states. 
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Saint Lucia 
The stability of Saint Lucian economy and society is best described by 
WKHVWDWHPHQW³wKHQµWKHEDQDQDLVXS¶«WKHHFRQRP\ERRPV:KHQµWhe 
EDQDQDLVGRZQ¶ERWKHFRQRP\DQGSHRSOHDUHGHSUHVVHG´433  The banana 
industry benefited from the trade protection of the Lome Conventions, which 
gave former colonies of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
trade preference into EU markets DQGUHVXOWHGLQ6DLQW/XFLDEHFRPLQJD³WUXH
EDQDQDUHSXEOLF´434  
7KH³:723DQHOUHSRUWLVVXHGRQWKH0D\IRXQGWKDWWKH(8¶V
EDQDQDLPSRUWUHJLPHZDVGLVFULPLQDWRU\DQGLQFRQVLVWHQW´ZLWKWKH*HQHUDO
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).435  The ending of the (8¶VEDQDQD
import regime led to the less efficient banana industry of Saint Lucia becoming 
vulnerable to the competition of more regulated banana industries in Ecuador, 
+RQGXUDV&RVWD5LFDDQG*XDWHPDODHDFKRIZKLFKSURGXFHVDURXQG³WRns 
per acre, which is three times as high as in St Lucia, and the cost to importers of 
WKHVHµGROODUEDQDQDV¶LVKDOIDVPXFK´)XUWKHUPRUHWKHPRUHUHJXODWHG
banana industries require a standard where the bananas should be at least 
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27mm wide, 14cm long and with no ``abnormal'' curvature,´ZKLFKZDVQRWWKH
type of banana produced in Saint Lucia.436  
This resulted in Saint Lucian farmers having bananas turned away from 
export, which influenced diversification into other crops, the most successful 
being plantains.  However, Latin America quickly intervened asserting they could 
grow any product bigger and cheaper than in Saint Lucia.  The banana proved 
to be the only product Saint Lucian farmers could produce competitively with 
Latin America.  As diplomatic and legal options surrounding trade agreements 
became more difficult the alternative of illegal drugs, where marijuana reaped 
about 30 times more per pound than bananas, resulted in marijuana replacing 
bananas as a principal export crop considering that Saint Lucia already served 
as a transshipment point for drugs on route to the US.437  This has caused many 
WR³EHOLHYHWKHIXWXUHRIWKHGUXJWUDGHLQWKH&DULEEHDQLVLQWLPDWHO\UHODWHGWR
WKHIXWXUHRIWKHEDQDQDWUDGH´438 
The weakness of the legal economy has created inroads for illegal 
HQWHUSULVH+RZHYHU6DLQW/XFLD¶VEDQDQDLQGXVWU\KDVPDGHYDVW
improvements and continues to battle Latin American producers and large 
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corporations such as Wal-0DUWZKLFKFRQWLQXHVWRPDNHLQURDGVLQWR%ULWDLQ¶V
marketplace.439 
In addition to the widespread effects of non-conventional security threats 
mentioned, the environment has proved to be one of the most devastating forms 
of non-conventional security threats to the Caribbean.  Though environmental 
threats are different from other non-conventional security threats such as 
organized crime and drug cartels which involve non-state actors, the 
environment has proved to be just as debilitating to Caribbean security. 
The Environment as a Nonconventional Security Threat 
The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti dramatically demonstrates how the 
environment poses a non-conventional security threat.  This is but one example 
of a natural disaster in the Caribbean.  Environmental non-conventional security 
threats include natural disasters such as cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, 
floods, hurricanes, landslides, storms, tsunamis, typhoons and volcanoes.  
Environmental threats have widespread effects, including damage to state 
infrastructure and transport and to personal and commercial property; human 
health and life; agriculture and livestock; and business activities.  The impacts of 
environmental disasters go beyond the physical damage and can be debilitating 
for small island states, as the cost of recovery adds to public expense and 
government indebtedness and can result in reliance on external financial 
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assistance.440  Table 12 illustrates the frequency and extent of damage incurred 
by Eastern Caribbean Currency Union states from 1970 to 2002.441 
Table 12: Eastern Caribbean Environmental Disasters from 1970 to 2002 
Country Year Event Number 
of Total 
Persons 
Affected  
% of 
Population 
Est. 
Damage 
US$ 
Thousands 
Est. 
Damage 
% 0f GDP 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
1983 Drought 75,000 100.0 « « 
 1989 Hurricane 
Hugo 
8,030 12.4 80,000 21.4 
 1990 Hurricane 
Gustav 
« « « « 
 1995 Hurricane 
Luis 
68,702 100.0 500 0.1 
 1998 Hurricane 
Georges 
2,025 3.0 « « 
 1999 Hurricane 
Jose 
2,534 3.8 « « 
 1999 Hurricane 
Lenny 
3,423 5.1 « « 
Dominica 1970 Hurricane « « « « 
 
 
 
1979 Hurricanes 
David and 
Frederick 
72,100 100.0 44,650 100.8 
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 St. Kitts National Emergency Management Agency estimated damage of US$402 million (140% 
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Country Year Event Number 
of Total 
Persons 
Affected  
% of 
Population 
Est. 
Damage 
US$ 
Thousands 
Est. 
Damage 
% 0f GDP 
 1980 Hurricane 
Allen 
« « « « 
 1984 Hurricane 
Klaus 
10,000 14.2 2,000 2.2 
 1989 Hurricane 
Hugo 
710 1.0 20,000 13.0 
 1995 Hurricane 
Luis 
3,001 4.2 3,428 1.6 
 1999 Hurricane 
Lenny 
715 1.0 « « 
 2001 Hurricane 
Iris 
175 0.2 « « 
Grenada 1975 Flood « « 4,700 13.4 
 1980 Hurricane 
Allen 
« « 5,300 7.7 
 1990 Tropical 
Storm 
Arthur 
1,000 1.1 « « 
 1999 Hurricane 
Lenny 
210 0.2 5,500 1.5 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
1984 Hurricane 
Klaus 
« « « « 
 1987 Flood « « 500 0.6 
 1989 Hurricane 
Hugo 
1,330 3.1 46,000 32.1 
 1990 Hurricane 
Gustav 
« « « « 
 
 
1995 Hurricane 
Luis 
1,800 4.2 197,000 85.4 
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Country Year Event Number 
of Total 
Persons 
Affected  
% of 
Population 
Est. 
Damage 
US$ 
Thousands 
Est. 
Damage 
% 0f GDP 
 1998 Hurricane 
Georges 
10,000 23.2 « « 
 1999 Hurricane 
Lenny 
1,180 2.7 41,400 13.6 
St. Lucia 1980 Hurricane 
Allen 
80,000 61.5 87,990 66.0 
 1983 Storm 3,000 2.2 1,290 0.8 
 1986 Tropical 
Storm 
Danielle 
« « « « 
 1987 Hurricane 
Emily 
« « « « 
 1988 Hurricane 
Gilbert 
« « « « 
 1994 Tropical 
Storm 
Debby 
750 0.5 « « 
 1996 Landslide 175 0.1 « « 
 1999 Hurricane 
Lenny 
200 0.1 « « 
St. Vincent 
&  the 
Grenadines 
1971 Volcano 2,000 2.3 « « 
 1977 Flood « « « « 
 1979 Volcano 20,000 18.6 « « 
 1980 Hurricane 
Allen 
20,500 18.8 16,300 27.6 
 1986 Flood 152 0.1 « « 
 1987 Hurricane 
Emily 
208 0.2 5,300 3.7 
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Country Year Event Number 
of Total 
Persons 
Affected  
% of 
Population 
Est. 
Damage 
US$ 
Thousands 
Est. 
Damage 
% 0f GDP 
 1987 Flood 1,000 0.9 5,000 3.5 
 1992 Flood 200 0.2 « « 
 1999 Hurricane 
Lenny 
100 0.1 « « 
 2002 Hurricane 
Lili 
« « « « 
 
Grenada experienced hurricanes in 2003 with an estimated damage of 4 
million US$ and 2004 with an estimated damage of 4.4 million US$.  Dominica 
experienced a hurricane in 2008 with an estimated damage of 3.3 million US$ 
and St. Kitts and Nevis experienced a hurricane in 2009 with an estimated 
damage of 3.4 million US$. 442 Such events illustrate the harassing and 
devastating nature of disasters in the Eastern Caribbean, as well as their 
financial impact.   
The effects of non-conventional security threats have had impacts on the 
political, economic and social aspects of Caribbean small island states.  The 
threat extends beyond one state becoming reliant on a patron state and 
EHFRPLQJD³EDQDQDUHSXEOLF´443  The impacts of non-conventional security 
threats lead to the deterioration of governance as it is recognized that: 
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³6,6PD\IDFHQRQ-conventional security threats which can be thoroughly 
FRUURVLYHLQWHUPVRIWKHVWDWH¶VZHOOEHLQJ$QGDVZHKDYHVHHQWKH\
may even threaten the identity and continuing existence of the state 
LWVHOI´444 
Recognizing the severity of non-conventional security threats raises the 
concern of failed statehood in the Caribbean,445 which is considered the ultimate 
security collapse of the state.446  While such terminology in the case of the 
Caribbean may be severe, it is raised to highlight awareness that the efforts to 
deter non-conventional security threats are driven by the hope of maintaining 
order and governance and avoiding security collapses of states in the region. 
Commonwealth Caribbean states have recognized the seriousness and 
implications of non-conventional security threats and have sought measures to 
increase regional and international cooperation to alleviate such concerns.  
These issues will be further examined in Chapter 5. 
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The recognition of shared non-conventional security threats, discussed in 
chapter 4, in addition to the recognition of limits to US hegemony in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, discussed in chapter 3, resulted in a transition of US 
foreign policy from a traditional KHJHPRQLFDSSURDFKWRRQHRI³DJOREDOVWUDWHJ\
for the management of interdependence.´447  In order to examine 
Commonwealth Caribbean and US interdependence and cooperation, an 
understanding of Commonwealth Caribbean regional cooperative bodies is 
necessary. 
Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Cooperation 
The islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean had traditionally been more 
accustomed to dealing directly with the British Colonial office than among 
themselves.  However, the British Colonial Office encouraged the creation of a 
federation among the UK colonies in the West Indies due to the recognition of 
common social, economic and political challenges.  The British Colonial Office 
SURPRWHGWKH:HVW,QGLHV)HGHUDWLRQDV³DPHDQVRIFUHDWLQJWKHHIIHFWLYHVL]H
of the West Indian territories to a point where they became eligible for self-
JRYHUQPHQWDVRQHXQLW´448  Furthermore, the British Colonial Office considered 
the West Indies Federation a viable option that would counteract challenges of 
³VPDOOVL]H´449  However, the argument that a federation would be more 
economically viable for the two largest island economies, Jamaica and Trinidad 
                                                          
447
 The International Crisis in the Caribbean, supra note 213 at 42. 
448
 The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79, supra note 24 at 13. 
449
 Ibid. 
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and Tobago, which would be the main contributors to sustain the federation, 
failed to win public opinion, particularly in Jamaica. 
CoQFHUQVRYHU³DEDODQFHRIUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV´EHWZHHQ-DPDLFDDQGWKH
other islands, particularly the smaller, poorer islands, were at the centre of 
-DPDLFDQSXEOLFRSLQLRQZKLFKFUHDWHGDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRU-DPDLFD¶V$OH[DQGHU
%XVWDPDQWH¶VVNHSWLFLVPRIWKHFederation.  The eventual no vote to the 
)HGHUDWLRQLQ-DPDLFD¶V5HIHUHQGXPOHGWRWKHSURVSHFWRID)HGHUDWLRQZLWKRXW
Jamaica.450  This created uncertainty towards the prospect of a Federation 
where Trinidad and Tobago would be the wealthiest contributor to the 
)HGHUDWLRQDQG³EHUHTXLUHGWRVXVWDLQDQ\QHZIHGHUDWLRQYLUWXDOO\VLQJOH-
KDQGHG´451  7KRXJK(ULF:LOOLDPVPRYHGTXLHWO\RQ7ULQLGDGDQG7REDJR¶VH[LW
IURPWKH)HGHUDWLRQ-DPDLFD¶VZLWKGUDZDOWUDQVODWHGLQWRWKHGLVVROXWLRQRIWKH 
organization.452 
Upon the dissolution of the West Indies Federation, Trinidad and Tobago 
3ULPH0LQLVWHU(ULF:LOOLDPVSRLQWHGRXWWKDW³IHGHUDWLRQZDVEXWone 
PDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKHUHJLRQDOLGHD´DQGSURSRVHGWKHFRQFHSWRID&DULEEHDQ
Economic Community.453  This led to the First Heads of Government 
&RQIHUHQFHE\WKHµ%LJ)RXURIWKH&RPPRQZHDOWK&DULEEHDQ7ULQLGDGDQG
Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados and British Guiana.454  The Heads of Government 
conference would be instrumental in Caribbean cooperation, as it would include 
                                                          
450
 Payne, ibid. at 15-22. 
451
 Payne, ibid. at 27. 
452
 Payne, ibid. at 26-29. 
453
 Payne, ibid. at 37. 
454
 Payne, ibid. at 40. 
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leaders of all Commonwealth territories and countries, and would be the setting 
for agreements such as the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA).  
CARIFTA 
CARIFTA was founded in 1965 by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, 
Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago.  Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, 
Saint Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines, Montserrat and Jamaica joined 
in 1968.  Belize joined CASRIFTA in 1971.  CARIFTA was intended to unite 
these Commonwealth Caribbean economies and to give them a joint presence 
on the international scene.  CARIFTA had significant outcomes.455  First, smaller 
territories were granted formal recognition as less developed countries.  Second, 
the need for regional institutions and the concept of a regional secretariat were 
recognized.  Third, the creation of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) 
included the US as a full member, along with Britain and Canada, in addition to 
the Commonwealth Caribbean states.  This created a specialized financial 
institution to meet the needs in the Commonwealth Caribbean of developing 
states which otherwise lacked access to, or did not meet the necessary criteria 
of, other lending agencies.456  
CARICOM 
CARIFTA evolved into the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 1972.  
CARICOM created a Caribbean common market which took a holistic package 
                                                          
455
 "The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) " 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/carifta.jsp?menu=community (accessed March 2, 2010). 
456
 The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79, supra note 24 at 92-95. 
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approach to address the issues which challenged CARIFTA, such as a common 
external tariff and protective policy, the harmonization of fiscal incentives, a 
common policy on foreign investment, the rationalization of regional agriculture, 
the development of a regional industrial policy, cooperation in tourism and in 
fiscal and monetary affairs, agreement on external commercial policy, adoption 
RIIXUWKHUPHDVXUHVWRHQDEOH/'&¶VWREHQHILWIURPLQWHJUDWLRQDQGFRRSHUDWLRQ
in areas like foreign policy.457 
CARICOM now consists of the following members:458 
State     Year  
Antigua and Barbuda  4 July 1974 
The Bahamas   4 July 1983 
Barbados    1 August 1973 
Belize     1 May 1974 
Dominica    1 May 1974 
Grenada    1 May 1974 
Guyana    1 August 1973 
Haiti     2 July 2002 
Jamaica    1 August 1973 
Montserrat    1 May 1974 (Overseas dependency of UK) 
Saint Lucia    1 May 1974 
St. Kitts and Nevis   26 July 1974 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1 May 1974 
                                                          
457
 Payne, ibid. at 143-144. 
458
 "CARICOM MEMBER STATES" 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community (accessed March 
2, 2010). 
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Suriname    4 July 1995 
Trinidad and Tobago  1 August 1973 
CARICOM Associate Members: 
Anguilla    4 July 1999 
Bermuda    2 July 2003 
British Virgin Islands  2 July 1991 
Cayman Islands   15 May 2002 
Turks and Caicos Islands  2 July 1991 
 Considering island insularity, CARICOM has been instrumental in the 
integration of the greater Caribbean Community.  However, other organizations, 
including the OECS, were created to meet the needs of smaller states facing 
similar challenges. 
 The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 
The collapse of the West Indies Federation created an atmosphere of 
uncertainty for those smaller islands of the Eastern Caribbean that were no 
longer wanted as colonies, that were viewed as unviable candidates for 
sovereignty, and therefore were included in many discussions of federation 
DPRQJWKHµWLQ\¶LVODQGVRIWKH(DVWHUQ&DULEEHDQ7KHFUHDWLRQRIWKH:HVW
Indies Associated States Council of Ministers (WISA) in 1966 saw the islands 
shift from colonial status to one of free association with the United Kingdom and 
the creation of the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) in 1968, which 
was eventually replaced with CARICOM.    
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Recognizing the need for a more formal development arrangement as 
Eastern Caribbean islands gained their independence, the OECS was 
established with the signing of the Treaty of Basseterre in 1981.  The OECS 
adopted the WISA Secretariat as the central secretariat of the OECS and the 
ECCM as the Economic Affairs Secretariat.459  The objectives of the OECS are 
WR³SURPRWHFR-operation among its Members and defend their sovereignty, 
territorial integrity; promote economic integration; assist them in meeting their 
international obligations and responsibilities; and establish wherever possible, 
arrangements for joint overseas representation and common servicHV´460 
The OECS reflects the regional cooperation among the smallest of Caribbean 
small island states and includes the following members.461 
State     Year  
Antigua and Barbuda  18 June 1981 
Dominica     18 June 1981 
Grenada    18 June 1981 
Montserrat    18 June 1981 (Overseas dependency of UK) 
St. Lucia    18 June 1981 
St. Kitts and Nevis   18 June 1981 
                                                          
459
 "Origin & Evolution of the OECS," http://www.oecs.org/about-the-oecs (accessed March 3, 
2010).  
460
 "OECS", supra note 57. 
461
 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, "Member States," http://www.oecs.org/about-the-
oecs/member-states (accessed January 21, 2011). 
"The OECS - 25 Yrs of ,QWHJUDWLRQ´ 
http://www.foreign.gov.vc/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32&Itemid=8 
(accessed 4/12/2011, 2011). 
Also, detailed information regarding the associate membership of Anguilla was obtained from the 
OECS High Commission Political and Consular Affairs Office in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. 
Barbara Wallace, (bwallace@oecs.org³$QJXLOOD´0DUFK3HUVRQDOHPDLO0DUFK
2011).   
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St. Vincent    18 June 1981 
Associate Members: 
Anguilla    25 May 1995 
British Virgin Islands  22 November 1984 
 The OECS focused mainly on economic and political support of member 
countries demonstrated by the creation of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 
(ECCB) in 1983, which replaced the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority. The 
ECCB sought to maintain stability of the East Caribbean Dollar and has been 
pegged to the US Dollar, which it has remained stable with for over 20 years. 
OECS initiatives eventually led to a more contentious agreement focused on 
security with the Regional Security System (RSS). 
Regional Security System  
The RSS was established by a Memorandum of Understanding in 1982 
and includes the following Eastern Caribbean States.462 
State     Year 
Antigua and Barbuda  1982 
Barbados    1982 
Dominica    1982 
Grenada    1985 
St. Kitts and Nevis   1983 
St. Lucia    1982 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1982 
                                                          
462
 "RSS - what we are," supra note 337. 
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The RSS was intended to provide a rapid response capability to 
traditional security concerns of the smaller Eastern Caribbean islands, against 
the backdrop of the 1979 Marxist coup in Grenada.463  The RSS is a paramilitary 
RUµK\EULG¶RUJDQL]DWLRQWKDWcomprises both military and police personnel who 
remain under the command of their respective forces.464  The RSS may be 
invoked if a member state deems its security to be threatened, in which case it 
has the right to request assistance from any or all of the member states.465 
Though the RSS was designed with traditional security concerns in mind, 
conventional security issues such as territorial and political threats were 
assigned less weight, as the Commonwealth Caribbean 1985 Colloquium only 
touched on recommendations typically in line with aspects of traditional security 
such as force levels and capabilities.  Instead, the colloquium focused on 
economic and institutional development, coordinating foreign policies, and the 
national, regional, and international mechanisms needed to give effect to non-
conventional security threats.466  This resulted in the adaption of the RSS to 
encompass those security needs that coincide with nontraditional security 
threats as illustrated in the RSS update of its MOU in 1992, and upgraded to 
WUHDW\VWDWXVLQ7KHWUHDW\¶VSXUSRVHDQGIXQFWLRQSURPRWHFRRSHUDWLRQ
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 Grenada Revolution and Invasion, supra note 200 at 97. 
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 "RSS - what we are," supra note 337. 
465
 ³5HJLRQDO6HFXULW\&RRSHUDWLRQ7UDGLWLRQDODQG1RQ-traditional Areas, Caribbean Security,´
supra note 337 at 469. 
466
 "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," supra note 263 at 15.  
Also, the recognition of non-security threats and creation of regional and international rules and 
institutions to respond to non-military threats corresponds with the post-realist view that 
traditional concepts of sovereignty cannot cope with the trans-border flows of drugs, money, 
weapons/arms and immigrants, and that these non-military developments pose genuine threats 
to security and cannot be addressed by one country alone.   
Theodore C. Sorensen, "America's First Post-Cold War President," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 4 (Fall 
1992): 29, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045307. 
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with member states in the prevention and interdiction of traffic in illegal drugs, in 
national emergencies, search and rescue, immigration control, fisheries 
protection, customs and excise control, maritime policing duties, natural and 
other disasters, pollution control, the prevention of smuggling, the protection of 
offshore installations and exclusive economic zones and combating threats to 
national security.467 
The RSS was deployed in Grenada for Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, 
and for seven other events up to 2003, including in Grenada post-Hurricane Ivan 
in 2004, and in Barbados in the aftermath of extensive prison riots in 2005.468  
The RSS is financed by contributions from its member states. The US, UK and 
Canada also provide technical assistance and funding for training courses, 
conferences and equipment for RSS personnel.469  The RSS relies heavily on 
US financing and has been subject to budget cuts.  RSS member states have 
had difficulty in assuming these additional costs.470 
 
 
                                                          
467
 ³5HJLRQDO6HFXULW\&RRSHUDWLRQ7UDGLWLRQDODQG1RQ-traditional Areas, Caribbean Security,´
supra note 337 at 469. 
468
 RSS Operations: 1989 Hurricane Hugo relief in St Kitts and Nevis and Montserrat; 
1990 aftermath of attempted coup in Trinidad and Tobago; 1994 St Kitts and Nevis prison 
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Georges relief in St Kitts and Nevis and Operation WEEDEATER (cannabis eradication) in St 
Vincent and the Grenadines; 2003 Operation BORDELAIS (prisoner transfer) in St Lucia.  
Cited in K. W. Henry, "Caribbean Security in 2005 Fact Or Fiction?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA495874&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed March 3, 2010). 
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Organization of American States 
The Organization of American States has the most extensive 
membership of South American hemisphere states, and its membership has 
been discussed in Chapter 2.  The encompassing nature and emergence of 
influential states such as Mexico and Brazil have increased the profile and 
importance of OAS initiatives.  The OAS has been a springboard for small island 
VWDWHFRQFHUQV)LUVW³WKHFRXQWULHVRI&HQWUDO$PHULFDLGHQtified with the 
concerns expressed by the small island states since Central America had similar 
RQHV´471 6HFRQGWKH2$6UHFRJQL]HGWKHµVSHFLDO¶QDWXUHRIVPDOOLVODQGVWDWH
concerns.472  
The OAS has been essential to the security of the region, in that it 
addresses security concerns over and above the specialized security interests of 
organizations such as the RSS.  The OAS security arrangement is solidified 
through the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the 
Rio Treaty.473  The Rio 7UHDW\UHFRJQL]HV³WKDWan armed attack by any State 
against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the 
American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties 
undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of 
                                                          
471
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individual or collective self-GHIHQVH«´474  The Rio Treaty consists of the 
following signatories in Table 13:475  
Table 13: OAS Countries and Year of Signature/Entry to the Rio Treaty 
Commonwealth Caribbean Year Latin America Year 
Barbados 1967 Argentina 1947 
Trinidad and Tobago 1967 Brazil 1947 
Jamaica  1969 Bolivia 1947 
Grenada 1975 Chile 1947 
Dominica 1979 Columbia 1947 
St Lucia 1979 Costa Rica 1947 
Antigua and Barbuda 1981 Cuba 1947 
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
1981 Dominican 
Republic         
1947 
Bahamas 1982 El Salvador 1947 
                                                          
474
 Ibid. 
475
 The following non Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin American states are also members of 
the OAS: Canada 1990, Suriname 1977, and the US 1947. 
The Rio Treaty was signed in 1947 and came into force in 1948. 
Note - On June 3, 2009, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas adopted resolution 
AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), that resolves that the 1962 resolution, which excluded the 
Government of Cuba from its participation in the inter-American system, ceases to have effect in 
the Organization of American States (OAS). The 2009 resolution states that the participation of 
the Republic of Cuba in the OAS will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the 
request of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and 
principles of the OAS. 
On July 5, 2009, the Organization of American States (OAS) invoked Article 21 of the Inter-
American Democratic Charter, suspending Honduras from active participation in the hemispheric 
body7KHXQDQLPRXVGHFLVLRQZDVDGRSWHGDVDUHVXOWRIWKH-XQHFRXSG¶pWDWWKDWH[SHOOHG
President José Manuel Zelaya from office. Diplomatic initiatives are ongoing to foster the 
restoration of democracy to Honduras. 
"Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)." 
Organization of American States, "OAS: Member States " 
http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp (accessed January 21, 2011). 
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St Kitts and Nevis 1984 Guatemala 1947 
Belize  1991 Haiti 1947 
Guyana 1991 Honduras 1947 
  Mexico 1947 
  Panama 1947 
  Paraguay 1947 
  Peru 1947 
  Uruguay 1947 
  Venezuela 1947 
  Nicaragua 1948 
  Ecuador 1949 
 
OAS membership serves to demonstrate not only the separation between 
the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America, but also the separation 
between the Commonwealth Caribbean and the US.  Though Commonwealth 
Caribbean states achieved independence much later than Latin American 
states, the Commonwealth Caribbean was slow to pursue OAS membership 
because they were not only suspicious of Latin America, but also the US.476 
                                                          
476
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supra note 320 at 256. 
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Nonetheless, the Commonwealth Caribbean had little choice but to create closer 
ties with the US as British presence in the region decreased.477   
Closer ties to the US also translated into closer ties with Latin America, 
as demonstrated with Trinidad and Tobago becoming the first Commonwealth 
Caribbean state and only the second English-speaking state in the OAS.  US 
influence in the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America served to 
integrate both regions into the OAS, which demonstrates that US superiority 
does not have to be dangerous.  Closer ties between the Commonwealth 
Caribbean and the US are evident in larger regional bodies such as the OAS, 
but are also demonstrated through an increased US presence and investment in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean region. 
US Cooperation and Role in Commonwealth Caribbean 
The overview of Caribbean regional bodies, in which small island states 
participate, illustrates the cooperation and integration of Caribbean states.  The 
inclusion of US participation, leadership and funding, particularly in the sphere of 
military training, equipment, capabilities and operations, shows US cooperation 
and integration with Commonwealth Caribbean states.  US presence in the 
region has taken precedence over that of the UK, with the CBI and participation 
in the RSS 1983 Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada.  US participation and 
leadership continued as seen in US contributions to combating the common 
security threat posed by the drug trade in the Caribbean region. 
                                                          
477
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US contributions towards combating the drug trade in the Caribbean 
illustrate US capabilities and leadership, which are imperative in alleviating drug-
related security concerns in the Caribbean.  The US has contributed extensive 
sea and air resources to patrol drug-shipping lanes in the Caribbean as part of 
their drug interdiction efforts. .478  In addition, the US has engaged in bilateral 
counterdrug agreements with Caribbean small island states, as illustrated in 
Table 14.  
Table 14: US Bilateral Counterdrug Agreements as of August 1997479 
Country Ship boarding Shiprider Pursuit Entry to 
Investigate 
Overflight Order to 
Land 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
X X X X X X 
Bahamas  X   X  
Barbados       
Belize X X X X   
                                                          
478
 US employs logistics, cruiser, destroyer, frigate, amphibious and coast guard  sea capabilities 
in addition to C130, C141, E2, E3, F15/F16, KC135, P3C, S3, SH2F, SH60B, C5, EC130, H46D, 
UH60, OV10, and U2 air capabilities as part of their Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) ± East 
is responsible for the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. 
 "Drug Control: 1997 Update on US Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific - 
Report to Congressional Requesters," supra note 398 at 18, 19. 
479
 Ship boarding: Standing authority for the US Coast Guard to stop, board, and search foreign 
vessels suspected of illicit traffic located seaward of the territorial sea of any nation. 
Shiprider: Standing authority to embark law enforcement official on vessel platforms of the 
parties. These officials may then authorize certain law enforcement actions. 
Pursuit: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to pursue fleeing vessels or aircraft 
suspected of illicit drug traffic into foreign waters or airspace. May also include authority to stop, 
board, and search pursued vessels. 
Entry to investigate: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to enter foreign waters or 
airspace to investigate vessels or aircraft located therein suspected of illicit drug traffic. May also 
include authority to stop, board, and search such vessels. 
Overflight: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to fly in foreign airspace when in 
support of counter drug operations. 
Order to land: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to order to land in the host 
nation aircraft suspected of illicit drug traffic. Source: US Coast Guard in United States General 
Accounting Office, ibid. at 15-16. 
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Dominica X X X X   
Grenada X X X X X X 
Jamaica       
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
X X X X X X 
St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
X X X X X X 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
X X X X X X 
 
The countries listed in Table 14, with the exception of Barbados and 
Jamaica, signed the August 1997 Shiprider Agreement in its original form, 
³JLYLQJWKH86EODQNHWDXWKRULW\LQGUXJHQIRUFHPHQWRSHUDWLRQVLn their 
MXULVGLFWLRQSOXVSRZHUVRILQWHUGLFWLRQ´480  Barbados and Jamaica did not sign 
the August 1997 Ship Rider Agreement: 
³«arguing that it did not give enough consideration or respect to their 
sovereignty.  Of particular concern, too, was the fear that the US would 
be able to exercise unconditional power within Jamaica's territorial 
waters, especially its Exclusive Economic =RQH´481   
Jamaica negotiated for three months to reach an agreement that 
respected LWV¶sovereignty and removed blanket immunity in respect of US 
personnel taking action against a suspected vessel.  The negotiated Shiprider 
                                                          
480
 Lloyd Williams, ³7he Shiprider Agreement: No Smooth Sailing,´-DPDLFD Gleaner, 8 February 
2004," http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040208/cleisure/cleisure2.html (accessed 
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agreements came under attack as CaULEEHDQFRXQWULHV¶YLHZHGWKHDJUHHPHQWDVDEUHDFKRI
their sovereignty by the United States. 
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agreement was signed by Jamaica on 6 May 1997.482  Barbados also engaged 
the US in lengthy negotiations and signed its own Shiprider Agreement on 25 
June 1997.483  
ThHVWDQFHRI-DPDLFDDQG%DUEDGRVUHFHLYHGUHDFWLRQIURP³KHJHPRQ
WDPHG´WRUHFRJQLWLRQRI86ZLOOLQJQHVVWRQHJRWLDWH484  This has resulted in 
GHEDWHRYHU86KHJHPRQ\ZKHUHWKH86LVYLHZHGDVEXOO\LQJ³ZHDNHU
countries of limited resources into treaties and concessions without providing 
DQ\WKLQJLQUHWXUQ´485  However, Anthony Maingot, in The United States and the 
Caribbean: Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty, concedes that Jamaica 
DQG%DUEDGRV³«DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKH86KDUGO\DFWHGDVDFRQYHQWLRQDO
hegemon´486  Moreover, the Ship Rider Agreement resulted in Jamaica 
receiving the support of US radar protection, sophisticated aircraft sorting 
techniques, and cellular intercept equipment, in addition to three 44-foot fast 
patrol boats, costing some US$500,000 apiece, that were presented to 
-DPDLFD¶V'HIHQVH)RUFH&RDVW*XDUG487  The Shiprider Agreement is useful in 
illustrating the US Caribbean relationship because it highlights the concerns and 
realities Commonwealth Caribbean states face in meeting their security needs, 
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and also the significant US contributions in the region, mainly in the form of 
intelligence and detection systems. 
US Intelligence and Detection Contributions to Caribbean Security 
 Though challenges in intelligence-sharing exist among agencies and 
countries, US intelligence-gathering has proven invaluable in detecting and 
monitoring suspected drug traffickers and making successful law enforcement 
interdictions.488  Challenges are also reflected in US radar surveillance, which 
experienced reductions from nine microwave radars and was eventually 
replaced with less accurate Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar (ROTHR) 
systems.489  This is illustrated in Table 15, depicting radar capability in 1994 
compared with that of Table 16 depicting radar capability in 1995.490  Despite the 
recognition that reduced radar resources limit capabilities, the larger challenge 
remains funding for operations and maintenance.491  
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Pacific - Report to Congressional Requesters," supra note 398 at 25. 
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 United States General Accounting Office, ibid. at 22. 
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Table 15: 
 
 
 
Table 16: 
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The scale of US investment into Caribbean security in the 1990s is 
illustrated in Table 17.492  The decrease of US funding raises questions of 
American willingness to assert hegemony in the region. This does not imply that 
the US has not and does not continue to play a central role in the Caribbean.  In 
fact, the US remains a large contributor to Caribbean small island state 
economies. 
Table 17: US Counternarcotics Funding in the Transit Zone, Fiscal Years 
1991-97 (Dollars in Millions) 
Agency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Est. 
DOD $407.1 $504.5 $426.0 $220.4 $214.7 $228.9 $304.6 
USCG 565.2 443.9 310.5 234.1 301.2 323.2 335.7 
USCS Not 
Available 
Not 
Available 
16.2 12.5 10.1 4.5 6.2 
DEA 26.2 28.8 29.1 28.7 29.6 34.0 31.7 
State 35.9 36.2 14.0 7.9 10.6 8.5 18.4 
Total $1,034.4 $1,013.4 $795.8 $503.6 $566.2 $599.1 $696.6 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
492
 Legend: USCG= US Coast Guard; USCS= US Customs Service. 
Note: 
1. US Coast Guard data for 1994 are different from the data presented in our April 1996 report 
because of updated information provided by the U.S Coast Guard. 
2. US Customs Service data do not include funding for Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. 
These areas are territories of the United States, and funding is not included as part of the transit 
zone. 
Source: Indicated federal agencies in United States General Accounting Office, ibid. at 17. 
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US Third Border Initiative  
7KH86³7KLUG%RUGHU,QLWLDWLYH´7%,ZDVDQQRXQFHGEy President Bush 
in $SULODVDQ³HIIRUWto deepen cooperation between the United States and 
the Caribbean nations, particularly on issues such as HIV/AIDS, disaster 
mitigation, and law enforcement´ 493  7KH7%,LVD³WDUJHWHGSDFNDJHRI
programs designed to enhance diplomatic, economic, health, education and law 
HQIRUFHPHQWFRRSHUDWLRQDQGFROODERUDWLRQ´ZLWK&DULEEHDQ&RXQWULHV494 
Though security was not the main theme of the TBI, the events of 9/11 resulted 
in a paradigm shift creating a focus on security and law enforcement such as 
improved customs and border practices, surveillance, expertise of security 
forces and international cooperation.495 However, the sentiment WKDW³WKH8QLWHG 
States has paid little policy attention to the Caribbean countries as an integral 
SDUWRILWVµSHULPHWHUGHIHQVH¶VWUXFWXUH´SUHYDLOV496 as Third Border initiatives 
KDYHEHHQFULWLTXHGDVXQDEOH³WRDFKLHYHFULWLFDOPDVVDQGGHYHORSWRWKHir 
IXOOHVWSRWHQWLDO´WKHUHIRUHPDLQWDLQLQJ³WKHVWDWXVTXR´497  Concerns of socio-
cultural differences between all the nations involved, language barriers, territorial 
disputes, perceived threats to national sovereignty, the strong influence of the 
powerful narcotics trafficking cartels and organized crime organizations in the 
                                                          
493
  "Fact Sheet: President's Speech at the Summit of the Americas - Quebec City, Canada " 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010423-1.html 
(accessed 4/19/2011, 2011). 
494
 "Fact Sheet: Caribbean Third Border Initiative - Quebec, Canada " http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010423-5.html (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011). 
495
 Dion E. Phillips, "Terrorism and Security in the Caribbean Before and After 9/11," 
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace, Economics and Development 7 (2008), 123, 130. 
496
 Anthony T Bryan and Stephen E. Flynn, "Free Trade, Smart Borders and Homeland Security: 
U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation in a New Era of Vulnerability," The Dante B. Fascell North-South 
Center Working Paper Series 8 (September 2002), 5. 
497
 "Caribbean Institution for Safety and Preparedness " http://www.cisp-
inc.org/challenge/scenario.htm (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011). 
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region that engage in weapons smuggling and the human trade, socialist and 
nationalist movements, and  terrorist activity have all been obstacle to US and 
Caribbean cooperation.498 Nevertheless, US and Caribbean governments 
³FRQWLQXHWRwork together to achieve shared goals´.499 
Contributions to the Political Economy of Caribbean Small Island States 
Different models to describe the economic structures of small island 
states, such as, MIRAB, SITEs, and PROFITs aid in the examination of the 
US/Caribbean relationship. 
MIRAB 
St. Kitts and the US Virgin Islands have been described as Caribbean 
Migration Aid and Bureaucracy (MIRAB) economies.500  Migration between the 
US and the Caribbean has resulted in a large Caribbean diaspora.  To give an 
idea of the scope of Caribbean migration to the US, a 2000 US census indicated 
that 10% out of a population of 291 million were born in the Caribbean.501  A 
benefit can be experienced by the sending community of a migrant through 
remittances, which in turn increases the income and therefore the quality of life 
within the community.502  Indeed, Bertram notes the significance of remittances 
in stating that³WUDQVQDWLRQDOQHWZRUNVRIXQUHTXLWHGWUDQVIHUVQRZGZDUIRIficial 
development aid and rank alongside private direct investment as a source of 
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 Ibid. 
499
 Adam J. Ereli, "Joint Statement on Third Border Initiative," 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/v.26-2/Ereli.pdf (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011). 
500
 "The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century," supra note 276 at 7. 
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JOREDOGHYHORSPHQWILQDQFH´503  In addition to economic benefits, migration also 
has a social and cultural impact, because an increase in the Caribbean 
population affects the sentiments behind US policies towards the region.  
PROFIT 
PROFIT is an acronym for: People considerations affecting citizenship, 
residence and employment rights (P); Resource management (R); Overseas 
engagement and ultra national recognition (O); Finance (F); and Transportation 
(T).504  PROFIT economies found in WKHIROORZLQJ61,-¶V: the Bahamas, Cayman 
Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda and Turks & Caicos, exemplify 
Caribbean economies which manifest PROFIT economic strategies.  PROFIT 
economies are successful in deploying their jurisdictional autonomy to advance 
their ambitions through interaction with their larger metropolitan partner.505  Such 
jurisdictional autonomy is exemplified through offshore banking facilities and tax 
havens in proximity to the US and its corporations.  Characteristics of MIRAB 
and PROFIT economies compared below illustrate the nuances between a 
MIRAB economy and a PROFIT economy.  The comparison of MIRAB and 
PROFIT economies highlights the ability of Caribbean small island states to use 
jurisdiction as a resource to adapt to the normative rules of the regional 
economy. 
 
 
                                                          
503
 "The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century," supra note 276 at 8. 
504
 "Managing the Hinterland Beyond," supra note 279 at 54. 
505
 "The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century," supra note 276 at 5. 
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Characteristics of MIRAB and PROFIT Economies:506 
MIRAB economies     PROFIT economies 
Migration (out)     Migration (in/out) 
Remittances (high)    Remittances (low/medium) 
Aid (high)      Aid (low/nil) 
Bureaucracy (high)     Bureaucracy (medium/high) 
Resource management (low/nil)  Resource management (medium/high) 
(Para-)Diplomacy (subsidy driven) (Para-) Diplomacy (procedure-driven) 
Finance management (low)   Finance management (medium/high) 
Transportation management (low) Transportation management 
(medium/high) 
Manufactures (low)     Manufactures (medium) 
 
In addition to the MIRAB and PROFIT economies mentioned, Jerome 
McElroy describes a prominent tourism sector or industry as an economic driver 
for Caribbean small island states. 
SITEs 
The Caribbean includes many Small Island Tourist Economies (SITEs).507 
SITEs benefit from the proximity and lucrative spinoffs from US tourists and 
include such islands as the British Virgin Islands, St. Maarten, Aruba, Cayman 
Islands, Turks & Caicos, Bermuda, the US Virgin Islands, Anguilla, Barbados, 
Bonaire, Antigua, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, Curacao, Martinique, Grenada, Montserrat, 
St. Vincent, Guadeloupe, and Dominica.508  As in MIRAB and PROFIT 
economies, SITEs also overlap. 
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 "Managing the Hinterland Beyond," supra note 279 at 54. 
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The models of MIRABs, PROFITs, and SITEs illustrate the 
interconnectedness of the US Caribbean economies through transfers of aid, 
remittances, tourist dollars, and tax havens.  Moreover, social 
interconnectedness is also present, due to the cultural exchange involved in 
migration of MIRAB and PROFIT economies. 
The Impact of US/Caribbean Cooperation 
Political, economic, social and military cooperation among the Caribbean 
small island states with the US through bilateral agreements and regional and 
international institutions has created more equal footing between small powers 
such as small island states and large powers such as the US.  The increase of 
equality among nations lends to the arguments on the full extent of US 
hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean in the late 20th century.509 
Moreover, the focus of US/Caribbean security on non-conventional threats 
highlights the prevalence of such threats compared with conventional security 
threats, and illustrates the true nature of security threats which Commonwealth 
Caribbean SIS face.
                                                          
509
 The examples of US and Commonwealth Caribbean cooperation serve to further Robert 
.HRKDQH¶VDUJXPHQWRIDJHQHUDOGHFOLQHRI86KHJHPRQ\DQGWKHULVHRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
institutions and the normative rules they set out. 
After Hegemony, supra note 215 at 244.  
Also, Hilbourne Watson suggests that the post-1945 era of US hegemony has come to an end, 
and that control of the world order has slipped beyond the capacity of any single state, or indeed 
any group of states. 
Hilbourne Watson, "Caribbean Integration under Global Neo-liberalism: Selected Issues in the 
West Indian Commission Report," 21st Century Policy Review, vol. 2, no. 1-2, (1994): 63.  
Discussed in  Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, "Repositioning the Caribbean within 
Globalisation : Centre for International Governance Innovation | Centre Pour l'Innovation Dans 
La Gouvernance Internationale," http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2007/6/repositioning-
caribbean-within-globalistion (accessed February 17, 2010), 2. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 6: 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   175 
 The US Invasion of Grenada in 1983 was significant for a number of 
reasons.  It illustrated the asymmetry of power between very small states and 
major powers because it was the first time a sovereign microstate found itself in 
open conflict with a major power.510  It signaled the US as the major player in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean and created the debate on US hegemony in the 
region. 511  Moreover, the US invasion of Grenada created international focus on 
small state conventional security, which in turn revealed the non-conventional 
nature of small island state security.  Furthermore, the recognition of SIS 
security concerns, conventional or non-conventional, fostered increased regional 
cooperation where the US has come to act as a mentor state.  Moreover, the 
&RPPRQZHDOWK&DULEEHDQ¶VLQFUHDVHGUHJLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURILOHKDV
proven to increase its influence on greater powers such as the US through 
regional organizations (for example, the OAS), and extends to bodies such as 
the G20. 
The literature review discusses the concerns of the asymmetry of power 
between great states and small states, which were borne into reality with the US 
invasion of Grenada.  However, control of Grenada by its people and 
government was restored via democratic elections.  In contrast, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1991 was the ultimate test of the integrity of international 
principles such as collective security and extantism.  Had it not been for the 
intervention of the international community, Kuwait would have lost its legal 
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 "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security," supra note 47 at 363.  
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international personality as a sovereign state and participant in the international 
community.   
Nonetheless, despite recognition in the decline of global US hegemony 
prior to the events in Grenada, US intervention was perceived as an act to 
reassert US hegemony in the region, as demonstrated in Grenada: Revolution 
and Invasion by Paul Sutton, Anthony Payne, and Tony Thorndike, where they 
highlighted the predominance of US hegemony in the Caribbean.512  However, 
the US role in the territorial disputes between Guyana and Venezuela, Belize 
and Guatemala and the British Falkland Islands and Argentina illustrate how the 
US has been caught between Latin American and Commonwealth Caribbean 
interests.  Acknowledging the separation of Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin 
America aids in delineating how US foreign policy differs between Latin America 
and the Commonwealth Caribbean and in concluding that the Commonwealth 
&DULEEHDQKDVQRWH[SHULHQFHGDVSHFWVRI86KHJHPRQ\IRXQGLQWKHµEDQDQD
UHSXEOLFV¶RI/DWLQ$PHULFD)XUWKHUPRUHWKHSUHPLVHRI86KHJHPRQ\LQWKH
region is also in question, considering that Britain had been the main player in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean and continues to hold influence with the US, 
GHPRQVWUDWHGE\%ULWDLQ¶VDELOLW\WRJDLQ86VXSSRUWLQWKH)DONODQGVWar.  
The US invasion of Grenada demonstrated the asymmetry of power 
between a small state and not only a major power, but a superpower, as well as 
the US ability to restore order to the SIS of Grenada.  The reassertion of US 
hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean over time has even been 
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 Grenada Revolution and Invasion, supra note 200.  
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reassessed by Anthony Payne, who acknowledges that WKHµ1HZ5LJKW¶ of the 
Reagan era was unable to restore US hegemony in the region.513  Moreover, 
with the passage of time, the initial reaction of the US invasion of Grenada was 
seen as an overreaction, given the return of constitutional government in 
Grenada and increased US cooperation with Commonwealth Caribbean SIS.514  
The role of the US in the Commonwealth Caribbean is also illustrated 
through the response of the international community.  Though the reaction of the 
international community to the US-led invasion was negative, when the 
international community was given an opportunity for reprisal toward the US, the 
OECS countries instead lent their support to the US.  Even though the validity of 
WKHUHTXHVWIURP*UHQDGD¶V+HDGRI6WDWH*RYHUQRU-General Paul Scoon, for 
assistance from the US and the OECS was questioned, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the OECS considered US hegemony secondary to the threat of 
leftist coups in the region.   
 Furthermore, concerns of US hegemony or encroachment of US 
interests on OECS member state sovereignty have proven to be secondary to 
the security threats posed by violent coups in the Commonwealth Caribbean as 
US intervention facilitated the return of a democratically elected government in 
Grenada.  US ability to restore order in Grenada demonstrates US respect for 
the sovereignty of Grenada and the integrity of the international system as US 
                                                          
513
 "Rethinking United States-Caribbean Relations,´ supra note 72. 
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actions have been more similar to that of a mentor state rather than a 
hegemonic power.515 
 Despite the return of democratic rule to Grenada, the ease with which 
the US invaGHG*UHQDGDEHFDPHDµZDWHUVKHG¶IRU6,6VHFXULW\DQGFDXVHG
great concern among the international community, leading eventually to 
initiatives in the Commonwealth Secretariat and the UN to explore means in 
which to bolster small state security.  Commonwealth and UN concerns focused 
on conventional security threats stemming from the demonstration of the 
asymmetry of power between the SIS of Grenada and the superpower of the US 
GXULQJWKHODWWHU¶VLQYDVLRQRI*UHQDGD 
 +RZHYHU86µVXSHUSRZHU¶VWDWXVVKRXOG not only be considered in 
relation to small states.  The disparity in the asymmetry of power between 
superpowers and major powers also needs to be contemplated.  Therefore, to 
claim that SISs are insecure or lack necessary security capabilities due to their 
inability to thwart an invasion by a superpower is unreasonable.  This is 
especially so if one considers that major powers are also vulnerable to the 
military supremacy of a superpower. 
Nonetheless, initial studies and organizations focused on conventional 
security threats towards small state security.  However, as pre-Grenada 
literature indicates, SIS concerns were more political, economic, and social in 
                                                          
515
 US actions can be interpreted as being in line with %DUWPDQQ¶VDVVHUWLRn WKDW³7KHIULHQGVKLS
of close mentor state, the support of regional bodies within their neighbourhoods, and the 
extantism of the international system itself continue to be the major pillars of small island 
security.   
"Island War and Security," supra note 198 at 307, 314, 321.  
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nature, and such concerns would prove to become the focus of the 1985 
Commonwealth Caribbean Colloquium as well as Commonwealth Secretariat 
and UN studies, where they would be described in terms of non-conventional 
security threats.  The recognition of non-conventional security threats and their 
debilitating impacts on SISs have proven to be more urgent, making any 
potential conventional security concern guised in terms of US hegemony in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean secondary to non-conventional security threats in the 
region.516  Moreover, the recognition of the predominance of non-conventional 
security threats in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the US has led to regional 
co-operation efforts, further illustrating the key political, economic and social 
aspects of regional security. 
 The proliferation of SIS in the international system has increased the 
importance of regional and international cooperation as a basis for small island 
states.  The shift from realist to neo-realist perceptions of security with the 
emergence of liberalization demonstrated through regional cooperation has 
resulted in the integration of US and Commonwealth Caribbean governments. 
This has created a more interactive atmosphere through common institutions 
and normative values, as noted by Keohane.  The atmosphere of regional and 
international cooperation has become more entrenched with the recognition that 
states share common security concerns emanating from non-state actors.  The 
security concerns posed by non-state actors have proven to be beyond the 
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 ³0DULWLPH&RXQWHUQDUFRWLFV$JUHHPHQWV7KHFRSRQWKH%HDW,´ supra note 394. 
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capability of any one state to address on its own and in turn dominate the 
Commonwealth Caribbean and US security agenda.    
 The increased diplomatic recognition of Commonwealth Caribbean states 
by the US has increased both Commonwealth Caribbean regional cooperation 
DQGWKHUHJLRQ¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURILOH7KRXJKWKH86UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKe 
Commonwealth Caribbean has been described as one of a non-conventional 
hegemon that produces an encroachment on Commonwealth Caribbean state 
sovereignty, the US/Commonwealth Caribbean diplomatic relations and 
cooperation actually have served to demonstrate the practice of Commonwealth 
Caribbean state sovereignty.  Additionally, US cooperation with the 
Commonwealth Caribbean has enhanced regional security through 
organizations such as OECS and OAS.  US technology such as radar and 
intelligence-gathering has been instrumental in counter-drug operations. 
The rise of new influential states and their participation in facing 
international challenges, as demonstrated by the G20, has shifted the dynamic 
of power in the international community.517  This change has coincided with the 
evolution of globalization, which has led to the US being unable to reconstitute 
³DQHZ%UHWWRQ:RRGV.´518  Also, Commonwealth Caribbean economies have 
demonstrated their ability to become more economically competitive through 
MIRAB,  PROFIT, and SITE economies, which has made them more 
economically competitive .  Though the US plays a major role in Commonwealth 
Caribbean economies, there is also a degree of Commonwealth Caribbean 
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influence on the US economy.  Such influence is exercised by their territorial 
jurisdiction and inclusion in the regional and international institutions in which 
they are equal members to address their concerns with the US.  
Moreover, the integration of Commonwealth Caribbean culture into the 
US society has occurred through migration.  This has resulted in the influence of 
US policy through Caribbean diaspora communities.  In addition, the sense of 
µLVODQGLGHQWLW\¶DFURVVWKH&RPPRQZHDOWK&DULEEHDQGLDVSRUDDQGWKHLQVXODULW\
of Commonwealth Caribbean SISs has proved effective against external 
LQIOXHQFHDVGHPRQVWUDWHGLQWKH&RPPRQZHDOWK&DULEEHDQ¶VDELOLW\WRDYRLG
British plans of a West Indies Federation. The Commonwealth Caribbean has 
proven to be just as successful in thwarting US influence, as the US has been 
unable to assert the necessary cultural power to embed a hegemonic 
relationship in the Commonwealth Caribbean.519  
Negative connotations of hegemony based on the US invasion of 
Grenada in 1983 have overshadowed the mentor role of the US in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.  Such interpretations fall short in considering US 
contributions to the increase of Commonwealth Caribbean SIS security and 
have also been counterproductive in recognizing the true nature of small island 
state security.  Though the US invasion increased the profile of small state 
security, the focus remained on state actors, rather than on non-state actors and 
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non-conventional security.  Continued cooperation and study, however, reveals 
that the true nature of SIS security is expressed in non-conventional terms and 
that those threats are the primary security threat to Commonwealth Caribbean 
security, not the US.   
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